Towards secure web browsing on mobile devices by Amrutkar, Chaitrali Vijay








of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy in
Computer Science
College of Computing
Georgia Institute of Technology
May 2014
Copyright c© 2014 by Chaitrali Vijay Amrutkar
TOWARDS SECURE WEB BROWSING ON
MOBILE DEVICES
Approved by:
Professor Patrick Traynor, Advisor
College of Computing
Georgia Institute of Technology
Professor Wenke Lee
College of Computing
Georgia Institute of Technology
Professor Mustaque Ahamad
College of Computing
Georgia Institute of Technology
Dr. Shobha Venkataraman
AT&T Labs – Research
Professor Nick Feamster
College of Computing
Georgia Institute of Technology
Date Approved: December 3rd, 2013
To my parents,
Ujwala and Vijay Amritkar,
for giving their children wings to fly
iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The PhD journey is long, strenuous and presents several hurdles along the way. For
a bird to safely reach her destination, her flying skills need to be honed. Maintaining
the right balance, avoiding obstacles and changing direction when necessary is crucial.
I have been fortunate to have a mentor who opened and closed many doors for me
at the right time and guided me through the difficult PhD process. I thank my
advisor, Prof. Patrick Traynor for having faith in me and giving me the freedom to
explore new territories. Prof. Mustaque Ahamad was the first to hire me at Georgia
Tech as a graduate research assistant during my masters’ days. For his guidance
and continuing support through my PhD process, I thank him. More thanks to my
committee members for their valuable feedback and insights: Prof. Wenke Lee for
encouraging me to strive for the best, Dr. Shobha Venkataraman for her guidance
during and after my summer internship at AT&T labs, and Prof. Nick Feamster for
his constructive advice. Special thanks to my collaborators outside Georgia Tech,
Prof. Paul van Oorschot and Kapil Singh whose guidance helped improve my work.
A flight is more fun if taken with others who want to reach similar heights as one’s
own. I had a great team in the CISEC lab with fellow students Italo, Saurabh, Young,
Hank, David, Brad and Chaz. I will always remember the birthdays celebrated in the
lab and hope the celebrations continue. I thank everyone for making the lab a fun
place to work. I grew personally and professionally around everyone. Musheer, San-
tosh, Long, Brendan, Vijay, Bharat, and Terry made my days at GTISC memorable.
I thank you all. I also thank Alfreda and Mary Claire for being kind, and taking care
of my caffeine needs and travel reimbursements. Finally, thanks to Adam Allred for
his energetic help in increasing CISEC’s productivity.
iv
Surrounding oneself with friends and laughter is crucial in a PhD. I made some very
close friends at Georgia Tech who became my family away from home. My roommate
Anushree is one of my closest friends today and has stood by me no matter what
the situation. I thank her for all the dance lessons, south Indian food and shopping
sprees. Joon, Srikanth, Sam, Samantha, Arpit; thank you all for the cookouts, movies
and restaurant binges. More thanks to Denise, Catherine and Samantha for being
great colleagues in organizing women@cc events. Rohit and Mihir for the fun times
during masters, Tushar and Hrushikesh for the road trips, Shauvik for the technical
talks, Gauri for making sure I eat, and John and Bertrand for the gala time at AT&T
and sharing the PhD experience since. Finally, Amruta, Sharvari and Prachi, for
being there for me for almost two deacades. I hope our childhood bonds never break.
Lastly and most importantly, the bird needed the confidence that she could fly
and that she had the freedom to travel to the place of her choice. My family has been
the most important support system through the PhD process. My parents’ love and
inspiration have been crucial during the lows as well as the highs. They have always
encouraged us children to think on our own, make our own decisions and then take
responsibility for the same, while ensuring us that they will catch us when we fall.
Going forward, I wish to be as hardworking as my dad and be able to garner the
same respect and faith from my colleagues as he garners from his. His astonishing
range of knowledge has always awed us around him. With my dad’s busy schedule,
mom held the fort at home. She juggled a hundred things at once, from looking after
finances to us kids. In many difficult situations, her positivity has kept us all going
forward. She is a strong lady and that inspires me. My brother Chaitanya is carrying
the family tradition forward in the field of medicine. His discipline, clarity in thought,
knowledge and the ability to remain calm under pressure has helped me many times
through my PhD. Thank you for frequently visiting me in the USA and bringing a
piece of home closer. Finally, my fiancè Pushkar has been a pillar of strength through
v
my PhD. His calm and humble nature, and the ability to inspire others with his own
successes have had a positive impact on me. Discussing life, work and everything
under the sun with him is exhilarating. I know that we have many many happy years
ahead of us. I consider myself fortunate to be surrounded by a loving family and
dedicate this thesis to them. My success is also theirs.
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiv
SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xviii
I INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Thesis Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Dissertation Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
II RELATED WORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1 Web Browser Policies and Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1.1 Access Control Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1.2 Attacks and Defenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1.3 Browser Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1.4 Browser Kernels and Operating Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Browser Security Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.1 Ineffective Security Indicators on Desktop Browsers . . . . . 12
2.2.2 Improved Security Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3 Malicious Webpages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3.1 DNS-based Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3.2 Content-based and In-depth Inspection Techniques . . . . . . 16
2.4 The Mobile Web . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.4.1 Native Application Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.4.2 Mobile Web Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
vii
III MEASURING SYSTEMICWEAKNESSES INMOBILE BROWSER
SECURITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.2 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.2.1 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.2.2 Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.3 User Event Routing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.3.1 Experimental Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.3.2 Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.3.3 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.4 Boundary Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.4.1 Experimental Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.4.2 Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.4.3 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.5 Top Level Frame Navigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.5.1 Attack and Experimental Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.5.2 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.6 Discussion and Potential Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.8 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
IV AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF SSL INDICATORS IN MO-
BILE BROWSERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.2 Background on the W3C Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.2.1 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.2.2 W3C Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.3 Empirical Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.3.1 Identity Signal: Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.3.2 Certificates: Required Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
viii
4.3.3 TLS Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.3.4 Robustness: Visibility of Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.3.5 Error Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.4 User Deception and Potential Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.4.1 Deception Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.4.2 Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.5 Additional results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.5.1 The Good . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.5.2 The Bad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.5.3 The Silent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.6 Discussion and Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.6.1 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.6.2 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
V KAYO: DETECTINGMOBILEMALICIOUSWEBPAGES IN REAL-
TIME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.2 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.3 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5.3.1 kAYO Feature Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
5.3.2 Data Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.4 Implementation and Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.4.1 Model Selection and Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.4.2 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.5 Browser Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.6.1 Investigating False Positives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.6.2 Cross-channel threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.6.3 Limitations and Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
ix
VI FUTURE WORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
6.1 Advancing Dialogue on Mobile Browser Security . . . . . . . . . . . 119
6.2 Tools for Malicious Mobile Webpage Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
6.3 Hybrid Mobile Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
6.4 Unified Permission Systems for Mobile Web Apps . . . . . . . . . . 121
6.4.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
6.4.2 Proposed Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
6.4.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
VII CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
x
LIST OF TABLES
1 Details of the browsers used for experimental evaluation. We also eval-
uated Opera Mini 5.5.1, Android 2.2.1 and Android 2.3.3 on Nexus
One and Android 4.0.1 on Galaxy Nexus. We observed the same vul-
nerabilities in both the old and new versions of Opera Mini and An-
droid browsers (except Android 4.0.1). (*: The version numbers of
these browsers were not apparent. We have used the default browsers
shipped with the referenced version of the OS.) . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2 Market Share of Popular Mobile Browsers as of April 2012 [14]. We
cover approximately 90% of the mobile browsers in the market for our
evaluation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3 Summary of observed display-related vulnerabilities in candidate browsers
and respective attacks possible (A Xdepicts that attack is possible).
1) Equivalent vulnerabilities exist in mobile and tablet browsers with
different rendering engines. 2) Mobile, tablet and desktop browsers
from the same vendor do not necessarily implement the same code to
handle display elements in different settings. 3) Desktop browsers are
more compliant with security policies for display. . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4 Gazelle’s (the ideal column) policies for a landlord to access a cross-
origin tenant’s position, dimensions, pixels and URL location. R: Read
access. W: Write access. R*: Android mobile, Android tablet on
Xoom, Nokia Mini-Map and Opera Mini browsers allow a landlord to
read user interaction with its cross-origin tenant. This vulnerability
breaches the access control policy for the tenant’s ‘pixels’ allowing the
landlord to launch the user interaction interception attack. . . . . . . 44
5 Gazelle’s (the ideal column) policies for a tenant of a cross-origin land-
lord to access its own position and dimensions on the landlord’s page,
its URL location and its pixel content. R: Read access. W: Write
access. RW*: Android mobile, iPhone and iPad2 Safari, Opera Mini
and Opera Mobile allow a cross-origin tenant to write self dimensions
and are thus susceptible to the phishing and password stealing attacks.
IE Mobile does not allow a tenant to read self dimensions. This may
allow a malicious landlord to shrink the tenant’s dimensions to ‘zero’
without any notice to the tenant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
6 Details of the browsers used for experimental evaluation. (*: The
version numbers of these browsers were not apparent. We have used
the default browsers shipped with the referenced version of the OS.) . 57
xi
7 Results of experiments on candidate mobile browsers to test compliance
with the first two W3C guidelines given in Section 4.2.2. Each guideline
column consists of sub-columns stating the experiments performed on
the browsers. An × implies that the browser does not comply with the
respective W3C guideline. A · implies that the browser complies with
the respective W3C guideline. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
8 Results of experiments on traditional web browsers to test compliance
with the same guidelines as given in Table 7, with × and · symbols also
implying the same. Note that all the desktop browsers are compliant. 59
9 Results of experiments on candidate mobile browsers to test compliance
with the W3C guidelines 3a and 3b given in Section 4.2.2. The symbol
notation is as defined in Table 7. ‘s’: Implies that the https URL
prefix is present on the ‘s’econdary interface. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
10 Results of experiments on traditional web browsers to test compliance
with the same guidelines as Table 9. The symbol notation is as defined
in Table 7. ‘p’: Implies that the https URL prefix is present on the
‘p’rimary interface. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
11 Results of experiments on candidate mobile browsers to test compliance
with the W3C guidelines 3c and 4 given in Section 4.2.2. The symbol
notation is as defined in Table 7. ‘s’: Implies that the https URL
prefix is present on the ‘s’econdary interface. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
12 Results of experiments on traditional web browsers to test compliance
with the same guidelines as Table 9. The symbol notation is as defined
in Table 7. ‘p’: Implies that the https URL prefix is present on the
‘p’rimary interface. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
13 Results of experiments on traditional web browsers to test compliance
with the W3C guidelines 5a, 5b and 5c given in Section 4.2.2. The
symbol notation is as defined in Table 7. NA: Implies that the con-
cerned experiment is not applicable to that browser, the reasoning can
be found in the text. (*: Our view is that a browser should dis-
play a warning message for a webpage holding mixed content, to avoid
misleading users trained to interpret SSL indicators to mean that the
(entire) webpage is secured.) ×∗: Implies that the browser fails to
warn a user according to our view. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
14 Results of experiments on traditional web browsers to test compliance
with the same guidelines as Table 11. The symbol notation is as defined
in Table 7 and Table 11. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
15 Summary of potential attacks on candidate mobile browsers. A ×
implies that the attack is possible. A · implies that the corresponding
attack is not possible on the browser. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
xii
16 Results of the support for SSLv2, the null cipher, DES-CBC-SHA
(weak cipher) and whether browsers differentiate between EV-SSL and
SSL certified webpages. The symbol notation is as defined in Table 7. 80
17 The 44 features of kAYO from four categories. According to our knowl-
edge, the category of mobile specific features is studied for the first
time in this work. The significance of these features is described in
Section 5.4.2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
18 Indicators of mobile specific webpages extracted by manual analysis of
the top-level mobile and desktop webpages of the 1,000 most popular
websites on Alexa. We identified one top-level domain (TLD), nine
subdomains and seven URL path prefixes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
19 Comparison of kAYO with Cantina, a technique using static webpage
features to detect phishing webpages in real-time. kAYO’s evaluation
set size is over two orders of magnitude larger than that of Cantina.
Moreover, kAYO’s feature extraction process is two orders of mag-
nitude faster than Cantina. Cantina’s functionality is dependent on
external tools unlike kAYO and Cantina works well only on webpages
written in the English language. kAYO does not have these drawbacks. 105
20 Comparison of kAYO with five existing static analysis techniques that
detect malicious desktop webpages. kAYO provides the lowest false
positive rate on an evaluation set twice as large as the one used by
other techniques. kAYO also considers mobile web threats, whereas,
the other techniques are focused on detecting desktop web threats. . 106
21 Comparison of kAYO with five existing static analysis techniques that
detect malicious desktop webpages. kAYO’s feature extraction process
is 10 times faster than the fastest existing technique [188] and classifi-
cation time is 100 times faster than the fastest existing technique [153].
kAYO is the only technique that considers mobile specific features of
webpages. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
xiii
LIST OF FIGURES
1 Left image: Fake image advertisement of sales in San Francisco on the
www.landlordattacker.com website; Right image: The mesothe-
lioma ad from Google AdSense placed directly below the enticing fake
sales ad image by malicious landlord. A user clicking on the mesothe-
lioma ads [1] earns the landlord attacker more money. The landlord
places the honest mesothelioma ads from AdSense in an iframe and
overlays it with the more enticing images of sales in San Francisco to
increase the rate of clicks. When a user clicks on the fake sale ad in
San Francisco, the mesothelioma ad is clicked benefiting the landlord
attacker. The Opera Mini (pictured), Android mobile, Android tablet
on Xoom and Nokia Mini-Map browsers are vulnerable to the click
fraud attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2 Login CSRF attack on Yahoo’s sign in page. Left image: Image over-
lapping the www.yahoo.com iframe on www.landlordattacker.com.
The text areas for entering ‘solution’ of the CAPTCHAs are placed
exactly over the email and password fields on yahoo.com. The verify
button is placed exactly above the ‘sign in’ button of yahoo.com. The
two CAPTCHAs are the real email and password of the attacker’s Ya-
hoo account.; Right image: Login page of www.yahoo.com included
in an iframe on www.landlordattacker.com, placed below the image.
The Android mobile (pictured), Android tablet on Xoom, Opera Mini
and Nokia Mini-Map browsers are vulnerable to this attack. . . . . . 31
3 Left image: Layout of the malicious and honest widgets on the mashup
webpage. ‘ATTACKER’ is a malicious widget and Amazon and YouTube
are honest widgets; Right image: The browser allows a cross-origin
tenant to write its own dimensions. The malicious widget expands its
own dimensions and masquerades as the honest Amazon and YouTube
widgets on the browser. It pushes the honest widgets south and launches
a phishing attack on the user. This attack works in the iPhone Safari
(pictured), Android mobile, iPad2 Safari, Opera Mini and Opera Mo-
bile browsers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
xiv
4 Left image: www.aol.com webpage containing a cross-origin malicious
advertisement. The browser displays only the ‘title’ of the page and
does not display the address bar.; Right image: Due to the top-level
frame navigation policy, the malicious ad can redirect the top-level
window to www.attacker.com, which looks exactly the same as AOL’s
website, thereby launching a phishing attack. The user cannot de-
tect the attack since the address bar containing the URL of the top
window is not included in the mobile browser’s view due to space con-
straint. The Nokia Mini-Map and Blackberry Mango browsers are the
most susceptible to this attack. However, all other mobile and tablet
browsers (except Chrome Beta and iPad2 Safari) are also susceptible
to this attack due to address bar not being persistently available while
browsing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5 Identity information displayed by Firefox Mobile. . . . . . . . . . . . 60
6 Blackberry Mango browser rendering a mixed content webpage. Note
that the webpage contains a Google map obtained over an http connec-
tion. Although the webpage holds mixed content, the browser displays
the padlock icon as well as the https URL prefix indicators. This be-
havior fails to meet with guideline 3a. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
7 Security indicators on the primary interface (address bar) of all the
mobile and tablet browsers. Every browser has three screenshots of the
address bar: from top to bottom, the websites are Google over an http
connection, Gmail over a secure connection with an SSL certificate and
Bank of America over a secure connection with an EV-SSL certificate. 64
8 The address bar of the Android browser when a webpage over SSL
is loaded. The browser places the favicon adjacent to the lock icon,
thereby violating the W3C guideline 3b described in Section 4.2.2. The
star icon to the right of the address bar is to bookmark the webpage. 65
9 Danger message on iPhone Safari when a website presenting a self-
signed certificate is accessed. This message interrupts the user and also
inhibits the user from proceeding without interacting with the danger
message first. Note that the website’s URL has been anonymized for
submission. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
10 Normalized density curves of static features when measured on mobile
and desktop webpages. There is substantial difference between the
distributions of the number of (a) iframes, (b) Javascript and (c) redi-
rections when measured on mobile and desktop versions of the same
websites, whereas, the distribution of the number of (d) IP addresses
is similar. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
11 Number of mobile specific websites found in every 10,000 websites in
the top 1,000,000 URLs on Alexa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
xv
12 The final ROC curve for kAYO’s logistic regression model with regu-
larization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
13 Ex1: Results of a model trained on desktop webpages using desktop
features studied in earlier techniques and then tested on mobile web-
pages. Ex2: Results of a model trained on mobile webpages by adding
mobile specific features to the feature set and tested on mobile web-
pages. Ex1 shows that a model trained on desktop pages using static
features from earlier desktop-specific techniques, when applied to mo-
bile webpages performs poorly. However, when a model is trained with
the same static features and additional mobile specific features exclu-
sively on a mobile datatset, the results of testing on a mobile dataset
improve significantly as seen in Ex2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
14 The Pearson Coefficient Correlation (PCC) of each of the features ex-
tracted in kAYO with the label (malicious/benign), found using our
evaluation dataset. Each point corresponds to the correlation of a fea-
ture with the label. In total there are 44 points corresponding to the
44 features of kAYO, including the newly identified features and the
ones adopted from existing techniques. The Y value of each point de-
picts the predictive power of the corresponding feature i.e. PCC. The
greater the absolute value of the PCC of a feature, the better predic-
tive power of the feature. Note that all the PCC values are non-zero
implying that every feature in kAYO’s feature set is significant and
impacts the result of classification. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
15 Architecture of the mobile browser extension based on kAYO. User
enters the URL he wants to visit in the extension toolbar and receives a
response in real-time from our backend server about the maliciousness
of the URL. If the URL is benign according to kAYO, the page of
interest is rendered in the browser. Otherwise, the user is shown a
warning message to not visit the URL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
16 (a): Chrome desktop browser informing the user of a potentially ma-
licious webpage. The webpage is a known mobile phishing webpage.
(b): The same webpage when rendered on the Chrome mobile browser,
whose users are the real targets, does not provide any warning. (c):
kAYO extension running on the Firefox mobile browser detects the
webpage as malicious and warns the user. (d): Screenshot of com-
mand line processing at the extension server. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
xvi
17 User interface for permission management of mobile web apps. Left:
When a user clicks on the lock icon, the browser shows this interface
to interact with permissions and certificates. Right: The browser pro-
vides an interface to view the status of the permissions requested by
www.foo.com (domain in the address bar). The user has not stored
hardware controls permissions, whereas he has stored the location,
cookies and Internet access permissions. The cookie and Internet per-
missions are normal permissions granted without user consent. The
location and hardware control permissions require explicit user con-
sent. The user can easily revoke a permission by unchecking the box
next to it. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
xvii
SUMMARY
The Web is increasingly being accessed by portable, multi-touch wireless devices.
Despite the popularity of platform-specific (native) mobile apps, a recent study of
smartphone usage shows that more people (81%) browse the Web than use native
apps (68%) on their phone [79]. Moreover, many popular native apps such as BBC
depend on browser-like components (e.g., Webview) for their functionality [48]. The
popularity and prevalence of web browsers on modern mobile phones warrants charac-
terizing existing and emerging threats to mobile web browsing, and building solutions
for the same. Although a range of studies have focused on the security of native apps
on mobile devices, efforts in characterizing the security of web transactions originating
at mobile browsers are limited.
This dissertation presents three main contributions: First, we show that porting
browsers to mobile platforms leads to new vulnerabilities previously not observed in
desktop browsers. The solutions to these vulnerabilities require careful balancing be-
tween usability and security and might not always be equivalent to those in desktop
browsers. Second, we empirically demonstrate that the combination of reduced screen
space and an independent selection of security indicators not only make it difficult
for experts to determine the security standing of mobile browsers, but actually make
mobile browsing more dangerous for average users as they provide a false sense of
security. Finally, we experimentally demonstrate the need for mobile specific tech-
niques to detect malicious webpages. We then design and implement kAYO, the first




Internet connected mobile devices are going to outnumber humans in the year 2013 [88,
152]. Moreover, global mobile data traffic is expected to increase 13-fold between 2012
and 2017 [49]. Both platform-specific applications (“native apps”) and browser-based
applications (“web apps”) enable mobile device users to perform security sensitive
operations such as online purchases, bank transactions and accessing social networks.
The distinction between native apps and web apps on mobile devices is increasingly
being blurred. Many popular native apps, such as BBC, depend on browser-like com-
ponents (e.g., Webview) for their functionality [48]. Moreover, as HTML5 becomes
universally deployed and mobile web apps directly take advantage of device features
such as the camera, microphone and geolocation, the difference between native and
web apps will vanish almost entirely. A recent study of smartphone usage [79] shows
that more people (81%) browse the Web than use native apps (68%) on their phone.
Over 85% of handsets shipped globally in 2011 included some form of browser and it
is expected that over 2.1 billion mobile devices will have a web browser component
by 2016 [33]. This trend and the increasing use of web browsers on modern mobile
phones warrant characterizing existing and emerging threats to mobile web browsing,
and building solutions for the same. Although a range of studies have focused on the
security of native apps on mobile devices, efforts in characterizing the security of web
transactions originating at mobile browsers are limited.
Mobile web browsers have long underperformed their desktop counterparts. Whether
by implementing limited alternative standards such as WAP [200] or incomplete ver-
sions of HTML, the first mobile browsers provided a meager set of capabilities and
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attracted only a small number of early adopters. However, recent improvements in
processing power and bandwidth have spurred significant changes in the ways users
experience the mobile web. Modern mobile browsers provide rich functionality equiv-
alent to their desktop counterparts using web technologies such as HTML, JavaScript,
and CSS. Furthermore, browsers on mobile platforms now build on the same or sim-
ilarly capable rendering engines used by many desktop browsers [40, 42]. Other fea-
tures of mobile browsers include support for cryptographic tools including SSL/TLS
and the corresponding user interfaces to convey SSL/TLS security implemented by
websites to the end user. All these features have allowed mobile users to become
increasingly reliant upon browsers to enable sensitive personal, social and financial
exchanges.
Despite the apparent similitude between functionality offered by desktop and mo-
bile browsers, the browsing experience on mobile devices is considerably different.
This difference can be largely attributed to the dramatic reduction of screen size
and the ability of invoking mobile specific functionality (e.g., SMS) through the web
browser. These differences impact the design of web browsers and webpages built
specifically for mobile devices, which in turn might lead to a number of security con-
sequences. First, due to the limitations in the screen real estate, existing desktop
browser software was not directly ported to mobile devices. Accordingly, while many
mobile browsers bear the name of related desktop applications, their internal compo-
nents might differ. The impact of these changes on security has not previously been
evaluated. Second, in spite of the availability of SSL/TLS, mobile users are regularly
becoming the target of malicious behavior. A 2011 report indicates that mobile users
are three times more likely to access phishing websites than desktop users [80]. Secu-
rity indicators (i.e., certificate information, lock icons, cipher selection, etc.) in web
browsers offer one of the few defenses against such attacks. A user can view different
security indicators and related certificate information presented by the browser to
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offer signals or clues about the credibility of a website. Although mobile and tablet
browsers appear to support similar security indicators when compared to desktop
browsers, the reasons behind the increasing number of attacks on mobile browsers
are not immediately clear. Finally, reduced screen size and availability of rich func-
tionality also impacts the structure of webpages built specifically for mobile platforms.
The content, functionality and layout of webpages have regularly been used to per-
form static analysis to determine maliciousness in the desktop space [84, 147, 176].
Features such as the frequency of iframes and the number of redirections have previ-
ously served as strong indicators of malicious intent. Due to the significant changes
made to accommodate mobile devices, such assertions may no longer be true. For
example, whereas such behavior would be flagged as suspicious in the desktop setting,
many popular benign mobile webpages require multiple redirections before users gain
access to content. Previous techniques also fail to consider mobile specific webpage
elements such as calls to mobile APIs. For instance, links that spawn the phone’s
dialer (and the reputation of the number itself) can provide strong evidence of the
intent of the page. New tools are therefore necessary to identify malicious pages in
the mobile web.
To begin the effort of making mobile browsing secure, it is essential to understand
the state-of-the-art of security in mobile browsers, and analyze the similarities be-
tween desktop and mobile browsers. This analysis can assist browser vendors with
decisions of reusing security features from the desktop environment into the mobile
environment to avoid duplication of effort. Browser vendors can also evade repeating
already solved errors in desktop browsers in the corresponding mobile versions. Sec-
ond, it is vital to understand the similarities and differences across the diverse browser
software on popular mobile platforms. This evaluation can provide insight into the
security impact of similar vulnerabilities in web browsers built by different vendors.
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Furthermore, identifying similarities between different browsers can also facilitate for-
mulating mobile specific standards for prevalent security problems. Third, studying
the structural differences in mobile and desktop webpages will help build robust tools
that consider the impact of changes in mobile webpages on security. Finally, stronger
permission systems are necessary to manage the dynamic nature of mobile web apps
and multiple access requests to sensitive information and hardware.
1.1 Thesis Statement
The goal of this thesis is to investigate the factors affecting security of the mobile
web to improve the design and implementation of mechanisms for securing mobile
web browsing. We argue that mobile web is different from the desktop web and thus
demands independent evaluation and new techniques to protect sensitive information.
Based on our evaluation of popular mobile browsers and mobile specific webpages,
we propose the following thesis statement.
Mobile browsers, webpages and user interfaces significantly differ from those in
the desktop environment thereby profoundly impacting security. Making the impact of
limited display and mobile specific functionality integral to the design of web security
solutions for mobile platforms identifies and addresses new threats.
1.2 Contributions
This dissertation makes the following contributions:
Perform the first comprehensive and systematic evaluation and comparison of se-
curity of desktop and mobile browsers: Modern mobile browsers now build on the
same or similarly capable rendering engines used by many desktop browsers and also
enable SSL/TLS transactions. We analyze SSL/TLS security indicators and display
security on ten mobile (Android Mobile, Blackberry (Mango), Blackberry (Webkit),
Chrome Beta, Firefox Mobile, Internet Explorer (IE) Mobile, Nokia Browser, Opera
Mini, Opera Mobile and iPhone Safari) and three tablet (Android on Motorola Xoom,
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Android on Samsung Galaxy and iPad2 Safari) browsers. We then compare the se-
curity standing of these mobile browsers with five most popular desktop (Chrome,
Firefox, Internet Explorer, Opera and Safari) browsers. Our analysis covers over
90% of the mobile browser market and over 95% of the desktop browser market by
download.
Identify new display security vulnerabilities in modern mobile browsers and imple-
ment real world attacks: We identify previously unknown erroneous display security
policies in user event routing and boundary control, and implement multiple attacks
that demonstrate their seriousness. Even though many mobile browsers rely on the
same rendering engines as their desktop counterparts, our experiments demonstrate
that mobile browsers are vulnerable to attacks not previously seen in the desktop
space. Additionally, we exploit the conflict between usability and security in the mo-
bile environment with limited screen estate to show that adopting some policies from
desktop browsers exposes mobile browsers to new phishing attacks.
Demonstrate that the incomplete and inconsistent nature of SSL/TLS indicators
in mobile browsers preclude experts from determining the security of web transactions:
We experimentally illustrate that all popular mobile and tablet browsers fail to meet,
in numerous instances, the recommendations in the W3C guidelines for user interface
of security information, whereas in comparison desktop browsers largely follow the
guidelines. We outline attacks on mobile browsers, such as phishing and undetectable
man-in-the-middle, enabled by failure to properly follow these guidelines. Further-
more, we highlight missing security indicators, e.g., extended validation (EV) SSL
indicators.
Design and implement the first mobile-specific static tool to detect malicious web-
pages in real-time: We demonstrate that mobile specific webpages differ significantly
from their desktop counterparts in content, layout and functionality. We design and
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implement kAYO, a fast and reliable mechanism that distinguishes between mali-
cious and benign mobile webpages. kAYO makes this determination based on static
features of a webpage ranging from the number of iframes to the presence of known
fraudulent phone numbers. First, we experimentally demonstrate the need for mobile
specific techniques and then identify a range of new content-based static features that
highly correlate with mobile malicious webpages. We then apply kAYO to a dataset
of over 350,000 known benign and malicious mobile webpages and demonstrate 90%
accuracy in classification. Moreover, we discover, characterize and report a number
of webpages missed by Google Safe Browsing and VirusTotal, but detected by kAYO.
Finally, we build a browser extension using kAYO to protect users from malicious
mobile websites in real-time.
Research impact: The newly discovered mobile browser vulnerabilities have been
acknowledged and a subset of them addressed [2–4] by some browser vendors in the
latest version of their browsers. The work on display security of mobile browsers
(Chapter 3) was recognized as one of the top 10 papers of 2012 at the national level
‘CSAW AT&T Best Applied Security Paper Award’ competition. Moreover, it won
the institute-level ‘SAIC Best Student Paper Award’ and the ‘Best Demo’ prize at the
College of Computing research day at Georgia Tech. The second piece of this thesis
(Chapter 4) was recognized as the ‘Best Student Paper’ at the Information Security
conference 2012 and was covered by several media outlets [45,53,90,119,186,199]. The
third and final piece of this thesis on detecting mobile malicious webpages (Chapter 5)
has led to a patent.
1.3 Dissertation Outline
The goal of this dissertation is characterizing security of modern mobile browsers and
implementing new mechanisms to secure web browsing on mobile devices. Chapter 3
provides details on the newly discovered display security vulnerabilities in modern
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mobile browsers. We then discuss real-world attacks that exploit these vulnerabil-
ities and also propose defenses. Additionally, we give an example of a universally
adopted security policy that makes mobile browsers more vulnerable to phishing at-
tacks than desktop browsers. Chapter 4 studies the impact of the small screen size
of mobile devices on implementation of SSL/TLS indicators in browsers. We ex-
perimentally demonstrate that mobile browser vendors have implemented incomplete
and inconsistent subsets of SSL/TLS indicators usually found in desktop browsers.
We then discuss the impact of the unavailability of these indicators and outline po-
tential phishing and man-in-the-middle attacks on security experts accessing mobile
browsers. After studying security vulnerabilities in mobile browsers, we focus on mo-
bile webpages in Chapter 5. We demonstrate the structural differences in desktop and
mobile webpages through a series of experiments. We then characterize the conse-
quence of these changes on existing static tools to detect desktop malicious webpages
to show the need for mobile-specific tools. By selecting novel and existing static fea-
tures of webpages relevant to mobile, we build the first technique to detect mobile
malicious webpages in real-time.
Chapter 6 discusses our ongoing work on building new permission systems for
mobile web apps. We study the impending changes in mobile web apps due to the
introduction of HTML5 and web API suites such as Firefox Boot2Gecko [51]. We





Browsers and websites are the core components of web browsing. A web browser is a
software application for retrieving, presenting and traversing information resources on
the World Wide Web, whereas a webpage is information written in a document so that
it renders correctly in a web browser. Securing each of these components individually
is important to secure the end-to-end browsing experience. A web browser implements
several security policies to protect users and individual websites from attacks [216].
While most of these policies are embedded in the browser’s code, others are user
facing (e.g., SSL/TLS indicators). Malicious browser extensions and plugins can also
compromise private information of a user. Therefore, web browsers employ techniques
to sandbox potentially malicious untrusted extensions [69] and plugins.
Simply securing the browser does not protect users from all web-based attacks.
Attackers build malicious webpages to steal a user’s identity or other sensitive infor-
mation such as passwords [104] and credit card numbers [172]. Traditionally, browser-
based attacks originated from bad websites. However, due to poor security policies of
web applications or vulnerabilities in the software supporting websites [47], attackers
have recently been successful in compromising large numbers of trusted web sites to
deliver malicious payloads to unsuspecting visitors [141].
2.1 Web Browser Policies and Attacks
Design flaws in security policies, implementation errors, and trade-offs between per-
formance and security lead to attacks on web browsers. Browsers implement sev-
eral defense techniques against potential attacks, including access control policies for
browser resources.
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2.1.1 Access Control Policies
The Same Origin Policy (SOP) [67] is the most widely used access control policy in
modern browsers. The SOP protects the content owned by a principal (domain or
website, e.g., www.example.com) from being modified by an untrusted principal (e.g.,
www.attacker.com). The SOP defines each principal based on the corresponding
browser resource, which include the Document Object Model (DOM), network, cook-
ies, other persistent state and display [191]. For example, a principal for the DOM
resource is defined as the tuple 〈protocol, domain, port〉; whereas for the cookie
resource, a principal is labeled by 〈domain, path〉. This incoherency in labeling prin-
cipals leads to replay attacks and privilege escalation [191].
Older techniques for inter-frame communication lead to breach of authentication
and confidentiality. The fragment identifier messaging method provided confiden-
tiality without authentication, whereas the postMessage method provided authenti-
cation, but breached confidentiality. Barth et al. [72] proposed stricter policies for
fragment identifier messaging by adopting ideas from well-known network protocols
and modified the postMessage API to allow the sender specify an intended recip-
ient. These access control policies were primarily focused on isolating cross origin
components of webpages. Jackson et al. [133] recognized that the security policy
of browsers provides no isolation between documents from the same origin (scheme,
host, and port), even if those documents have different security characteristics. This
lack of isolation leads to origin contamination vulnerabilities in a number of browser
security features, such as cookies, encryption, and code signing. Other weaknesses
in access control mechanisms such as frame navigation policies [72, 209], client-side
browser state [134], cookie path protection, and display protection [209] also expose
browsers and web applications to a range of attacks.
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2.1.2 Attacks and Defenses
SQL injection [168] is one of the most prevalent security risks as of 2013 [169]. This
attack is carried out by inserting malicious SQL statements into an entry field for
execution. Another way of injecting client-side scripts into webpages viewed by other
users is Cross Site Scripting (XSS) [68]. The persistent and non-persistent types of
XSS, together have surpassed buffer overflows to become the most common publicly
reported security vulnerability in recent years [197]. Other steadily rising browser
threats include Cross Site Request Forgery (XSRF) [71], clickjacking [6, 7, 182] and
phishing. Implementation errors in the browser code [55,74], slow adoption of security
techniques [221] and incorrect handling of privileges in browser extensions [69] further
increase the threats to the browser and the user.
A range of defenses have been proposed to protect browsers from attacks. To
defend against login CSRF, Barth et al. [71] proposed that browsers implement the
Origin header, which provides the security benefits of the Referer header while re-
sponding to privacy concerns that have lead to the widespread suppression of the
Referer header. Another client-side defense that mitigates cross-origin CSS attacks
was proposed by Huang et al. [129]. The authors advocate enforcing content type
checking for style sheets loaded from cross-origins, even if the requesting page is in
quirks mode. Other defense techniques against web attacks include enforcing new
security policies [129] and algorithms [54,68] in browsers, running tools for detecting
JavaScript-based attacks [92,120,139,177], and implementing security vulnerabilities
scanners [65].
2.1.3 Browser Extensions
Malicious extensions exploit browser vulnerabilities to run their code with all the
privileges and features as that supported by any native programming languages. Re-
searchers have investigated vulnerabilities in extension platforms of Firefox [65, 137,
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149] and most recently Chrome [85,148].
One of the fundamental defenses against malicious browser extensions is privilege
separation [184]. Similar to OpenSSH [175] and qmail [75], this concept has been
applied to build several tools and frameworks for modern web apps [78, 110, 142,
143, 161]. Moreover, studies have established that privilege separation has value in
software projects that employ security experts (e.g., browsers [101]). Yet another
protection technique from malicious plugins is implementing policies for document
access, persistent state, network connections and other devices [122]. The plugin is
required to run in a separate process from the browser and all interactions with the
underlying system are performed through the browser. Finally, permission systems for
browser extensions are popular in defending against malicious extensions [69,111,124].
2.1.4 Browser Kernels and Operating Systems
Websites include a number of cross-domain elements for rich features and user expe-
rience. Therefore, it is important to provide strong isolation between cross-domain
principals in a browser to ensure code integrity and confidentiality. The OP Web
browser [123] was the first to design a small browser kernel to enforce new browser
security features and handle resources. The authors broke the web browser into sev-
eral distinct and isolated components based on processes and made all interactions
between these components explicit. The OP browser kernel then managed each of
the components and interposed on communications between them. The OP browser
allows any security model to be specified with their framework. However, this flex-
ibility comes with a cost. The OP browser requires intimate interactions between
browser components, such as JavaScript interpreter and HTML engine to use IPC
and be inspected by the browser kernel. When targeting a specific security model,
such as that of existing browsers, this additional IPC cost does not add any benefits
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since isolating browser components within an instance of a webpage provides no ad-
ditional security protection. Furthermore, the OP browser kernel does not provide
cross-principal display protection. The Gazelle [209] browser provides cross-principal
display protection and also reduces the cost of separating browser components within
the same instance of a webpage by removing the requirement of IPC communication.
The security architecture of the Google Chrome browser [73] also repudiates the
monolithic browser architecture that combines the “user” and the “web” into a sin-
gle protection domain. Chromium has two modules than run in separate protection
domains: a browser kernel, which interacts with the underlying operating system,
and a rendering engine, which runs with restricted privileges in a sandbox. All these
secure web browsers are built on top of commodity operating systems and include
complex user-mode libraries and shared system services within their trusted comput-
ing base (TCB). The Illinois operating system and browser [198] reduce the TCB for
web browsers drastically and simplify browser-based systems. The authors expose
browser-level abstractions at the lowest software layer to remove almost all tradi-
tional OS components and services from the TCB by mapping browser abstractions
to hardware abstractions directly.
2.2 Browser Security Indicators
Traditional desktop browsers contain user facing security indicators in addition to
the security techniques embedded in the browser code. A range of security indicators
are displayed in the chrome of the browser including the lock icon, the https URL
prefix, and public key certificates.
2.2.1 Ineffective Security Indicators on Desktop Browsers
Each website provides its certificate information to the browser and the browser in
turn conveys the same to the user using graphical and textual indicators. Certificates
and other SSL/TLS indicators are meant to provide simple cues to the user about the
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identity of the website and protection from eavesdroppers. However, several studies
have indicated that these security cues used in desktop browsers go unnoticed [97,100,
185,192,211] or are absent in websites [193]. In a study conducted by Dhamija et al.,
desktop web browser users were challenged to identify phishing attacks in the presence
of phishing and fraudulent certificate warnings [97]. 23% of their subjects completely
ignored the passive or non-interruptive phishing warnings, and 68% of subjects quickly
clicked through the active or interruptive fraudulent certificate dialogs. Another
study by Akhawe et al. [135] used Mozilla Firefox and Google Chrome’s in-browser
telemetry to observe 25 million warning impressions in situ. The authors found that
users continued through a tenth of Mozilla Firefox’s malware and phishing warnings,
a quarter of Google Chrome’s malware and phishing warnings, and a third of Mozilla
Firefox’s SSL warnings. Moreover, it was observed that users rarely click on the
explanatory links such as “More Information” or “Learn More”.
Although domain name mismatches between certificates and websites are observed
often [206], Sunshine et al. [196] showed that users ignore TLS warnings for domain
name mismatches, and showed that users ignore TLS warnings for expired certificates
and unknown CAs. Moreover, a majority do not understand these warnings. The
lock icon is the security indicator most often noticed [100,211]. However, even when
used as a security cue by users, many do not fully understand its meaning [97,98,100]
and its absence also often goes unnoticed [97]. Additionally, the majority of users
who rely on the lock icon remain unaware of its identity feature [97,100,115,211] and
do not reliably understand the concept of certificates [97, 98]. Indicators for newer
technologies such as EV-SSL have also been shown to be ineffective to convey better
security to the user as compared to a simple SSL certificate [76, 136].
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2.2.2 Improved Security Indicators
Several techniques have been proposed to design better security indicators to pre-
vent potential attacks such as phishing. Researchers have proposed better warn-
ings [196], more effective interface dialogues [76], browser plugins [91], trusted path
from the browser to the human user [214] and mandatory security indicators [126]
to help users make correct security decisions. Other proposed security mechanisms
include disabling JavaScript in the user browser and forcing persistent visibility of
the browser’s location line [113]. Dynamic Security Skins [98] allow a remote web
server to prove its identity in a way that is easy for a human user to verify and hard
for an attacker to spoof. Finally, efforts have been taken [29,34–36,41] to standardize
security indicators and thus minimize confusion across browsers.
2.3 Malicious Webpages
Simply securing the web browser alone cannot protect a user from all web-based
attacks. Attackers build malicious webpages to steal a user’s identity or other sensitive
information such as passwords or credit card numbers.
2.3.1 DNS-based Approaches
A popular approach in detecting such malicious activity on the web is by lever-
aging distinguishing features between malicious and benign DNS usage. The first
study [205] in this direction proposed to collect real-world DNS data for analyzing
malicious behavior. The results of the passive DNS analysis showed that malicious
domains that are used in fast-flux networks exhibit behavior that is different than
benign domains [217]. Antonakakis et al. [63] added to the passive monitoring idea
by proposing Notos, a detection scheme that dynamically assigns reputation scores to
domain names whose maliciousness is yet to be discovered. The premise behind No-
tos is that agile malicious uses of DNS have unique characteristics and thus malicious
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use of DNS can be distinguished from benign use. To this end, the authors analyze a
number of features from three categories, network-based features, zone-based features
and evidence based features. Notos is unable to detect malicious domains that are
mapped to a new address space each time and never used for other malicious purposes
again. This limitation is addressed by yet another passive DNS monitoring system
called EXPOSURE. EXPOSURE uses time-based features which account for short-
lived domains. Other efforts to identify malicious domains include more passive DNS
monitoring tools [173, 217] and active DNS probing methods [127, 131]. Active DNS
probing methods repeatedly query the domains that are advertised to be malicious
by various sources (e.g., spam mails) to detect the abnormal behavior. The main
drawback of active DNS analysis is the possibility of being detected by the miscre-
ants who manage the domains under analysis. Passive DNS analysis, in comparison,
is more stealthy because of its non-intrusiveness characteristics.
These techniques did not detect all types of web-based attacks. While some of
these existing efforts focused solely on detecting fast-flux service networks [127, 164,
171, 210], another [77] can also detect domains implementing phishing and drive-by-
downloads. Fast-flux service networks [127] are malicious systems that abuse Round-
Robin DNS. Most of the efforts in detecting fast-flux service networks [127, 140, 164,
171] differ from each other only in the number of features used and the details of the
classification algorithms. They are also limited to mainly studying fast-flux domains
advertised through email spam. In particular, potential fast-flux domain names are
extracted from the URLs found in the body of spam emails in a dataset. Then an
active probing strategy is applied, which repeatedly issues DNS queries to collect
information about the set of resolved IP addresses to classify each domain name into
either fast-flux or non-fast-flux. Perdisci et al. [173] overcame the limitations of such
techniques by performing passive analysis of recursive DNS (RDNS) traffic traces.
A major drawback of these DNS based mechanisms is that they do not necessarily
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provide deeper understanding of the specific malicious activity implemented by a
webpage or domain.
2.3.2 Content-based and In-depth Inspection Techniques
Dynamic approaches using virtual machines [159, 176] and honeyclient systems [130,
157,163] provide deeper visibility into the behavior of a webpage. Honeyclient systems
fully execute the contents of a webpage. This includes fetching the webpage, all
the resources that are linked from it, and then interpreting the associated dynamic
content, such as JavaScript code. The complete visibility into each webpage leads
to a very low false positive rate and great accuracy. However, downloading and
executing each webpage also impacts performance and hinders scalability of dynamic
approaches. Each webpage can take anywhere from a few seconds to several minutes,
depending on the complexity of the analyzed page.
This performance penalty can be avoided by using static approaches. The oldest
static approach is signature-based techniques based on string patterns in malicious
code, commonly used in anti-virus tools [32]. Such techniques can be easily evaded us-
ing obfuscation, thus suffering from high false negative rates [92,179]. These high false
negative rates can be reduced by using static approaches that rely on the structural
and lexical properties of a webpage and do not execute the content of the webpage.
One such technique of detecting malicious pages is using statistical methods for URL
classification based on a URL’s lexical and host-based properties [114, 117, 144, 153].
Garera et al. used URL statistical techniques to classify phishing URLs [117]. A larger
scale classification was carried out by Ma et al. [153] using lexical properties of URLs
and registration, hosting, and geographical information of the corresponding hosts.
All URL-based techniques usually suffer from high false positive rates. Using HTML
and JavaScript features extracted from a webpage in addition to URL classification
helps address this drawback and provides better results [84,156,212,218]. Commonly
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used features include visibility and size of iframe tags, and the number of script tags
referencing external resources. Static approaches avoid performance penalty of dy-
namic approaches. Additionally, using fast and reliable static approaches to detect
benign webpages can avoid expensive in-depth analysis of all webpages.
2.4 The Mobile Web
Mobile Internet users are growing rapidly [166]. Based on the current rate of change
and adoption, mobile web usage will be greater than desktop Internet use by 2015.
Mobile users access Internet using both native applications and web browsers. De-
spite 81% of mobile users browsing web on their phones using a web browser [79],
the majority of security research in the recent years has focused on securing native
applications on mobile devices.
2.4.1 Native Application Security
The Android, iPhone, Symbian and Windows operating systems use different types of
permissions. The Android OS and iOS have been the most popular among researchers
due to the popularity of the iOS platform and both widespread use and open source
nature of the Android platform.
Detecting overprivilege in Android applications and studying its impact on users’
private data has been a popular area of study. Enck et al. applied Fortify’s Java
static analysis tool to decompiled applications to study the applications’ use of a
small number of permissions and API calls [106]. Their analysis uncovered pervasive
use or misuse of personal and phone identifiers, and deep penetration of advertising
and analytics networks. Felt et al. detected overprivilege by manual classification of
a small set of Android applications [111], whereas the Kirin [107] system used static
analysis focusing on permissions and other application configuration data. Kirin relies
solely on developer permission requests, rather than examining whether or how per-
missions are used by applications. Another permission overprivilege study examined
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1,100 Android applications’ permission requirements and used self-organizing maps to
visualize which permissions are used in applications with similar characteristics [66].
Other tools to detect overprivilege include application source code analyzer [204], ap-
plication package attribute analyzer [87], NLP to detect reasoning behind permission
requests [170] and static analysis on Android APIs [118].
Several systems also studied the impact of application overprivilege on users’ pri-
vate data. TaintDroid [105] used system-wide dynamic taint tracking to identify
privacy leaks in Android applications. By using static analysis, the authors studied
a number of applications and confirmed the exfiltration of information. PiOS [102]
performed static analysis on iOS applications for the iPhone. The PiOS study found
that the majority of analyzed applications leaked the device ID and over half of the
applications included advertisement and analytics libraries.
In addition to application overprivilege, host security is a growing concern on
smartphones. OS-level protections such as Saint [167] and Security-by-Contract [96]
provide enhanced security mechanisms for Android and Windows Mobile. These ap-
proaches prevent access to sensitive information; however, once information enters the
application, no additional mediation occurs.Mulliner et al. [160] provide information
tracking by labeling smartphone processes based on the interfaces they access, effec-
tively limiting access to future interfaces based on acquired labels. Finally, Aquifer
presents a policy framework and system for preventing accidental information disclo-
sure in modern operating systems such as Android, iOS, and Windows 8 [162].
2.4.2 Mobile Web Security
Web browsers have become one of the most popular applications on today’s smart
phones. The mobile web research so far has focused on browser energy consumption
analysis [201], device performance [93] and mobile latency [56]. However, there are
limited or no efforts in securing web browsing on mobile devices. In addition to
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malicious mobile applications affecting user privacy [102,105] and potentially harming
the cellular network [202,203], the increasing user base of mobile platforms and mobile
e-commerce have made mobile browsers an attractive target for attackers [24, 28,
31, 59, 95, 112, 165, 178, 183, 183]. Researchers have already begun to think about
defending against attacks on mobile phones using smart CDNs [150]. Although mobile
browsers will be targets of security attacks in the coming years, security issues in
mobile browsers will be new since the devices have serious limitations compared to
desktops. However, a large-scale security analysis of the differences between mobile
and desktop browser software has not yet been performed.
In addition to the underlying code, the user interfaces of mobile browsers differ
significantly from their desktop counterparts. The small display of mobile phones
and tablet computers leads to adaptation in user facing security indicators in web
browsers. Until now, almost all research efforts in the area of security indicators in
browsers have been focused on desktop browsers. However, in light of the recent
attacks targeted towards mobile browsers [28, 59] and considering how the mobile
browser user interface differs from desktops, it is important to analyze and understand
the security indicators used in mobile browsers. Although the W3C [35] guidelines
consider mobile browsers in their definitions, a large-scale evaluation of the state-of-
the-art security indicators in mobile browsers has not been carried out.
Finally, all the approaches for malicious webpage detection have focused on web-
sites built for desktop browsers in the past. Although differences in mobile and desk-
top websites have been observed before [83], it is unclear how these differences impact
security. Furthermore, the threats on mobile and desktop websites are somewhat dif-
ferent [112]. Static analysis techniques using features of desktop webpages have been
primarily studied for drive-by-downloads on desktop websites [84, 176], whereas, the
biggest threat on the mobile web at present is believed to be phishing [81]. Efforts
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in mitigating phishing attacks on desktop websites include isolating browser appli-
cations of different trust level [116], email filtering [114], using content-based fea-
tures [212, 218] and blacklists [151]. The best-known non-proprietary content-based
approach to detect phishing webpages is Cantina [218]. Cantina suffers from perfor-
mance problems due to the time lag involved in querying the Google search engine.
Moreover, Cantina does not work well on webpages written in languages other than
English. Finally, existing techniques do not account for new mobile threats such as
known fraud phone numbers that attempt to trigger the dialer on the phone. Con-
sequently, whether existing static analysis techniques to detect malicious desktop
websites will work well on mobile websites is yet to be explored.
In summary, the mobile web is evolving rapidly. Most of the existing techniques
in securing web browsing focus primarily on the desktop environment. However, due
to the differences in the mobile and desktop environments, the threats in desktop
might not translate directly to the mobile environment. Furthermore, the mobile
web presents new threats due to the newly added functionality such as web APIs.




MEASURING SYSTEMIC WEAKNESSES IN MOBILE
BROWSER SECURITY
3.1 Introduction
Mobile web browsers have long underperformed their desktop counterparts. Whether
by implementing limited alternative standards such as WAP [200] or incomplete ver-
sions of HTML, the first mobile browsers provided a meager set of capabilities and
attracted only a small number of early adopters. However, recent improvements in
processing power and bandwidth have spurred significant changes in the ways users
experience the mobile web.
Modern mobile browsers now build on the same or similarly capable rendering
engines used by many desktop browsers [40,42]. Mobile browsers are so capable that,
through APIs such as WebViews, many of the most popular mobile apps (e.g., BBC,
Walgreens) [48,82] act as wrappers for the browser pointed to specific webpages. How-
ever, due to limitations in the screen real estate and memory, existing desktop browser
software was not directly ported to mobile devices. Accordingly, while many mobile
browsers bear the name of related desktop applications, their internal components
might significantly differ. The impact of these changes on security has not previously
been evaluated. Given the popularity of browsing on mobile devices [79,152], focusing
on the security of mobile browsers is critical.
In this chapter, we perform the first large-scale security comparison between mo-
bile and desktop browsers. While there are many potential areas for investigation,
we focus on the issues of display security due to the screen constraints of mobile
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devices. Given the often crowded layout of mobile webpages, we specifically investi-
gate the behavior of overlapping HTML elements (and how browsers handle clicks -
i.e., “user event routing”), behavior at the boundaries between non-overlapping items
(“boundary control”) and the impact of nonpersistent availability or complete ab-
sence of the address bar. We apply blackbox analysis across ten mobile, three tablet
and five desktop browsers and demonstrate that many mobile and tablet browsers
are vulnerable to new two classes of attacks due to inconsistent click-event routing
and incorrect write policies. We illustrate that desktop browsers are not susceptible
to these attacks and present solutions to address the new vulnerabilities. We then
discover a third class of vulnerability resulting from a clash between considerations
made for usability in mobile browsers and a universally implemented display policy,
demonstrating that making usability considerations while creating mobile software is
crucial and blind porting of traditional browser code to mobile devices can introduce
unexpected vulnerabilities.
We make the following contributions:
• Characterize display security disparity between the most popular mo-
bile and desktop browsers: We analyze display security on ten mobile (An-
droid Mobile, Blackberry (Mango), Blackberry (Webkit), Chrome Beta, Firefox
Mobile, Internet Explorer (IE) Mobile, Nokia Mini-Map, Opera Mini, Opera
Mobile and iPhone Safari), three tablet (Android on Motorola Xoom, Android
on Samsung Galaxy and iPad2 Safari) and five desktop (Chrome, Firefox, Inter-
net Explorer, Opera and Safari) browsers. We use blackbox analysis as source
code is not available for the majority of browsers. Table 3 on page 14 summa-
rizes our findings.
• Identify erroneous implementations of display security policies: We
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identify previously unknown erroneous policies in user event routing and bound-
ary control and implement multiple attacks that demonstrate their seriousness.
Even though many mobile browsers rely on the same rendering engines as their
desktop counterparts, our experiments demonstrate that mobile browsers are
vulnerable to attacks not previously seen in the desktop space.
• Expose conflict between usability and display security: We show that
some re-implemented policies from desktop browsers, specifically Top-Level
Frame Navigation [70], expose mobile devices to phishing when mobile browsers
hide or completely eliminate indicators such as the address bar for reasons of
usability. In particular, we demonstrate the ability to navigate users away from
their intended destinations. Our technique is new and does not use address bar
spoofing similar to the phishing techniques studied earlier [112, 165]. We find
that our technique enables a more dangerous and easy to launch attack, since
it exploits a built-in policy in all web browsers instead of attempting to spoof
the address bar in individual browsers.
Our analysis demonstrates that the discovered vulnerabilities are not isolated
bugs; rather, they are pervasive and affect all but one of the most popular mobile
and tablet browsers in some capacity.1 We have communicated our results to various
browser vendors who have acknowledged the presence of these vulnerabilities. More-
over, we argue that because an increasing number of apps rely on mobile browsers,
that these issues are relevant to all mobile app developers. Our results are the first
comprehensive study in display security and they provide strong evidence that the
security of mobile browsers has taken steps backward when compared to desktop
browsers.
1The Chrome Mobile browser was not susceptible to any of the attacks described in this work at
the time of experiments (June 2011). However, the latest version of the Chrome Mobile browser (as
of Dec 2013) minimizes the address bar on page rendering, thereby being susceptible to the attack
described in Section 3.5.
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Table 1: Details of the browsers used for experimental evaluation. We also evaluated
Opera Mini 5.5.1, Android 2.2.1 and Android 2.3.3 on Nexus One and Android 4.0.1 on
Galaxy Nexus. We observed the same vulnerabilities in both the old and new versions
of Opera Mini and Android browsers (except Android 4.0.1). (*: The version numbers
of these browsers were not apparent. We have used the default browsers shipped with
the referenced version of the OS.)
Category Browser Name Version Rendering Engine Operating System Device
Mobile
Android 2.3.6 Webkit Android 2.3.6 Nexus One
Blackberry 5.0.0 Mango Blackberry OS 5.0.0.732 Bold 9650
Blackberry 6.0.0 Webkit Blackberry OS 6 Torch 9800
Chrome Beta 0.16.4301.233 Webkit Android 4.0 Galaxy Nexus
Firefox Mobile 4 Beta 3 Gecko Android 2.3.6 Nexus One
Internet Explorer * Trident Windows Phone LG-C900Mobile 7.0.7004.0 OS
Nokia Mini-Map * Webkit Symbian S60 E71x
Opera Mini 6.0.24556 Presto Android 2.3.6 Nexus One5.0.019802 Presto iOS 4.1 (8B117) iPhone
Opera Mobile 11.00 Presto Android 2.3.6 Nexus One
Safari * Webkit iOS 4.1 (8B117) iPhone
Tablet Android * Webkit Android 3.2.1 Motorola XoomAndroid * Webkit Android 3.1 Samsung Galaxy
Safari * Webkit iOS 4.3.5 (8L1) iPad 2
Desktop
Chrome 15.0.874.106 Webkit OS X 10.6.8 –
Firefox 7.0.1 Gecko OS X 10.6.8 –
Internet Explorer 8.0.7600.16385 Trident Windows 7 –
Opera 11.52 Presto OS X 10.6.8 –
Safari 5.1.1 Webkit OS X 10.6.8 –
3.2 Overview
This section discusses our experimental methodology and defines our threat model.
3.2.1 Methodology
We analyze the rendering differences between popular desktop and mobile browsers
for security. The studied browsers are shown in Table 6. We have selected these
browsers as they represent approximately 90% of mobile browsers in the market [14],
as shown in Table 2.
We define a ‘display element’ as any HTML element that can color pixels on the
screen. For example, iframe, image, text, text area, link, table and button all
fall under display elements. However, HTML elements such as head or option do
not qualify as display elements. We create customized scenarios to evaluate common
interactions of cross-origin display elements: 1) when they overlap, 2) when they
border each other and 3) when they are navigated to new sources. Given the tight
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Table 2: Market Share of Popular Mobile Browsers as of April 2012 [14]. We cover
approximately 90% of the mobile browsers in the market for our evaluation.







Other (Firefox Mobile, 3.28IE on Windows Phone 7 OS etc.)
layout of many mobile webpages and the corresponding small screen sizes of the
associated devices, characterizing such interactions is critical. We discover new classes
of vulnerabilities in mobile browsers and evaluate their risk by implementing attacks
exploiting the vulnerabilities. All the experiments were performed on browsers on
real mobile phones, and are recreated in the respective emulators to create many of
the figures throughout the chapter.
3.2.2 Threat Model
We consider two classes of adversaries. Each adversary attempts to attack other web-
site principals and/or the user and exploit the constrained nature of a mobile device’s
display. Each adversary can identify the user’s mobile browser and is knowledgeable
of the display-related security vulnerabilities associated with that browser.
Landlord attacker: The landlord attacker is a malicious principal2 who can host his
own websites such as landlordattacker.com. For example, the owner of a phishing
website such as blankofamerica.com imitating bankofamerica.com is classified as a
landlord attacker. A ‘tenant’ is a principal who rents an area on a landlord’s website to
render his own content such as advertisements. After the landlord gets honest tenants
on his website, he attempts to exploit the honest tenant and/or the honest user. The
2A principal is the owner of some web content. In general, one principal does not trust another
with respect to his resources [208].
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landlord cannot read or change parts of the content in the tenant’s rented area on
the screen (due to the Same Origin Policy3), but controls the external properties
of the tenant’s rented area. For example, the landlord can specify the dimensions,
transparency and position of the tenant’s area on his website. The landlord instead
tries to attack the honest tenant and honest user by manipulating his own website
display.
We note that not every user visiting the malicious website will be exploited. De-
pending on the vulnerability targeted by the landlord attacker, the honest tenant
and honest user may be attacked only when landlordattacker.com is rendered in a
vulnerable browser. Placing web advertisements, displaying popular content indexed
by search engines and sending bulk e-mail to users are some of the techniques that
the landlord attacker can use to attract users to his website [72].
Tenant attacker: The tenant attacker is a malicious principal who can rent an
area of the display on a website owned by an honest landlord. For example, the
tenant attacker can insert a malicious advertisement or widget into an honest website.
Websites such as iGoogle allow any user having an account to upload a new widget.
We assume that an honest user visits an honest website containing at least one tenant
attacker area using a vulnerable mobile browser. The tenant attacker has knowledge
of the display vulnerabilities in the popular mobile browsers. He manipulates the
content of his rented area to attack the honest website and/or the user.
A successful exploit is able to:
1. Influence the state and logic of a victim website principal across Same Origin
Policy boundaries, and/or
2. Deceive a user into performing unintended actions or sharing private data.
3The Same Origin Policy prevents a document or script loaded from one domain from getting or
setting properties of a document from another domain [18,181].
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3.3 User Event Routing
Overlapping elements are common in many webpages. From drop-down menus to
floating advertisements, the ability to overlay objects allows for content to be dynam-
ically presented to the user. However, the interaction between such elements must
be strictly defined, especially in cases when they are controlled by different origins.
When two or more display elements share the same pixel on the screen, browsers
must decide both a) which element can control the ‘coloring’ (display) of the pixel
and b) which element owns and responds to the user access to that pixel (user event
routing). For example, if a drop-down menu covers over an image and a user clicks
in this shared screen area, the browser must decide whether the principal owning the
image or the principal owning the menu will respond to a user’s click action.
Although all browsers make these decisions, the security relevance of user event
routing in overlapped elements has not previously been studied. Our evaluation
demonstrates that while desktop browsers consistently route user actions to the top-
most element, event routing is inconsistent across mobile and tablet browsers. This
inconsistency allows hidden elements to intercept user actions and potentially perform
dangerous operations. We first discuss the results of our evaluation of overlapped el-
ements using the methodology in Section 3.2.1 and then present attacks exploiting
the vulnerabilities.
3.3.1 Experimental Evaluation
Mobile and tablet browsers:
Inconsistent click-event reception: Click-event reception refers to a browser choosing
the element that receives a user’s click action in a stack of overlapped elements. In the
Android mobile, Android tablet on Xoom, Nokia Mini-Map and Opera Mini browsers,
a user’s onclick event on an image is routed to the onclick events of buttons, text
areas and links below the opaque image, thereby executing the events of the hidden
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mesothelioma-find-lawyer.com
Display: user's view of the webpage
User access: the user's click 
actually accesses the hidden 
mesothelioma ad
Click Fraud
Figure 1: Left image: Fake image advertisement of sales in San Francisco on the
www.landlordattacker.com website; Right image: The mesothelioma ad from
Google AdSense placed directly below the enticing fake sales ad image by malicious
landlord. A user clicking on the mesothelioma ads [1] earns the landlord attacker
more money. The landlord places the honest mesothelioma ads from AdSense in an
iframe and overlays it with the more enticing images of sales in San Francisco to
increase the rate of clicks. When a user clicks on the fake sale ad in San Francisco,
the mesothelioma ad is clicked benefiting the landlord attacker. The Opera Mini
(pictured), Android mobile, Android tablet on Xoom and Nokia Mini-Map browsers
are vulnerable to the click fraud attack.
elements. We note that only the events corresponding to the element directly situated
below the area where a user clicks responds to the click action. Click events of all
the elements situated below the image are not executed when the user clicks on the
image.
In the Nokia Mini-Map and Opera Mini browsers, even if the top image has an
onclick event associated with it, the onclick events of the buttons below the image
are given preference. If the image on top does not have an event associated with it,
the buttons below the image are clickable in the Android mobile and Android tablet
on Xoom browsers.
Incorrect write policy: The Android mobile, Android tablet on Xoom, Nokia Mini-
Map and Opera Mini browsers allow a user to write into the text areas in an iframe
situated below an opaque image. When a user clicks on the portion of the image
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overlapping any part of the text area below, the text area pops out on top and the
user can write into the box.
Desktop browsers: The desktop browsers always route click and write events ex-
clusively to the top element in a stack of overlapped elements.
3.3.2 Attacks
We present three novel techniques that exploit inconsistent click-event reception and
incorrect write policies for overlapping elements.
1) Click Fraud: This attack is possible due to inconsistent click-event reception in
overlapping elements. Click fraud occurs in pay-per-click advertising when a malicious
principal creates illicit clicks on an ad by either tricking a real user or by imitating a
legitimate user’s click with a program. Such attacks generate revenue per click with
no actual interest in the target of the ad’s link. A popular pay-per-click advertising
program is Google’s AdSense. A malicious landlord or tenant website cannot manip-
ulate the ad placed by Google (due to the Same Origin Policy) and thus cannot trick
a legitimate user into clicking on an unwanted ad by disguising it with more enticing
content.
Consider a malicious landlord principal who creates an AdSense account and em-
beds relevant content containing targeted keywords to attract high paying ads. The
high paying ads [1] are generally not as popular as ads for discounts or coupons and
thus are not clicked very often. A landlord attacker can carry out click fraud as shown
in Figure 1, on a browser that allows a user to inadvertently access hidden content
(links, buttons etc.) placed below an opaque element such as an image. The landlord
attacker overlaps the mesothelioma ad (right) with more enticing and opaque content
such as sales at local restaurants (left). If an honest user clicks the area containing
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the attractive content from a vulnerable browser, the mesothelioma ad4 below the
attractive content will be clicked without the user’s knowledge. Since the user’s click
is captured by the Google AdSense ad instead of the image on top, the malicious
landlord illicitly benefits.
2) Login CSRF: This attack is possible due to inconsistent click-event reception
and incorrect write policies. The intention of an attacker in a login Cross Site Re-
quest Forgery (CSRF) is to make the honest user’s browser log in as the attacker
into a legitimate website without any notice to the user. While seemingly counter-
intuitive, such an attack allows an adversary to monitor operations executed by the
user and steal their private information. For example, if an attacker successfully
logs in into his Yahoo account from the victim’s browser, the victim’s actions on all
of the websites (search, shopping, finance, health) belonging to Yahoo’s single sign-
on system will be recorded in the attacker’s account. If the user makes a purchase
at shopping.yahoo.com and enters his credit card details, the information will be
stored in the attacker’s profile. Note that the user will not be asked to sign-in since
the attacker has already signed in in the user’s browser. Previous work has leveraged
a browser’s network connectivity and a browser’s state to launch a login CSRF at-
tack [71]. We present a new mechanism to launch the login CSRF attack by exploiting
the vulnerability of incorrectly handling user access to overlapped display elements in
mobile browsers. Our method is more robust and not easy to detect since it exploits
an in-built vulnerability in the browsers.
Consider a malicious website landlordattacker.com. The landlord includes a
legitimate iframe containing the ‘sign in’ page of www.yahoo.com as shown in Figure 2
(right). The landlord then overlaps the iframe completely with an opaque image as
shown in Figure 2 (left). The image shows enticing free content on the landlord’s
4Mesothelioma is a cancer caused by inhaling asbestos and an ad costs $65.21 per click [15].
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and password fields on the hidden yahoo page






Figure 2: Login CSRF attack on Yahoo’s sign in page. Left image: Image over-
lapping the www.yahoo.com iframe on www.landlordattacker.com. The text areas
for entering ‘solution’ of the CAPTCHAs are placed exactly over the email and pass-
word fields on yahoo.com. The verify button is placed exactly above the ‘sign in’
button of yahoo.com. The two CAPTCHAs are the real email and password of the
attacker’s Yahoo account.; Right image: Login page of www.yahoo.com included in
an iframe on www.landlordattacker.com, placed below the image. The Android mo-
bile (pictured), Android tablet on Xoom, Opera Mini and Nokia Mini-Map browsers
are vulnerable to this attack.
website and includes two image CAPTCHAs expected to be solved by the user to
access the free content. The intention of the landlord attacker is to make the user
enter the attacker’s credentials into the hidden iframe below the opaque image. The
landlord accomplishes this by setting the two CAPTCHAs to the email and password
of the attacker’s Yahoo account. For example, in Figure 2, FVbLzzF and following
are the username and password respectively of the attacker’s Yahoo account. The
landlord attacker then carefully places each of the solution boxes of the CAPTCHAs
on the image exactly overlapping the email and password fields (text areas) of the
Yahoo iframe below the opaque image. The ‘Verify’ button on the image of the
CAPTCHAs is exactly overlapped with the ‘Sign in’ button of the Yahoo iframe
below.
When an honest user visits landlordattacker.com from a vulnerable browser, he
solves the two CAPTCHAs on the image to view free content. Since the browser allows
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user access to the text area below the image, when the user fills in the CAPTCHA
on top, he actually fills in the username and password of the landlord attacker in the
Yahoo iframe below the image. Once the user clicks the verify button on the image,
the ‘sign in’ button on the Yahoo iframe is clicked instead, thereby logging the user’s
browser into www.yahoo.com as the attacker.
In general, solving a CAPTCHA does not disclose private user information and is
perceived as a security feature. Therefore, even a careful user would likely be willing
to solve the CAPTCHA. Because the top image is opaque, the user is completely
oblivious to the consequences of his seemingly benign action. Once the attacker is
logged in from the user’s browser, all the potential consequences of login CSRF are
possible.
3) User Interaction Interception: This attack is possible due to inconsistent click-
event reception. A malicious landlord can launch a user interaction interception attack
on his cross-origin tenant by inserting display elements below a cross-origin tenant
image. In a webpage containing mutually distrusting principals, each principal’s
actual content as well as the user interaction with the principal’s content are private
to that principal (due to the Same Origin Policy). Therefore, the browser must not
allow unauthorized observation by a principal on a user’s interaction with another
tenant.
A malicious landlord attacker can intercept user interaction with an opaque cross-
origin image ad with a click event in a browser that gives priority to the user events
(such as onclick, onmouseover) of elements situated below the image. The expected
behavior of onclick on the image is navigation of user’s browser to the advertiser’s
webpage. A user’s interaction with the ad on the malicious landlord’s page is private
to the advertiser because of the Same Origin Policy. To snoop on the user interaction
with the tenant, the landlord fills the entire screen area below the image ad with
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buttons that have an onclick event defined. If a user visits the landlord’s website
from a vulnerable browser and clicks on the image ad, the click event of the buttons
below the image will be executed. This browser behavior will allow a malicious
landlord to monitor user interaction with the honest tenant.
3.3.3 Analysis
Android Mobile, Android tablet on Xoom, Nokia Mini-Map and Opera Mini browsers
are susceptible to all the attacks; whereas, none of the desktop browsers are suscep-
tible to any of the attacks. We found discrepancies between browsers made by the
same vendors. For instance, while Opera Mini is susceptible to all of the attacks
discussed in this section, neither the Opera desktop nor Opera Mobile browsers are
vulnerable. However, this behavior does not indicate that Opera Mobile enforces all
the same policies implemented in Opera desktop as seen in Section 3.4.
These experiments demonstrate that there are a number of ways in which user
actions can be intercepted by hidden and potentially malicious objects when rendered
by many popular mobile web browsers. However, as our next set of tests demonstrates,
there are more direct ways by which malicious objects can elicit direct user interaction.
3.4 Boundary Control
Many websites contain one or more cross-origin tenants in the form of ads or widgets.
Websites (landlord) rely on the browsers to restrict a tenant’s dimensions to the dis-
play area as defined by the landlord. However, if a browser allows a malicious tenant
to control its own dimensions (display ballooning), the tenant can easily expand its
own boundaries, completely disregarding the dimensions specified by the cross-origin
landlord. This lack of boundary control allows the tenant to dominate the constrained
mobile screen and intercept a user’s intended interaction with the landlord. We discuss
details of the discovered vulnerability and then describe potential attacks.
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3.4.1 Experimental Evaluation
Mobile and tablet browsers: The Android mobile, iPhone and iPad2 Safari, Opera
Mini and Opera Mobile browsers allow an iframe to stretch its own dimensions to fit
the content inside the iframe. Even if the landlord specifies the dimensions of the
iframe, the cross-origin tenant can change them by putting more content in the iframe.
By altering the iframe’s dimensions, the tenant’s iframe does not alter the layout of
the original page; rather all other elements on the screen are adjusted around the new
dimensions of the iframe while retaining the original relative layout.
Desktop browsers: We observe that desktop browsers restrict the boundaries of
a cross-origin tenant to those defined by the landlord. Instead of expanding, these
browsers add scroll bars to the contained iframes, allowing the user to scroll the
iframes to access the content not immediately visible due to the boundary restrictions.
Therefore, the phishing and password stealing attacks are not possible on desktop
browsers.
3.4.2 Attacks
We illustrate two attacks that take advantage of incorrect boundary control.
1) Display Ballooning→ Phishing: Display ballooning allows a malicious website
principal to push legitimate content far outside of the view of the user (an attack made
acute by the general lack of visible scroll bars), thereby causing a client to interact
with a seemingly benign but actually dangerous function.
Consider the iGoogle mashup webpage (landlord) containing each widget (tenant)
inside an iframe. As shown in Figure 3, an honest user innocently adds a malicious
widget (ATTACKER) to his profile. ATTACKER is placed “North” of the honest
widget Amazon, which shows online deals and helps the user purchase the items of
his choice. The intention of the malicious tenant is to navigate an honest user to a
website of the tenant’s choice. To launch the attack, the malicious tenant alters his
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Display Ballooning      Phishing
Figure 3: Left image: Layout of the malicious and honest widgets on the mashup
webpage. ‘ATTACKER’ is a malicious widget and Amazon and YouTube are honest
widgets; Right image: The browser allows a cross-origin tenant to write its own
dimensions. The malicious widget expands its own dimensions and masquerades as
the honest Amazon and YouTube widgets on the browser. It pushes the honest
widgets south and launches a phishing attack on the user. This attack works in
the iPhone Safari (pictured), Android mobile, iPad2 Safari, Opera Mini and Opera
Mobile browsers.
dimensions, expands his own iframe and masquerades as the Amazon and YouTube
widgets, while pushing the real Amazon and YouTube widgets “South”, far outside
of the user’s view. Unless the user scrolls down very far, he is unable to notice the
attack. The user perceives the masqueraded Amazon as the real widget and clicks on
the deals of the attacker’s choice.
The tenant attacker does not necessarily need to know the presence and layout of
specific widgets on the victim’s personal profile. The attacker can masquerade as any
of the default widgets generally included on the mashup website. Unless the victim
is very familiar with the layout of his profile, he will trust the masqueraded widget.
Additionally, if the malicious widget is published on a well known mashup website,
a not-so-careful user may be willing to click on links he finds interesting irrespective
of the credibility of the widget presenting the links to him. The phishing attack can
work on any mash-up website with a similar layout. The Appendix provides code for
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a malicious widget on iGoogle.
2) Display ballooning→ Password Stealing: Consider a malicious advertisement
(tenant attacker) situated to the “North” of the login box of an honest website.
The malicious ad can steal a user’s credentials by stretching its own dimensions and
including a fake login box, which looks exactly the same as the honest website’s login
box. The real login box would be pushed “South” beyond the bottom of the user’s
screen. Because the user is not able to see all the content on the screen at the same
time, the user will likely enter his credentials in the fake login box.
3.4.3 Analysis
The Android mobile, iPhone and iPad2 Safari, Opera Mini and Opera Mobile browsers
are susceptible to phishing and password stealing as a result of display ballooning.
The desktop browsers restrict a tenant iframe’s dimensions to those specified by the
landlord thereby preventing these attacks.
Browsers made by the same vendor deal with boundary control inconsistently.
For example, the Opera Mini, Opera Mobile and iPhone Safari browsers exhibit the
same vulnerability, whereas their desktop versions do not. Additionally, while the
Android tablet browser on Xoom is susceptible to display ballooning similar to its
mobile version, the Android tablet browser on Galaxy behaves like desktop browsers,
correctly implementing tenant boundary restrictions.
The experiments in Section 3.3 and Section 3.4 demonstrate that none of the desk-
top browsers are vulnerable to the attacks feasible on mobile browsers. Intuitively,
adopting similar policies implemented on desktop browsers will prevent introduction
of new vulnerabilities in mobile browsers. However, we show in the next section that
reusing desktop browser code without modifications can lead to unexpected vulnera-
bilities in mobile browsers, due to adjustments made in mobile browser software for
improved usability.
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3.5 Top Level Frame Navigation
The address bar indicates the URL of the viewed webpage and, in some browsers,
the current security status. Because of limited screen real-estate, mobile browsers
minimize the address bar once a page is rendered, hiding it from the user. This
usability concession in mobile browsers directly conflicts with the ‘Top-Level Frame
Navigation’ display policy [70] implemented throughout desktop browsers. This policy
governs a principal’s ability to navigate principals of other origins. In particular,
this policy allows top-level frames (i.e., the landlord) to be navigated by any of its
descendants (i.e., tenants) regardless of their origin. Because users can always see the
address bar, it is possible for a user to determine if the current destination represents
their intended target or a malicious webpage [70]. Accordingly, all desktop browsers
allow a user to always view the top-level window’s address bar.5 We show that since
mobile browsers do not make the address bar persistently available to a user, browser
policies that assume persistent view of address bar for security can be exploited. We
also discuss the differences in our attack and the already studied attacks [112, 165]
that exploit non-persistent address bar in mobile browsers, and argue that our attack
is more dangerous and easier to launch.
3.5.1 Attack and Experimental Evaluation
A tenant attacker (descendant) can launch a phishing attack if he can navigate the
cross-origin top-level window and the top-level window’s address bar is not visible to
the user.
Consider a webpage www.honest.com consisting of a malicious cross-origin ad-
vertisement as shown in Figure 4 (left). The onload event of the ad is to navi-
gate the top-level window to www.attacker.com, which looks exactly the same as




! AOL.com - Welcome to AOL
!
!Options                                         Back
!
! AOL.com - Welcome to AOL
!
!Options                                         Back
Phishing (exploiting top-level frame navigation policy)
Figure 4: Left image: www.aol.com webpage containing a cross-origin malicious
advertisement. The browser displays only the ‘title’ of the page and does not display
the address bar.; Right image: Due to the top-level frame navigation policy, the
malicious ad can redirect the top-level window to www.attacker.com, which looks
exactly the same as AOL’s website, thereby launching a phishing attack. The user
cannot detect the attack since the address bar containing the URL of the top window
is not included in the mobile browser’s view due to space constraint. The Nokia
Mini-Map and Blackberry Mango browsers are the most susceptible to this attack.
However, all other mobile and tablet browsers (except Chrome Beta and iPad2 Safari)
are also susceptible to this attack due to address bar not being persistently available
while browsing.
www.honest.com (Figure 4 (right)) and contains malicious content. When the ad on
the honest page is loaded, it navigates the top-level window to the attacker’s page.
If the user’s browser shows the address bar of the top-level window, the user may
be able to detect the phishing attack and refrain from interacting with the malicious
page. However, if the user’s browser does not show the address bar, the user cannot
detect the phishing attack. The Appendix provides sample code for this attack.
Experimental Evaluation:
Mobile and tablet browser results: All ten mobile and three tablet browsers
allow a tenant principal of any origin to navigate the top-level window to any source.
The iPhone Safari browser minimizes the top-level address bar for better usability
once a page is rendered. Moreover, the address bar disappears from view once a user
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starts interacting with the content on the page. This behavior is seen in all mobile
browsers except Blackberry Mango, Chrome Beta, IE Mobile 8 and Nokia Mini-Map.
IE Mobile browser persistently displays the address bar only in the portrait mode and
never in the landscape mode. The Chrome Beta is the only mobile browser allowing
persistent view of the address bar. In the Blackberry Mango and Nokia Mini-Map
browsers, the address bar of the top-level window is never accessible to the user on
the screen while browsing. The web address of the top-level window can be viewed
from Options → Advanced → Page Info in the Nokia Mini-Map browser. In the
Blackberry Mango browser, a user is required to click on the lock icon in the top
right corner of the screen to access the address of the webpage. It is difficult for a
user to browse to this page info every time he wants to access the top level URL. This
makes the Blackberry Mango and Nokia Mini-Map browsers the most susceptible to
phishing attacks by navigation of top-level window to malicious pages, since the user
can never detect the attack unless he intentionally checks the page information and
views the webpage’s address.
Interestingly, Safari on the iPad2 differs slightly from its iPhone version in that
the address bar is present at all times, enabling users to protect themselves from the
phishing attack. However, the Android tablet browsers (both Xoom and Galaxy)
exhibit similar behavior as their mobile version and hide the address bar when a
user starts interacting with the webpage. Therefore, the Android tablet browsers are
susceptible to the phishing attack. We also note that due to the smaller screen size
of mobile browsers, the complete URL of a webpage is not necessarily displayed to a
user. This makes it even more difficult for a user to make a decision of the credibility
of a website at the time of page load, when the address bar temporarily flickers at
the top of the browser.
Desktop browser results: All five desktop browsers allow a tenant principal of
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any origin to navigate the top-level window to any source. However, the desktop
browsers always display the address bar in the window. We note that if Chrome’s
option to hide the address bar becomes the widespread default, the ‘Top-Level Frame
Navigation’ policy should be reconsidered for all browsers.
3.5.2 Analysis
When a user interacts with a webpage on a desktop browser by scrolling or zooming,
the top-level address bar is always available to the user. However, because of the
drastically reduced screen size of mobile devices, removing the address bar from view
makes sense in mobile browsers. Because this necessarily pushes the address bar out
of the user’s sight for most of the time while browsing, the current policy for top-
level frame navigation is not appropriate for mobile browsers. We discuss potential
solutions to this problem in Section 6.4.3.
We note that our phishing attack is significantly different than the existing phish-
ing attacks [112, 165, 183] exploiting address bar hiding in mobile browsers. The
existing attacks [112, 165] assume that the user is already on a phishing website,
spoof the address bar and then preclude the user from viewing the ‘real’ address bar
using Javascript. Therefore, a successful attack requires an attacker to trick a user
into browsing to the phishing website. Our attack does not assume that a user is
already on a phishing website. Instead, an attacker can post an advertisement on any
legitimate website and then redirect the user to a phishing website without requiring
any explicit user interaction. This makes our attack more dangerous and feasible as
compared to the attacks that require user interaction to launch a phishing website.
Any legitimate website hosting cross-origin content becomes vulnerable to our attack.
We note that once an attacker redirects a user to a phishing website by exploiting the
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Table 3: Summary of observed display-related vulnerabilities in candidate browsers
and respective attacks possible (A Xdepicts that attack is possible). 1) Equivalent
vulnerabilities exist in mobile and tablet browsers with different rendering engines.
2) Mobile, tablet and desktop browsers from the same vendor do not necessarily
implement the same code to handle display elements in different settings. 3) Desktop
browsers are more compliant with security policies for display.
Type Rendering Browser Name
Attacks
Engine
Vulnerability - Vulnerability - Vulnerability -
Incorrect handling of Cross-origin tenant Inconsistent
user access to modifying self view of
overlapping elements dimensions address bar
Click fraud, Login Display Ballooning:




Android X X X
Blackberry Webkit X
Chrome Beta
iPhone Safari X X
Nokia Mini-Map X X
Presto Opera Mini X X XOpera Mobile X X
Gecko Firefox Mobile X
Mango Blackberry Mango X
Trident Internet Explorer X
Tablet Webkit
Android on Xoom X X
Android on Galaxy X





top-level frame navigation policy, existing address bar spoofing techniques [112, 165]
can be used to increase the success rate of the attack.
3.6 Discussion and Potential Solutions
Mobile browsers necessarily make considerations for the constrained platform on
which they run. Unfortunately, in the process of porting their software to these
devices, vendors have introduced a number of new classes of vulnerabilities. While
seemingly unrelated, Table 3 shows that these issues are repeated across many mo-
bile browser vendors. The vulnerabilities presented in this work are made even more
dangerous by the constrained nature of the mobile screen as shown in Section 3.4.2.
A subset of vendors of the evaluated browsers have confirmed the presence of
the vulnerabilities [2–4]. We note that unavailability of a standard for user event
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routing and boundary control may be a cause of these vulnerabilities. Identical vul-
nerabilities were observed in browsers irrespective of the rendering engine used or the
manufacturer. For example, the Android Mobile (Webkit) and Opera Mini (Presto)
browsers exhibit the same issues; whereas, the five Webkit-based mobile browsers do
not demonstrate all of the same vulnerabilities. Intuitively, assuming that browsers
built by the same company have some overlap in the development teams suggests
that browser components may be reused across platforms. However, the differences
in the presence of vulnerabilities in the mobile, tablet and desktop browsers built
by the same vendor (e.g., Opera) suggests that new vulnerabilities have been intro-
duced while porting components from existing browser software to a new platform.
Whether the discovered vulnerabilities are implementation or design errors in individ-
ual browsers is hard to state with certainty. The pervasive nature of the vulnerabilities
hints at a more concerning trend.
We propose solutions for the vulnerabilities discussed in this chapter. Browsers
should always route the click, hover and write user events exclusively to the top ele-
ment in a stack of overlapped elements. This will provide consistency in handling user
event routing and also prevent the attacks discussed in Section 3.3.2. Secondly, The
attacks possible due to erroneous boundary control can be prohibited by restricting
dimensions of tenant iframes to those specified by the landlord irrespective of the
origins of the tenant and landlord. We note that the evaluated desktop browsers have
implemented preventive measures against the attacks discussed herein. We recognize
that if desktop browsers implemented the exact same erroneous policies discussed in
this work, they might be susceptible to the attacks described herein. However, it is
important to note that in addition to desktop browsers implementing the respective
policies correctly, the constrained screen size of mobile devices makes the attacks dis-
cussed in this work more plausible and dangerous on mobile browsers. For example,
the non-persistent nature of address bar and small screen size makes the phishing
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attacks discussed in Sections 3.4 and 3.5 more difficult to detect and easier to launch.
Although borrowing desktop browser policies addresses the vulnerabilities in user
event routing and boundary control, the small screen size of mobile devices demands
more restrictive policies than those implemented in desktop browsers to prevent the
phishing attack discussed in Section 3.5. We propose using Gazelle’s top-level frame
navigation policy [209] allowing only tenants with the same origin and the user to
navigate the top-level window. This approach would better balance issues of usability,
specifically screen real-estate, and security. A more extreme solution would be remov-
ing support for the top-level frame navigation policy from mobile browsers; however,
legitimate webpages relying on this mechanism for functionality may break. Offload-
ing security decisions to the cloud [62] would be another alternative solution to the
generic problem of tension between security and usability on small mobile screens.
Most critically, borrowing the top-level frame navigation policy to the mobile environ-
ment is evidence that security and usability teams are not interacting closely enough
with each other. Any solutions should be applied with input from both groups.
We evaluated the impact of the discovered vulnerabilities on formally defined
display security policies in earlier works. One of the recent works on display security
in desktop browsers that solved some well-known issues is the Gazelle browser work
by Wang et al. [209]. Gazelle is a secure web browser [209] that defines more formal
access control rules for position, dimension, content and content source (location)
control between cross-origin principals. According to Gazelle’s display access control
matrix (refer to the Ideal column in Table 4 and Table 5), a landlord should be able to
read and write the position and dimensions of a tenant. The landlord can write over
the entire tenant screen area with new content (change location) without modifying
the current tenant’s private content. However, he should not be able to read or write
a cross-origin tenant’s private content (pixels). The tenant should be able to read
and write its own pixels and read its own dimensions.
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We tested the candidate mobile and desktop browsers against these proposed
policies. Our experiments showed that the desktop browsers conform to all of the
suggested policies. However, the mobile and tablet browsers violated recommended
display security policies due to the new found vulnerabilities in user event routing
and boundary control. The mobile browsers susceptible to the ‘user interaction inter-
ception’ attack allow a landlord to read the cross-origin tenant’s private information
(user interaction) as shown in Table 4. Moreover, the mobile browsers allowing ‘dis-
play ballooning’ allow a tenant to write its own dimensions (Table 5). This shows
that the new found vulnerabilities violate formally specified display security policies.
Table 4: Gazelle’s (the ideal column) policies for a landlord to access a cross-origin
tenant’s position, dimensions, pixels and URL location. R: Read access. W: Write
access. R*: Android mobile, Android tablet on Xoom, Nokia Mini-Map and Opera
Mini browsers allow a landlord to read user interaction with its cross-origin tenant.
This vulnerability breaches the access control policy for the tenant’s ‘pixels’ allowing
the landlord to launch the user interaction interception attack.
Landlord
Fail Pass
Ideal Android mobile, Nokia Android tablet on Galaxy,Android tablet Mini Chrome Beta, iPhone and
[209] on Xoom, Map iPad2 Safari, IE Mobile,
Opera Mini Opera Mini and Mobile,
Blackberry Mango and Webkit
position (x,y,z) RW RW RW RW
dimensions (height, width) RW RW RW RW
pixels – R* R* –
URL location W W – W
The relevance of our observations goes well beyond web browsing. A significant
amount of research effort has recently focused on the security of mobile applica-
tions [102, 105, 106]. These studies have generally centered around applications built
for specific platforms. However, an increasing number of applications are becoming
highly dependent on the browser. In particular, applications by a number of popu-
lar companies (e.g., BBC) are actually wrappers around the browser and point their
users to specific webpages within a target domain. The advantage to this approach
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Table 5: Gazelle’s (the ideal column) policies for a tenant of a cross-origin landlord
to access its own position and dimensions on the landlord’s page, its URL location
and its pixel content. R: Read access. W: Write access. RW*: Android mobile,
iPhone and iPad2 Safari, Opera Mini and Opera Mobile allow a cross-origin tenant
to write self dimensions and are thus susceptible to the phishing and password stealing
attacks. IE Mobile does not allow a tenant to read self dimensions. This may allow a





Android mobile, Android tablet on
IEiPhone and Galaxy and Xoom,
iPad2 Safari, Chrome Beta, Firefox Mobile
[209] Opera Mini Mobile, Nokia Mini-Map,
and Mobile Blackberry Mango
and Webkit
position (x,y,z) – – – –
dimensions (height, width) R RW * R –
pixels RW RW RW RW
URL location RW RW RW RW
is that it allows companies to ensure a relatively consistent user experience across all
platforms with minimal development effort. As a consequence, however, such “appli-
cations” now also potentially become vulnerable to the kinds of attacks discussed in
this chapter.
3.7 Conclusion
Constrained screen size fundamentally changes the browsing experience on mobile
phones. Crowded layout, the inability to consume large amounts of content con-
currently and the difficulty in discerning boundaries between different objects on a
webpage make it hard for users to browse the web in the manner to which they are
accustomed. In response to these problems and to alleviate these difficulties, mobile
browsers have been changed significantly from their desktop counterparts. However,
the impact of these changes on security has not been studied. In this work, we perform
the first large-scale comparison of display security between the most popular mobile,
tablet and desktop browsers and demonstrate that the differences are far from simply
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cosmetic. We identify and implement a number of attacks based on two new classes
of vulnerabilities found only on mobile and tablet browsers, and then present solu-
tions to address the vulnerabilities. We then identify a third class of vulnerability
that exploits the small screen size of mobile devices and a universally implemented
policy in all browsers. Our results and feedback from browser vendors exemplify that
new vulnerabilities have been introduced while porting browser software to mobile
platforms and that usability should be considered while designing solutions instead
of blindly porting desktop browser code to the mobile environment.
3.8 Appendix
A] Code Samples:




style="position:absolute; top:20; left:10;" WIDTH="250" HEIGHT="100"></IFRAME>




Image.png is the image shown in Figure 2 (left). The image totally overlaps the iframe
below it.
2) Display ballooning attack (Section 3.4.2): Widget code
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<Module>











The attacker.html iframe contains the malicious imitated widgets for Amazon and
YouTube.
3) Phishing attack (Section 3.5.1)
1) Parent code:
<html>
<head> Legitimate parent </head>
<body>
<IFRAME src="http://www.evil-advertisement.html" WIDTH=300 HEIGHT=300></IFRAME>
</body>
</html>












The parent includes a malicious advertisement from http://www.evil-advertisement.html,
which in turn navigates the top-level window of the browser to http://www.phishing-attack.com
that looks exactly like the original parent webpage.
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CHAPTER IV
AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF SSL INDICATORS IN
MOBILE BROWSERS
4.1 Introduction
Mobile browsers provide a rich set of features that often rival their desktop counter-
parts. From support for Javascript and access to location information to the ability
for third-party applications to render content through WebViews, browsers are be-
ginning to serve as one of the critical enablers of modern mobile computing. Such
functionality, in combination with the near universal implementation of strong cryp-
tographic tools including SSL/TLS, allows users to become increasingly reliant upon
mobile devices to enable sensitive personal, social and financial exchanges.
In spite of the availability of SSL/TLS, mobile users are regularly becoming the
target of malicious behavior. A 2011 report indicates that mobile users are three times
more likely to access phishing websites than desktop users [80]. Security indicators
(i.e., certificate information, lock icons, cipher selection, etc.) in web browsers offer
one of the few defenses against such attacks. A user can view different security
indicators and related certificate information presented by the browser to offer signals
or clues about the credibility of a website. Although mobile and tablet browsers
appear to support similar security indicators when compared to desktop browsers,
the reasons behind the increasing number of attacks on mobile browsers [24, 31] are
not immediately clear.
In this chapter, we perform the first comprehensive empirical evaluation of security
indicators in mobile web browsers. The goal of this work is not to determine if average
users take advantage of such cues, but instead whether security indicators are applied
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in a manner that allows expert users to accurately determine the identity of a website
or verify the use of strong cryptographic primitives for communications. We believe
that this distinction is critical because it highlights areas where not even the best
trained users will be able to differentiate between malicious and benign behavior.
Rather than an ad hoc analysis, we base our study on the recommendations set
forward by the W3C for user interface security [35] as a proxy for best practices. In
particular, we measure which browsers strictly conform to the absolute requirements
(“MUST” clauses) and prohibitions (“MUST NOT” clauses). We perform our analysis
across ten mobile and two tablet browsers, representing greater than 90% of the mobile
market share [39], and then compare our results against the five most popular desktop
browsers. Our experiments demonstrate that while the majority of desktop browsers
largely meet the W3C recommendations, all mobile browsers fail to meet many of
the guidelines. Additionally, we observe that mobile browsers exhibit tremendous
inconsistency in the presentation and availability of such indicators in contrast to
traditional desktop browsers.
Our main contribution is a comprehensive and systematic evaluation and compar-
ison of security indicators and security information for mobile and tablet browsers,
to our knowledge the first such analysis undertaken. The main findings of our ex-
periments are that all popular mobile and tablet browsers fail to meet, in numerous
instances, the recommendations in the W3C guidelines for user interface of security
information, whereas in comparison desktop browsers largely follow the guidelines.
Our findings of tremendous inconsistency of user interfaces across mobile browsers,
and between mobile and desktop browsers, are also expected to be of considerable
interest. Among other contributions, we outline attacks on mobile browsers, such as
phishing and undetectable man-in-the-middle, enabled by failure to properly follow
these guidelines; and we highlight missing security indicators, e.g., extended valida-
tion (EV) SSL indicators [34, 136, 192]. These are intended to convey an augmented
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assurance process, however we find most mobile browsers fail to implement EV-SSL
indicators visible to users, and their absence along with that of any distinguishing
browser behavior, precludes EV-SSL certificates from providing relying parties any
benefits beyond non-EV SSL certificates.
The remainder of our chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 provides def-
initions and explains the mandatory elements of the W3C guidelines; Section 4.3
provides the primary results of our evaluation; Section 4.5 discusses secondary obser-
vations; Section 4.4 presents ways in that a user can be mislead about the identity
of a website or the use of encryption and attacks that are enabled by this confusion;
Section ?? presents an overview of related research; and Section 5.7 offers a discussion
of our findings and concluding remarks.
4.2 Background on the W3C Recommendations
The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) has defined user interface guidelines [35] for
the presentation and communication of web security context information to end-users
of both desktop and mobile browsers. For context in later sections, we first define the
terminology and then provide a brief explanation of the W3C guidelines referenced
within this chapter.
4.2.1 Definitions
User interface elements: User interface elements in browsers are divided in two
categories [35]:
• Primary User Interface: the portions of a user interface that are available to
users without being solicited by a user interaction. The primary user interface
elements related to security traditionally include the padlock icon, the address
bar, the https URL prefix, the favicon, and the site-identity button or URL
coloring to signify the presence of EV-SSL and SSL certificates [34].
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• Secondary User Interface: the portions of a user interface that are available to
the user after they are solicited by a specific user interaction. The secondary
user interface elements related to security include the security properties dia-
log, domain name, owner information, verifier information, information on why
a certificate is trusted, validity period of manually accepted certificates (self-
signed) and cipher details of an SSL connection.
Trust anchor: A trust anchor represents an authoritative entity represented by a
public key and associated data. The public key is used to verify digital signatures
and the associated data is used to constrain the types of information for which the
trust anchor is authoritative. Relying parties (web browsers) use trust anchors to
determine if digitally signed information objects are valid by verifying digital signa-
tures using the trust anchor’s public key and by enforcing the constraints expressed
in the associated certificate data. Our interpretation is that a trust anchor refers to
a certificate authority (CA).
Root: A root is a trust anchor that is any certificate authority (CA).
Trusted root: A trusted root is a CA whose public key is a priori trusted by the
browser and may certify other keys.
Certificates: Public key certificates are widely used to provide keying material and
convey a website’s identity information to the user. The W3C defines four types
of certificates. We define two additional certificate types that are not covered in
the W3C document. We provide our interpretation for the definitions of certificate
types in the W3C document where they are ambiguous. For additional information
regarding the commercial practice of issuing and managing SSL certificates, please
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refer to the requirements defined by the CA/Browser forum [36].
• Validated certificate: This is a public key certificate that has been verified by
chaining up to a trusted root. Our interpretation is that a standard SSL cer-
tificate signed by a CA trusted by a browser refers to a validated certificate.
• Augmented assurance certificate: The certificate chain for such a certificate
MUST be validated up to a trusted root that is recognized as augmented assur-
ance qualified by the user agent (user’s browser). We interpret an EV-SSL cer-
tificate as an augmented assurance certificate that is validated by the browser.
• Self-signed certificate and untrusted root certificate: A self-signed certificate is
a certificate that is signed by its own creator and is not a priori trusted by a
browser. Our interpretation of an untrusted root certificate is that it refers to
a certificate holding the public key of a CA, that is signed by a CA not a priori
trusted by the user’s browser.
• Interactively accepted trust anchors or certificates: This refers to either a CA
or a website’s public key that is accepted by a user and thereby used as a
trust anchor by the browser. Whether the trust anchor is accepted just for the
present transaction or for the present and the future transactions depends on
the options presented to the user by the browser and then the option chosen by
the user.
• Unverifiable certificates: An unverifiable certificate refers to a certificate that is
neither included in a user’s browser, nor can be verified by the browser through
a trust chain.
• Untrusted site certificates: These certificates are signed by a trust anchor that
is not a root and the trust anchor is not included in the user’s browser.
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When a browser receives a website certificate, the public key therein (and the
certificate) is untrusted unless either the certificate was previously interactively
accepted (for future sessions), or trust can be derived in it transitively, through
a trust chain starting from a trust anchor (i.e., a CA key already trusted by the
browser).
Pinning: Pinning associates one or more certificates with a specific website. The
certificate provided by the website can either be self-signed or one issued by an un-
trusted root. Once a user interactively accepts such a certificate for the first time, the
browser pins the certificate to the website. After pinning, the browser warns users
only when the same website presents a different certificate. No warning messages are
shown by the browser if a site shows a certificate consistent with previously pinned
certificates for that site.
Identity Signal: An identity signal on a TLS-secured webpage includes information
about the owner of the webpage and the certificate issuer’s organization. A webpage’s
certificate provides its owner information and the issuer’s (e.g., Certificate Authority)
organization.
De-referencing a URI: The act of retrieving a representation of an information
resource identified by a URI is known as dereferencing that URI [27]. The act of
creating a representation is simply a transformation of information into an appropri-
ate form consumable by a user. For example, when a user accesses a bank account
statement, the binary data is retrieved from a database on the server and presented
to the user after conversion into a readable text format.
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TLS/SSL: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol allows client/server appli-
cations to communicate across a network in a way designed to prevent eavesdropping
and tampering. The predecessor protocol of TLS is called Secure Socket Layer (SSL).
Strong TLS: An http transaction is strongly TLS-protected if it is TLS-protected,
an https URL was used, strong TLS algorithms were negotiated for both confiden-
tiality and integrity protection, and at least one of the following conditions is true: the
server used a validated certificate that matches the dereferenced URI; the server used
a self-signed certificate that was pinned to the destination; the server used a certificate
chain leading to an untrusted root certificate that was pinned to the destination.
A strong TLS algorithm implies that no version of the TLS protocol that suffers
known security flaws has been negotiated. Therefore, versions of SSL prior to SSLv3
MUST NOT be considered strong. Additionally, a strong TLS algorithm must also
select a cipher suite for which key and algorithm strengths correspond to industry
practice. More information on strong and weak TLS algorithms can be found in the
W3C document [35] and RFC 4346 [26].
Weak TLS: An http transaction is weakly TLS-protected if it is TLS-protected,
but strong TLS protection could not be achieved for one of the following reasons:
TLS handshake used an anonymous key exchange algorithm, such as DH_anon; the
cryptographic algorithms negotiated are not considered strong, such as
TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_SHA; certificates were used that
are neither validated certificates nor self-signed certificates pinned to the destination.
Error messages: The W3C document defines common error interaction require-
ments and practices to signal two classes of errors ordered by increasing severity:
warning/caution messages and danger messages.
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Warning/caution messages are intended for situations when the system has reason
to believe that the user may be at risk based on the current security context infor-
mation, however a determination cannot positively be made. Danger Messages are
intended for situations when there is a positively identified danger to the user (i.e.,
not merely a risk).
Subject organization logotype: This is a logotype representing the organization iden-
tified in the subject name in the certificate.
4.2.2 W3C Guidelines
We chose a subset of the absolute requirements (MUST) and prohibitions (MUST
NOT) specified in the W3C user interface guidelines.1 We omitted the guidelines
represented by clauses including the MAY, MAY NOT, SHOULD and SHOULD
NOT keywords as they represent the optional guidelines [25]. We classify the W3C
guidelines into five categories: identity signal, certificates, TLS indicators, robustness
and error messages.
1) Identity signal: availability:
The security indicators showing identity of a website MUST be available to the
user either through the primary or the secondary interface at all times.
2) Certificates: required content:
In addition to the identity signal, the web browsers MUST make the following
security context information available through information sources (certificates): the
webpage’s domain name and the reason why the displayed information is trusted (or
not).
3) TLS indicators:
1The guidelines deemed to be the most critical and definitively testable were selected based on
the authors’ experience and knowledge of the area of SSL indicators.
56
Table 6: Details of the browsers used for experimental evaluation. (*: The version
numbers of these browsers were not apparent. We have used the default browsers
shipped with the referenced version of the OS.)
Category Browser Version Rendering Operating Device
Name Engine System
Mobile
Android 2.3.3 Webkit Android 2.3.3 Nexus One
Blackberry 5.0.0 Mango Blackberry Bold 9650OS 5.0.0.732
Blackberry 6.0.0 Webkit Blackberry OS 6 Torch 9800
Chrome Beta 0.16.4130.199 Webkit Android 4.0.3 Nexus S
Firefox Mobile 4 Beta 3 Gecko Android 2.3.3 Nexus One
Internet Explorer * Trident Windows Phone LG-C900Mobile 7.0.7004.0 OS
Nokia Browser 7.4.2.6 Webkit Symbian Belle Nokia 701
Opera Mini 6.0.24556 Presto Android 2.3.3 Nexus One5.0.019802 Presto iOS 4.1 (8B117) iPhone
Opera Mobile 11.00 Presto Android 2.3.3 Nexus One
Safari * Webkit iOS 4.1 (8B117) iPhone
Tablet Android * Webkit Android 3.1
Samsung
Galaxy
Safari * Webkit iOS 4.3.5 (8L1) iPad 2
Desktop
Chrome 15.0.874.106 Webkit OS X 10.6.8 –
Firefox 7.0.1 Gecko OS X 10.6.8 –
Internet Explorer 8.0.7600.16385 Trident Windows 7 –
Opera 11.52 Presto OS X 10.6.8 –
Safari 5.1.1 Webkit OS X 10.6.8 –
a) Significance of presence: Any UI indicator (such as the padlock) MUST NOT
signal the presence of a certificate unless all parts of the webpage are loaded from
servers presenting at least validated certificates over strongly TLS-protected interac-
tions.
b) Content and Indicator Proximity: Content MUST NOT be displayed in a
manner that confuses hosted content and browser chrome indicators, by allowing that
content to mimic chrome indicators in a position close to them.
c) Availability: The TLS indicators MUST be available to the user through the
primary or the secondary interface at all times.
4) Robustness: visibility of indicators:
Web content MUST NOT obscure the security user interface.
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5) Error messages:
a) Interruption: Both warning/caution and danger messages MUST interrupt the
user’s current task, such that the user has to acknowledge the message.
b) Proceeding options: Warning/caution messages MUST provide the user with
distinct options for how to proceed (i.e., these messages MUST NOT lead to a sit-
uation in which the only option presented to the user is to dismiss the warning and
continue).
c) Inhibit interaction: The interactions for danger messages MUST be presented
in a way that makes it impossible for the user to go to or interact with the destination
website that caused the danger situation to occur, without first explicitly interacting
with the danger message.
4.3 Empirical Observations
We evaluate ten mobile and two tablet browsers against the W3C recommended prac-
tices for security indicators. The details of the browsers are provided in Table 6. For
each of the guidelines described in Section 4.2.2, we create and run a set of experi-
ments to verify compliance on all the candidate browsers and record our observations.
All the experiments were performed on web browsers on real mobile phones, and are
recreated in the respective emulators to generate many of the figures throughout the
chapter. The browser versions used in our evaluation are approximately the latest as
of February 12th, 2012. Table 7 through Table 12 provide the synopsis of the results
of our experiments.
4.3.1 Identity Signal: Availability
An identity signal contains information about the owner of a website and the cor-
responding certificate issuer. Before issuing a certificate, the certificate provider re-
quests the contact email address for the website from a public domain name registrar,
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Table 7: Results of experiments on candidate mobile browsers to test compliance with
the first two W3C guidelines given in Section 4.2.2. Each guideline column consists of
sub-columns stating the experiments performed on the browsers. An × implies that
the browser does not comply with the respective W3C guideline. A · implies that the
browser complies with the respective W3C guideline.
Mobile and Tablet 1) Identity signal: availability 2) Certificates: required content
Browsers Owner Certificate Domain Information on
information issuer’s info name why certtificate
(See Table 6 for versions) available? available? available? trusted available?
Android · · · ×
Blackberry Mango · · · ·
Blackberry Webkit · · · ·
Chrome Beta · · · ×
Firefox Mobile · · · ×
iPhone Safari × × × ×
Nokia Browser · · · ×
Opera Mini × × × ×
Opera Mobile × × × ×
Windows IE Mobile × × × ×
Safari on iPad 2 × × × ×
Android on Galaxy · · · ×
Table 8: Results of experiments on traditional web browsers to test compliance with
the same guidelines as given in Table 7, with × and · symbols also implying the same.
Note that all the desktop browsers are compliant.
Desktop Browsers 1) Identity signal: availability 2) Certificates: required content
(See Table 6 Owner information Certificate issuer’s Domain name Information on why cert
for versions) available? information available? available? trusted available?
Chrome · · · ·
Firefox · · · ·
IE · · · ·
Opera · · · ·
Safari · · · ·
and checks that published address against the email address supplied in the certificate
request. Therefore, the owner of a website is someone in contact with the person who
registered the domain name. Popular browsers represent the owner information of a
website using different terminology including owner, subject, holder and organization.
We visited a public webpage presenting a trusted root certificate from all the can-
didate browsers. We then evaluated the browsers for the presence of identity signal,
either on the primary or the secondary interface.
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Figure 5: Identity information displayed by Firefox Mobile.
Observations: The IE Mobile, iPhone and iPad Safari, and Opera Mini and Mobile
browsers do not provide a user interface to view certificates. Accordingly, the identity
signal information is not available for a user of these browsers and thus none of these
five browsers comply with the W3C guideline for availability of identity signal. We
note that when a website presents a certificate that is from a CA not from a trusted
root, all the browsers provide an interface to view the certificate via an error message.
The Android mobile and tablet, Blackberry Mango and Webkit, Chrome Beta and
Nokia browsers always allow a user to view certificates (both trusted and untrusted)
and therefore comply with this guideline. A user is required to click the lock icon
to view certificate information on the Chrome Beta and Blackberry Mango browsers.
However, the browsers do not provide any visual indication to the user about this
process of accessing the certificate information. Browsers supporting a UI for viewing
certificate information provide a clear indication in the “options” in the browser menu.
Although the Firefox Mobile browser does not support a certificate UI, it displays the
identity information of a website when the site identity button is clicked, as shown in
Figure 5. All desktop browsers comply with this guideline. Tables 7 and 8 provide
the summary of our results.
4.3.2 Certificates: Required Content
In addition to the identity signal content, a certificate from a website must provide
the same website’s domain name and the reason why the displayed information is
trusted (or not). Trust reasons include whether or not a certificate was accepted
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interactively, whether a self-signed certificate was used, whether the self-signed cer-
tificate was pinned to the site that the user interacts with, and whether trust relevant
settings of the user agent were otherwise overridden through user action. We believe
that information such as “certificate is implicitly trusted” and “the certificate chain
is trusted/valid” also conveys the reason behind a browser trusting or not trusting a
particular website.
We analyzed the candidate browsers for the presence of the required certificate
content by visiting a website that uses strongly TLS-protected connection with its
clients.
Observations: The IE Mobile, iPhone and iPad Safari, and Opera Mini and Mo-
bile browsers do not provide a user interface to view certificates from trusted CAs.
Therefore, these browsers fail to meet the W3C guideline. Additionally, even though
the remaining mobile and tablet browsers provide a user interface to view certificate
information, they do not provide an explanation on why a particular certificate is
trusted. Only the Blackberry Mango and Webkit browsers comply with the guideline
by making all the required parts of a certificate available. When a website presents
a certificate from a trusted CA, the Blackberry Mango and Webkit browsers show
the reason “certificate is implicitly trusted”. Therefore, all but two mobile and tablet
browsers fail to meet this W3C guideline. All desktop browsers follow this guideline
correctly. Tables 7 and 8 provide the summary of our results.
4.3.3 TLS Indicators
TLS indicators include the https prefix, the padlock icon, information about the
ciphers used in the connection and url coloring (or site identity button) to depict the
61
Table 9: Results of experiments on candidate mobile browsers to test compliance
with the W3C guidelines 3a and 3b given in Section 4.2.2. The symbol notation
is as defined in Table 7. ‘s’: Implies that the https URL prefix is present on the
‘s’econdary interface.
Mobile and Tablet TLS indicators
Browsers 3a) significance of presence 3b) position
(See Table 6 for versions) Mixed content: Mixed content: Favicon not next
no lock shown? no https shown? to lock icon?
Android Open lock with × ×
a question mark
Blackberry Mango × × ·
Blackberry Webkit × × ·
Chrome Beta Closed lock with https striked ·
a cross on top through
Firefox Mobile No security × ·
indicators shown
iPhone Safari · × ·
Nokia Browser · × ·
Opera Mini · × ·
Opera Mobile · × ·
Windows IE Mobile × × ·
Safari on iPad 2 · × ·
Android on Galaxy Open lock with × ·
a question mark
Table 10: Results of experiments on traditional web browsers to test compliance with
the same guidelines as Table 9. The symbol notation is as defined in Table 7. ‘p’:
Implies that the https URL prefix is present on the ‘p’rimary interface.
Desktop Browsers TLS indicators
(See Table 6 3a) significance of presence 3b) position
for versions) Mixed content: Mixed content: Favicon not next
no lock shown? no https shown? to lock icon?
Chrome Lock with a × ·
yellow triangle
Firefox · × ·
IE · × ·
Opera · × ·
Safari · × ·
difference between EV-SSL and SSL certified webpages.
a) Significance of presence: If a web browser displays a TLS indicator for the
presence of a certificate for a webpage consisting of content obtained over both http
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Figure 6: Blackberry Mango browser rendering a mixed content webpage. Note that
the webpage contains a Google map obtained over an http connection. Although the
webpage holds mixed content, the browser displays the padlock icon as well as the
https URL prefix indicators. This behavior fails to meet with guideline 3a.
and https connections (mixed content), this guideline is not followed.
We created a simple webpage that uses a strong TLS connection to retrieve the
top level resource and embedded a map obtained from a third-party over an unse-
cured http connection. We analyzed the browsers while rendering the this page for
two basic TLS security indicators: the https URL prefix and the padlock icon. If a
browser shows any of these two indicators on a mixed content webpage, it does not
follow the W3C guideline. We also observed whether a browser shows a warning to
the user suggesting the presence of mixed content on the webpage.
Observations: The Blackberry Mango, Blackberry Webkit and IE Mobile browsers
display a lock icon on a webpage holding mixed content, thus failing to meet the
W3C guideline. Figure 6 shows a screen shot of the Blackberry Mango browser when
a mixed content webpage is rendered. The Blackberry Webkit and IE Mobile browsers
display a mixed-content warning and, if the user proceeds to the webpage, a lock icon
is displayed. The Android browsers on the mobile and tablet devices present an open
lock with a question mark inside the lock. The Chrome Beta browser displays a
closed lock with a cross on top and a striked through https URL prefix for a mixed
content webpage. This behavior of Android and Chrome is inconsistent with the other
browsers. Therefore, it is necessary for the users of these browsers to understand the
meaning of the new symbols in order to interpret its reference to mixed content on a
webpage.
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Android Mobile Blackberry Mango Blackberry Webkit
Chrome Beta Firefox Mobile Internet Explorer Mobile
Nokia Browser Opera Mini Opera Mobile
iPhone Safari Safari TabletAndroid Tablet
Figure 7: Security indicators on the primary interface (address bar) of all the mobile
and tablet browsers. Every browser has three screenshots of the address bar: from
top to bottom, the websites are Google over an http connection, Gmail over a secure
connection with an SSL certificate and Bank of America over a secure connection
with an EV-SSL certificate.
All the browsers display the https URL prefix either on the primary or the sec-
ondary interface. We note that this issue is present even in popular desktop browsers.
The behavior of displaying the https URL prefix on a mixed content webpage fails
to meet the W3C recommendation in both the desktop and mobile environments as
shown in Tables 9 and 10.
b) Content and Indicator Proximity: The padlock icon used as a security in-
dicator and the favicon used as an identity element of a website are two popular
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Figure 8: The address bar of the Android browser when a webpage over SSL is loaded.
The browser places the favicon adjacent to the lock icon, thereby violating the W3C
guideline 3b described in Section 4.2.2. The star icon to the right of the address bar
is to bookmark the webpage.
elements that use a browser’s chrome. If a browser allows a favicon to be placed next
to the padlock, an attacker can feign a secure website by mimicking the favicon as
a security indicator. We evaluate this scenario by visiting a webpage over a strong
TLS connection from all candidate browsers and observed the relative locations of
the favicon and padlock.
Observations: The Android mobile browser does not follow the W3C guideline. The
browser places the favicon of a webpage beside the padlock icon as shown in Figure 8.
All other browsers adhere to this guideline, as shown in Tables 9 and 10.
We observed several inconsistencies in the use and position of the padlock icon
and the favicon in the mobile and tablet browsers. As shown in Figure 7, the favicon
is displayed only on the Android (mobile and tablet), Blackberry Webkit and Firefox
Mobile browsers. The remaining mobile and tablet browsers never display a favicon.
This behavior is inconsistent with desktop browsers. We believe lack of screen space
to be one of the drivers behind the removal of the favicon from the mobile environ-
ment. In addition to the almost total lack of use of favicons, we also noticed that
the position of the padlock icon in mobile browsers is inconsistent across different
mobile browsers. In the past, researchers have shown that the padlock icon is the
security indicator most often noticed by users [100,211]. Traditional desktop browsers
generally display the padlock icon in the address bar. However, all mobile and tablet
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Table 11: Results of experiments on candidate mobile browsers to test compliance
with the W3C guidelines 3c and 4 given in Section 4.2.2. The symbol notation is
as defined in Table 7. ‘s’: Implies that the https URL prefix is present on the
‘s’econdary interface.
Mobile and Tablet TLS indicators 4) Robustness
Browsers 3c) availability Content obscures
(See Table 6 for versions) https prefix Lock shown? Cipher details indicators on
available? available? the address bar?
Android ·(s) · × ×
Blackberry Mango ·(s) · · NA
Blackberry Webkit ·(s) · · ×
Chrome Beta · · · ×
Firefox Mobile ·(s) · On clicking the × ×
site identity button
iPhone Safari ·(s) · × ×
Nokia Browser ·(s) · × ×
Opera Mini ·(s) · × ×
Opera Mobile ·(s) · × ×
Windows IE Mobile ·(s) · × ×
Safari on iPad 2 ·(s) · × ·
Android on Galaxy ·(s) · × ×
browsers except Android (mobile and tablet), Blackberry Webkit, Chrome Beta, and
IE Mobile browsers display the lock icon on the title bar instead of the address bar.
We believe that the reason behind this shift of location of the padlock icon in the
mobile and tablet browsers is the non-persistent availability of the address bar to the
user. Whenever a user starts interacting with a webpage, most mobile browsers hide
the address bar to accommodate more content on the small screen.
c) Availability: We studied the presence of the lock icon, the https URL prefix
and details of the cipher used in a TLS connection by visiting a TLS protected web-
page using all candidate browsers. The padlock icon and the https URL prefix are
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Table 12: Results of experiments on traditional web browsers to test compliance with
the same guidelines as Table 9. The symbol notation is as defined in Table 7. ‘p’:
Implies that the https URL prefix is present on the ‘p’rimary interface.
Desktop Browsers TLS indicators 4) Robustness
(See Table 6 3c) availability Content obscures
for versions) https prefix Lock shown? Cipher details indicators on
available? available? the address bar?
Chrome ·(p) · · ·
Firefox ·(p) · On clicking the · ·
site identity button
IE ·(p) · × ·
Opera ·(p) · · ·
Safari ·(p) · × ·
primary interface indicators and cipher information is a secondary interface indicator
on desktop browsers.
Observations: Websites handling sensitive digital transactions (such as banks) ask
users to search for the https URL prefix to ensure security of their transactions.
Therefore, easy access to the https URL prefix is important. This indicator is
present in the address bar (primary interface) of desktop browsers and is clearly
visible to the user at all times. Among the mobile and tablet browsers, all but the
Blackberry Mango browser display the https URL prefix in the address bar. The
Blackberry Mango browser does not have an address bar and provides a choice to
view the webpage’s URL from the browser’s options. This setting requires a user to
be knowledgable of the change to be able to find the URL of the current webpage
and also makes the https URL prefix a secondary interface indicator. Although the
other mobile browsers display the https URL prefix in the address bar, they hide the
address bar (except Chrome Beta) for better usability. In the Chrome Beta browser,
if the URL of a webpage is longer than the screen size, the https URL prefix is hidden.
Since a user is required to interact with the address bar to view the URL prefix of a
webpage, the https URL prefix becomes a secondary interface indicator in all mobile
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and tablet browsers. This increases the likelihood of a successful downgrade attack
(e.g., SSLstrip [30] attack) on the mobile and tablet browsers, since a user requires
effort to view the https URL prefix.
The information about the ciphers used in setting up the TLS connection between
a website server and the user’s browser is not available in any of the browsers except
Blackberry Mango andWebkit. Accordingly, all the mobile and tablet browsers except
two do not comply this W3C guideline for our experiments. Tables 11 and 12 provide
the summary of our results.
4.3.4 Robustness: Visibility of Indicators
The TLS indicators generally found on the primary interface are lock icon, https
URL prefix, URL coloring and site identity button. Typically, the address bar in a
web browser holds these indicators. Therefore, we examined whether web content
overwrites or pushes the address bar containing security indicators out of a user’s
view during browsing.
Observations: Presumably, in order to free up screen real estate for other purposes,
the address bar on all but one mobile browser is overwritten by web content once a
webpage is rendered and/or when a user starts interacting with the page. The IE
Mobile browser always displays the address bar, when the user accesses content in the
portrait view. However, the address bar is never displayed in IE Mobile when a user
interacts with a webpage in the landscape mode. The Chrome beta browser makes the
address bar persistently available in both the portrait and landscape modes. Out of
the two tablet browsers, only the tablet Safari browser avoids the security indicators
on the address bar being overwritten by a webpage’s content, therefore allowing a
persistent view of the security indicators on the primary interface. The Android
tablet browser hides the address bar once a webpage is rendered. Tables 11 and 12
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show that all the candidate desktop browsers follow this guideline unlike the mobile
and tablet browsers.
4.3.5 Error Messages
We created example scenarios that demand the warning/caution and danger messages,
given the definitions in the W3C document. The W3C document provides examples
of scenarios that demand a danger alert. However, as the document does not specify
any scenarios that should trigger warnings, we carried out our tests using the following
scenario.
We classified the scenario of a browser rendering a mixed content webpage as one
that should trigger a warning. This is because on a webpage with both insecure and
secure content, the user may or may not interact with the insecure content on the
webpage. Therefore, the browser system is unable to positively determine whether the
user is at risk. In contrast, we used an example scenario given in the W3C document
for our experiments on danger messages. The W3C document defines ‘rendering
a webpage presenting a self-signed certificate’ as one that should trigger a danger
message, since the certificate is not from a trusted root.
a) Interruption: We examined whether the mobile and tablet browsers display a
warning or danger message in our test scenarios. We further observed the nature of
the messages to confirm that they actually interrupt the user’s actions as specified
by the W3C guidelines and are not displayed at a position on the screen which a user
can ignore and continue interacting with the website.
Observations: Only four mobile and tablet browsers (Android Galaxy, Blackberry
Webkit, IE Mobile and Nokia) display a warning notifying the user of the existence
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Table 13: Results of experiments on traditional web browsers to test compliance with
the W3C guidelines 5a, 5b and 5c given in Section 4.2.2. The symbol notation is
as defined in Table 7. NA: Implies that the concerned experiment is not applicable
to that browser, the reasoning can be found in the text. (*: Our view is that a
browser should display a warning message for a webpage holding mixed content, to
avoid misleading users trained to interpret SSL indicators to mean that the (entire)
webpage is secured.) ×∗: Implies that the browser fails to warn a user according to
our view.
Mobile and Tablet 5) Error messages
Browsers 5a) Interruption 5b) Proceeding 5c) Inhibit
(See Table 6 for versions) Warning Danger options Interaction
(mixed content) (self-signed (for warnings) (for danger
cert) messages)
Android ×∗ · NA∗ ·
Blackberry Mango ×∗ · NA∗ ·
Blackberry Webkit · · “Continue, Close connection, ·
View cert, Trust cert" options
Chrome Beta ×∗ · NA∗ ·
Firefox Mobile ×∗ · NA∗ ·
iPhone Safari ×∗ · NA∗ ·
Nokia Browser · · · ·
Opera Mini ×∗ × NA∗ ×
Opera Mobile ×∗ · NA∗ ·
Windows IE Mobile · · “Yes and No" ·
options
Safari on iPad 2 ×∗ · NA∗ ·
Android on Galaxy · · “Continue, View Certificate, ·
Go Back” options
Table 14: Results of experiments on traditional web browsers to test compliance with
the same guidelines as Table 11. The symbol notation is as defined in Table 7 and
Table 11.
Desktop Browsers 5) Error messages
(See Table 6 5a) Interruption 5b) Proceeding 5c) Inhibit
for versions) Warning Danger options interaction
(mixed content) (self-signed cert) (for warnings) (for danger messages)
Chrome ×∗ · NA∗ ·
site identity button
shows a warning
Firefox ×∗ · NA∗ ·
IE · · “Yes, No” ·
More info options
Opera ×∗ · NA∗ ·
Safari ×∗ · NA∗ ·
of insecure content on a mixed content webpage, before the webpage is rendered.
The other browsers do not interrupt the user by displaying a warning. The iPhone
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Safari browser shows a mixed content warning on a console that needs to be enabled
by a user and is intended for developers. We believe that most iPhone Safari users
are unlikely to enable the debug console, carefully browse the debug messages and
therefore understand the presence of mixed content. Among the desktop browsers,
only IE displays a mixed content warning, thereby interrupting a user.
The mobile and tablet browsers comply with the interruption guideline by dis-
playing a danger message, when a webpage with a self-signed certificate is rendered.
The Opera Mini browser is the only browser that does not display a danger message
in this scenario; it simply renders the webpage and does not show any TLS indicators.
b) Proceeding options: We examined whether the warning message displayed for
a mixed content webpage provides a user with more than one option to proceed after
interruption.
Observations: Only the Android Galaxy, Blackberry Webkit, IE Mobile and Nokia
browsers display a warning message when navigated to a mixed content webpage.
The IE Mobile browser informs the user about the presence of unsecured content on
the webpage and provides two options for continuing: <Yes, No>. However, there is
no option to the user to view the certificate provided by the top-level website using
a secured connection. Conversely, the Android Galaxy and Nokia browsers provide
an option to view a website’s certificate. The options presented by the Android
Galaxy browser are <Continue, View Certificate, Go back> and those presented by
the Nokia browser are <Options, Back>. The “Go back” and “Back” options nav-
igate the user to a webpage viewed right before the mixed content webpage. The
options provided by the Nokia browser are <Accept this time only, Accept perma-
nently, Certificate details>. The Blackberry Webkit browser provides the options to
<Continue, Close Connection (default), View Certificate, Trust Certificate>. Among
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    anonymized URL  
    Anonymized URL
Figure 9: Danger message on iPhone Safari when a website presenting a self-signed
certificate is accessed. This message interrupts the user and also inhibits the user
from proceeding without interacting with the danger message first. Note that the
website’s URL has been anonymized for submission.
the desktop browsers, IE provides <Yes, No, More info> options to proceed when a
mixed content webpage is rendered.
c) Inhibit interaction: This guideline requires a browser to prevent a user from
interacting with a website that triggers a danger message, before user interaction
with the danger message. We visited a website presenting an untrusted self-signed
certificate from all the browsers.
Observations: All mobile and tablet browsers except Opera Mini display a danger
message on receiving a self-signed certificate. Additionally, they restrict a user’s
interaction to the danger message. A user is unable to access the website content
before explicitly interacting with the danger message. Figure 9 shows the danger
message presented by the iPhone Safari browser before loading a webpage with a
self-signed certificate. The Opera Mini browser does not show an error for self-
signed certificates. It simply routes the user to the webpage presenting the self-signed
certificate. All desktop browsers correctly follow this guideline. Table 11 and Table 12
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summarize our experimental results of the error message guidelines.
4.4 User Deception and Potential Attacks
Table 15: Summary of potential attacks on candidate mobile browsers. A × implies


































































Phishing without SSL × · · · · · · · · · · ·
Phishing with SSL · × · · · × · × × × × ·
Phishing using a · × · · · × · × × × × ·
compromised CA
Industrial espionage/ × × × × × × × × × × × ×
Eavesdropping
The W3C user interface guidelines, which we use as a proxy for best practice,
are an effort to communicate security information to users such that they can make
informed decisions about websites that they visit. If these guidelines are not imple-
mented by a browser, users are more easily misled about the identity of a website or
the security of a connection. We discuss four attacks that are enabled on browsers vi-
olating one or more of the W3C guidelines. Table 15 provides a summary of potential
attacks described in this section on the candidate browsers.
4.4.1 Deception Methods
We discuss techniques to confuse user perception about the security of a website’s
pages when rendered in a browser that fails to meet one or more of the W3C guidelines.
A malicious website or a network attacker successful in deceiving a user is more likely
to succeed in stealing a user’s sensitive information (i.e., phishing). We assume that
a malicious website principal or a network attacker has knowledge of the incomplete
security indicators in popular mobile browsers. We also assume that an honest user
visits a website using a mobile browser that does not follow one or more of the W3C
guidelines discussed in Section 4.2.2. Violation of a single W3C guideline may permit
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multiple attack vectors. The goal of an adversary is to trick the user into believing
that they are interacting with a secure website when they are actually interacting
with an insecure one.
1. Close imitation of identity information: A malicious website can closely
imitate the identity of a legitimate website to confuse a user. Attackers of-
ten buy domains that very closely resemble a legitimate website’s domain in
addition to imitating the content of the legitimate website. For example, an
attacker can buy the domain “bankofamericaa.com” that closely resembles the
“bankofamerica.com” domain (the malicious one has an additional ‘a’ at the
end of bankofamerica). Difficulty in clearly viewing a website’s URL due to the
constrained screen size of a mobile device allows for the possibility of a user
overlooking the slight difference in the domain name. Additionally, the attacker
can also obtain an inexpensive SSL certificate for his malicious website so that
the browser shows SSL indicators to the user to confuse the user into believing
that the malicious website is the legitimate one.
An expert user can view a website’s identity, domain name and reason behind
trusting the website, presented in the website’s certificate to identify the true
owner of the phishing website and avoid divulging sensitive information. Ab-
sence of the identity information of a website, domain name and the reason of
trusting that particular website certificate is a violation of guideline 1 and 2
given in Section 4.2.2.
2. Lock icon spoofing: The padlock icon is an important TLS indicator on the
primary interface of a browser. The padlock combined with the presence of the
https prefix in the URL signifies the presence or absence of SSL. The placement
of the padlock icon is critical because it provides a clean indication of encryption
and therefore security. If browsers situate a site’s favicon next to the padlock
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icon in the primary interface, the utility of the padlock icon is diminished.
A malicious website can make its favicon appear exactly the same as a user’s
browser’s padlock icon. This provides the illusion of strong TLS encryption and
allows an attacker to convince an expert user that his personal information (e.g.,
credit card number) is kept confidential and encrypted in transit. Moreover, the
fake padlock makes the website appear more legitimate without the attacker
purchasing any SSL certificates. Finally, a browser allowing an attacker to
manipulate the contents of the security indicators with website content is a
direct violation of guideline 3b described in Section 4.2.2.
3. Cipher downgrade: Aman-in-the-middle (network attacker) can tamper with
the initial messages sent by a client browser to establish an SSL connection with
a website server and force the negotiation of a weak cipher. An expert user can
refrain from providing sensitive information on a connection established using
a weak cipher, by viewing the cipher negotiated for the TLS connection with
the server. However, the same expert would be unable to detect the presence of
a weak cipher on an SSL connection carrying sensitive data if the browser does
not display cipher information of the connection. Such a browser fails to meet
the W3C requirement 3c in Section 4.2.2.
4. Substitute http for https: The https URL prefix is a TLS security indicator
signifying encryption on the channel between the client and the server. Since
the https URL prefix is available on the primary user interface (address bar),
a user can easily view this indicator while browsing sensitive data. If a network
attacker changes the intended https website to an http website, a user may
be able to recognize that he is using an unsecured connection by noticing the
change from https to http in the address bar.
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If the https prefix is not available to a user persistently, requirement 3c de-
scribed in Section 4.2.2 is not followed.
5. Mixed content: The content of a webpage is interpreted as mixed if the top-
level resource was retrieved through a strongly TLS protected http transac-
tion and some dependent resources were retrieved through a weakly protected
or unprotected http transaction. Dependent resources include inline images,
stylesheets, script content, and frame content. If a browser displays security in-
dicators defined for strongly TLS secured webpages on a webpage hosting mixed
content, users gain a false notion of security for the unsecured content. This
can lead to users providing sensitive information such as passwords while inter-
acting with unsecured http content embedded in a webpage whose top resource
is acquired over a strongly protected TLS connection. Moreover, this browser
behavior does not comply with the W3C guideline 3a given in Section 4.2.2.
4.4.2 Attacks
An attacker can exploit one or more of the above techniques for user deception to
launch a range of attacks. We describe four attacks in order of increasing effort
required from an attacker.
i) Phishing without SSL: An attacker masquerades as a trustworthy entity in a
phishing attack. By closely imitating a legitimate website’s identity information in
combination with lock icon spoofing, a malicious website can launch a phishing attack
without SSL on a browser violating the W3C guidelines 1, 2 and 3b as follows.
An attacker buys a domain name that closely resembles the domain name of the
legitimate website. For example, to spoof www.bankofamerica.com, the attacker buys
the domain name www.bankofamericaa.com. The attacker then imitates the content
of the targeted legitimate website. Instead of spending money on purchasing an
SSL certificate to increase the “false” credibility of the malicious website, an attacker
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instead makes the favicon of the malicious website a lock image. Therefore, the closely
imitated domain name provides an impression of correct identity of the intended
website and the spoofed lock provides an illusion of strong encryption.
When this malicious website is rendered in a browser that makes viewing the URL
of the website difficult, situates the favicon next to the padlock icon and does not offer
a UI to view identity information such as website owner’s name, even an advanced
user might be subjected to phishing.
ii) Phishing with SSL: Spoofing only the lock icon may not be adequate to launch
a successful phishing attack. To increase the credibility of a phishing website, the
attacker can buy an inexpensive SSL certificate for the website. The presence of a
valid certificate causes a browser to display SSL indicators such as the https URL
prefix and URL coloring (or colored site identity button) in addition to the lock icon
in the browser’s chrome. If a user blindly trusts just these SSL indicators and can
not verify additional identity information of the website (violation of guideline 1 and
2), he can be subjected to a phishing attack.
iii) Phishing using a compromised CA: Compromising a CA allows an attacker
to obtain rogue certificates for legitimate websites. There have been several such
attacks recently [37, 38]. If a user’s browser trusts a CA, the browser will accept all
certificates signed by the CA without showing any warning to the user. This behavior
persists even when the same CA is compromised and the necessary update to remove
the trusted CA from the browser has not been installed. An expert user who is
knowledgeable of a CA compromise can verify every certificate issuer’s organization
in the certificate chain, therefore declining interacting with a malicious website with a
rogue certificate. If a browser fails to meet guidelines 1 and 2, thereby not presenting
user interface to enable certificate viewing, even an expert user could be exposed to
a phishing attack.
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iv) Industrial espionage / eavesdropping: A man-in-the-middle (network) at-
tacker can use any one of the cipher downgrade, substituting http for https or
inserting mixed content techniques for user deception to launch an eavesdropping
attack on a user’s session as follows:
SSLstrip attack: The SSLstrip [30] man-in-the-middle attacker sits on a local
network and intercepts traffic. When the attacker detects a request to an encrypted
https site, he substitutes a duplicate of the intended destination as an unencrypted
http site. This switching strips away the security that prevents a third party from
stealing or modifying data, while deceiving the server that an encrypted page has
been sent to the client. The network attacker can also fake a lock icon in the stripped
http page, by replacing the favicon by a lock icon [154]. If the https prefix is not
available to a user persistently, he may not be able to recognize that he is using an
unsecured connection by noticing the change from https to http in the address bar.
A browser not displaying the https prefix persistently does not follow requirement
3c in Section 4.2.
Cipher downgrade attack: A man-in-the-middle (network attacker) can tamper
with the initial messages sent by a client browser to establish an SSL connection with
a website server. Before a TLS connection is set up, a client and server exchange a
list of ciphers that they support. A network attacker can modify the list of supported
ciphers sent by the client to a list containing only weak ciphers, and then forward the
client’s request/response to the server. On receiving a list of only weak ciphers (e.g.,
DES-CBC-SHA), the server can either drop the connection because no ciphers are
mutually supported, or provide support for that cipher and begin an encrypted session
with the weak cipher. When a connection using the weak cipher is initiated, all the
data in transit is protected using the weak cipher’s encryption scheme. This allows a
network attacker to capture the stream of data and break the weak encryption offline.
The attack is also useful to mislead even an expert user that their transactions are
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over a connection with strong encryption algorithms, since the SSL indicators such
as https URL prefix and lock icon are present even for a connection using a weak
cipher. If a browser does not display cipher information, it fails to meet the W3C
requirement 3c in Section 4.2.
Mixed content attack: A man-in-the-middle attacker can tamper (e.g., code injec-
tion) with the unencrypted content present on a webpage consisting of mixed content
and replace the original content with any malicious content of his choice. If a web
browser displays SSL indicators for a webpage containing mixed content (violation of
guideline 3a), even an expert user may be unable to detect a network attack exploiting
the mixed content on a webpage.
Our experimental results combined with this threat model make the candidate mo-
bile and tablet browsers susceptible to phishing and eavesdropping attacks as shown
in Table 15.
4.5 Additional results
We discuss our findings that are not directly related to the guidelines studied in
Section 4.3. We note our observations on the positive and negative characteristics
shown by the mobile and tablet browsers. We also discuss an important security
scenario that is not represented in the W3C guidelines and argue that it requires
attention. Table 16 provides a summary of the results covered in this section.
4.5.1 The Good
The W3C document defines two guidelines that MUST hold when strong TLS algo-
rithms are negotiated between a client and a server:
1. No version of the TLS protocol that suffers known security flaws has been
negotiated. At the point of writing of this document, versions of SSL prior to
SSLv3 MUST NOT be considered strong.
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Table 16: Results of the support for SSLv2, the null cipher, DES-CBC-SHA (weak
cipher) and whether browsers differentiate between EV-SSL and SSL certified web-
pages. The symbol notation is as defined in Table 7.
Mobile and Tablet SSLv2 Null cipher Weak cipher EV-SSL vs SSL
Browsers supported? supported? prohibited? differentiation?
(See Table 6 for versions) (DES-CBC-SHA)
Android · · × ×
Blackberry Mango · · × ×
Blackberry Webkit · · × ×
Chrome Beta · · · ×
Firefox Mobile · · · · (site identity
button coloring)
iPhone Safari · · × · (title
URL coloring)
Nokia Browser · · × ×
Opera Mini · · · ×
Opera Mobile · · · ×
Windows IE Mobile · · · ×
Safari on iPad 2 · · × · (title
URL coloring)
Android on Galaxy · · · ×
2. A cipher suite has been selected for which key and algorithm strengths corre-
spond to industry practice. The “export” cipher suites explicitly prohibited in
appendix A.5 of TLSv11 [26] (RFC 4346) MUST NOT be considered strong.
To verify the compliance with these guidelines we conducted two experiments.
SSLv2: We browsed to a website supporting only SSLv2 from each of the candidate
browsers. We found that all the mobile, tablet and desktop browsers comply with
the first guideline and do not support SSLv2.
Null cipher: The null cipher is one of the prohibited ciphers in RFC 4346 and
one of the most dangerous ciphers because it represents the lack of an encrypted
communication channel. To test browser compliance with the second guideline for
strong TLS algorithms, we built a website that supports only the null cipher. We
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observed that none of the mobile, tablet or desktop candidate browsers support the
null cipher.2
Discontinuing support for SSLv2 and the null cipher automatically reduces the
probability of cipher downgrade attacks on the candidate browsers.
4.5.2 The Bad
A browser supporting a weak cipher can enable a network attacker to break the
encrypted messages offline. The SSLv3 cipher-suite consists of certain weak ciphers,
although they are stronger than the SSLv2 ciphers and the null cipher. We verified the
support of the DES-CBC-SHA weak cipher. We observed that six (Android Mobile,
Blackberry Mango and Webkit, iPhone and iPad2 Safari and Nokia Browser) out of
the eleven mobile and tablet browsers support the weak cipher. The other mobile and
tablet browsers display error messages conveying the absence of a common encryption
protocol with the server. It is interesting to note that the the Safari browser in its
mobile, tablet and even desktop versions supports this weak cipher. However, the
Android tablet browser does not support this cipher, unlike its mobile version. Since
most mobile and tablet browsers do not allow users to see the cipher used on a TLS
connection, they can not determine that a weak cipher is being used. No desktop
browser other than Safari support this cipher.
4.5.3 The Silent
The W3C document does not establish guidelines for the browser user interface to
signify the difference between EV-SSL [34,192] and SSL certificates. The sole distinc-
tion between an SSL and an EV-SSL certificate from a user’s perspective is the set
of indicators on his browser. For example, the Firefox desktop browser uses a green
site identity button to convey the presence of an EV-SSL certificate on a website.
2We did not test for the support to all the prohibited ciphers (as given in TLSv11 [26]) by the
candidate browsers.
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However, the site identity button is blue in the same browser when a website with an
SSL certificate is rendered.
SSL certificates can be ‘domain-validation-only’ with minimal verification per-
formed on the details of the certificate. Since any successful SSL connection causes
the padlock icon to appear, users are not likely to be aware of whether the website
owner has been validated or not. Therefore, fraudulent websites have started using
inexpensive domain-validated SSL certificates with minimal verification to gain user
trust. EV-SSL certificates were created to restore confidence among users that a
particular website has been subjected to more rigorous vetting and has a verifiable
identity. If browsers do not differentiate between SSL and EV-SSL certificates, then
the fundamental motivation [34] behind EV-SSL certificates becomes void, so too
does the incentive for site owners to pay extra for such certificates. An SSL certifi-
cate from Go Daddy costs $12.99/year [9] and an EV-SSL certificate from VeriSign
costs $1499/year [22]. In a browser with no differentiation between SSL and EV-SSL,
both these certificates are the same from a user’s perspective. An adversary holding
a domain name and willing to spend money for the SSL certificate would then trigger
exactly the same user interface elements to users, and thus appear to provide identical
guarantees as a website certified by the more expensive certificate.
Experimental observations: We browsed both EV-SSL and SSL certified webpages
using all the candidate browsers. With the exceptions of the Firefox Mobile and the
iPhone and iPad Safari browsers, none of the mobile or tablet browsers display any
indicators that differentiate between EV-SSL and SSL certified webpages. The Firefox
Mobile browser uses green and blue colors of the site identity button to depict the
presence of EV-SSL and SSL certified webpages respectively. The Safari mobile and
tablet browsers use green and blue coloring of the ‘title’ to represent the difference
between EV-SSL and SSL. This behavior of the Firefox Mobile and the Safari browsers
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is consistent with their desktop counterparts. However, the IE Mobile, and the Opera
Mini and Mobile browsers are not consistent with the methods used on their desktop
counterparts to portray the different between EV-SSL and SSL webpages.
Gauging the security level of a website using the different EV-SSL and SSL indi-
cators can be complicated for an average user. The inconsistency across the mobile
and desktop browsers from the same vendor adds to an already confusing task. We
believe that a clear guideline on the indicators for differentiating between EV-SSL and
SSL certified webpages is necessary to help browser vendors provide the expected in-
terface consistently in the desktop and mobile environments. Moreover, we suggest
that a guideline from a well established international standards organization such as
the W3C is a minimal starting point in order to achieve consistency across browser
software from different vendors.
We note the following advice within official guidelines from the CA/Browser Fo-
rum [29]: In cases where the relying application accepts both EV and non-EV certifi-
cates, it is recommended that the application’s behavior differ in a distinct way for each
type of certificate. Application developers should consider the EV treatment offered by
other application developers that also recognize EV certificates and, where practical,
provide consistent treatment. We believe that much more specific advice is essential,
for example, in a revision or extension of the W3C user interface guidelines [35].
4.6 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
4.6.1 Discussion
For this study, we selected a subset of the absolute requirements and prohibitions
from the W3C guidelines. From our experimental analysis, we observed that popular
mobile and tablet browsers fail to meet many of the guidelines. However, by and
large popular desktop browsers follow the set of guidelines studied in this chapter.
Furthermore, the inconsistencies that we observed herein are cause for significant
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concern, as consistency of user interfaces is recognized as a fundamental usability
attribute [132], conveying many user benefits including enhancing users’ ability to
transfer skills across similar systems, and reducing training time on new and related
systems. Moreover, related to security, inconsistency confuses users, and confusion
aids the attacker. Our results raise an important question: is it appropriate to apply
the same user interface guidelines for web security to both the desktop and the mobile
environments?
We believe that the non-conformance to the W3C guidelines and the inconsisten-
cies in the use and presentation of SSL indicators in mobile browsers is primarily due
to the adjustments made in the browser interface as a result of the tension between
usability and security, and possibly due to dis-connects between mobile and desktop
development teams. For example, the address bar consisting of the padlock icon and
the https URL prefix indicators is persistently available in desktop browsers, however
is hidden (apparently to better accommodate content on small mobile screens) for the
majority of the time during user interaction. It is cumbersome for a user to bring the
address bar in view (to observe indicators) by scrolling to the top of the mobile screen,
suggesting this will be done far less frequently, whereas viewing the indicators on a
desktop browser requires little or no extra effort. This ease of interaction with desk-
top browsers also makes consuming certificate information simpler for a user. Again
in contrast, current design decisions related to mobile screen real estate force users to
execute scrolling operations to view all the content of a certificate, implying greater
inconvenience and effort compared to consuming certificate information on desktop
browsers; in other cases, mobile browser vendors have decided to make certificate in-
formation entirely unavailable. Such significant design changes preclude even expert
users from discerning clues about the credibility and security of websites, due to the
absence of security indicators, leaving average users with no hope at all. These secu-
rity concerns, the very significant non-conformance with existing recommendations,
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and tremendous inconsistency both within and across browser vendors, lead us to
call for the establishment of new recommendations for the mobile environment that
specifically take into account its limitations and additional challenges.
4.6.2 Conclusion
Modern mobile browsers enable a range of sensitive operations over SSL/TLS connec-
tions. Although these browsers aim for equivalent functionality to traditional desk-
tops, their smaller screen size has resulted in significant changes to the presentation
and availability of SSL indicators. We have carried out the first evaluation of security
indicators in mobile browsers, using the W3C web interface guidelines to measure
compliance in ten mobile and two tablet browsers. We observed that mobile browsers
fail to meet many of the security guidelines and exhibit tremendous inconsistency in
the presentation and availability of SSL indicators in contrast to traditional desktop
browsers. Such significant design changes preclude even expert users from discerning
clues about the credibility and security of websites, raising significant concerns about
the security of average users. Additionally, we observed that the absence of clear and
consistent EV-SSL indications leads to EV-SSL certificates currently adding complex-
ity to the mobile ecosystem without any corresponding benefits. Our work may be
viewed as a call to arms for greater consistency in mobile browser security interfaces
and greater attention to the specific challenges of mobile device issues in security user
interface guidelines. It also raises questions about the utility and usability of security
indicators as presently implemented in mobile browsers and related questions about




KAYO: DETECTING MOBILE MALICIOUS WEBPAGES
IN REAL-TIME
5.1 Introduction
Mobile devices are increasingly being used to access the web. However, in spite of
significant advances in processor power and bandwidth, the browsing experience on
mobile devices is considerably different. These differences can largely be attributed
to the dramatic reduction of screen size, which impacts the content, functionality and
layout of mobile webpages.
Content, functionality and layout have regularly been used to perform static anal-
ysis to determine maliciousness in the desktop space [84, 147, 176]. Features such as
the frequency of iframes and the number of redirections have previously served as
strong indicators of malicious intent. Due to the significant changes made to accom-
modate mobile devices, such assertions may no longer be true. For example, whereas
such behavior would be flagged as suspicious in the desktop setting, many popular
benign mobile webpages require multiple redirections before users gain access to con-
tent. Previous techniques also fail to consider mobile specific webpage elements such
as calls to mobile APIs. For instance, links that spawn the phone’s dialer (and the
reputation of the number itself) can provide strong evidence of the intent of the page.
New tools are therefore necessary to identify malicious pages in the mobile web.
In this chapter, we present kAYO1, a fast and reliable static analysis technique
to detect malicious mobile webpages. kAYO uses static features of mobile webpages
1Our technique is called “kAYO” (knockout in boxing terminology) because it knocks out mali-
cious mobile webpages.
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derived from their HTML and JavaScript content, URL and advanced mobile specific
capabilities. We first experimentally demonstrate that the distributions of identical
static features when extracted from desktop and mobile webpages vary dramatically.
We then collect over 350,000 mobile benign and malicious webpages over a period of
three months. We then use a binomial classification technique to develop a model
for kAYO to provide 90% accuracy and 89% true positive rate. kAYO’s performance
matches or exceeds that of existing static techniques used in the desktop space. kAYO
also detects a number of malicious mobile webpages not precisely detected by existing
techniques such as VirusTotal and Google Safe Browsing. Finally, we discuss the
limitations of existing tools to detect mobile malicious webpages and build a browser
extension based on kAYO that provides real-time feedback to mobile browser users.
We make the following contributions:
• Experimentally demonstrate the differences in the “security features”
of desktop and mobile webpages: We experimentally demonstrate that the
distributions of static security features used in existing techniques (e.g., the
number of redirections) are different when measured on mobile and desktop
webpages. Moreover, we illustrate that certain static features are inversely
correlated to a webpage being malicious, when extracted from desktop and
mobile pages. The results of our experiments demonstrate the need for mobile
specific techniques for detecting malicious webpages.
• Design and implement a classifier for malicious and benign mobile
webpages: We collect over 350,000 benign and malicious mobile webpages.
We then identify a range of new mobile relevant static features from these web-
pages that distinguish between mobile benign and malicious webpages. kAYO
provides 90% accuracy in classification and shows improvement of two orders of
magnitude in the speed of feature extraction over similar existing techniques.
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We further empirically demonstrate the significance of kAYO’s features. Finally,
we also identify 173 mobile webpages implementing cross-channel attacks, which
attempt to induce mobile users to call numbers associated with known fraud
campaigns.
• Implement a browser extension based on kAYO: To the best of our
knowledge kAYO is the first technique that detects mobile specific malicious
webpages by static analysis. Existing tools such as Google Safe Browsing are
not enabled on the mobile versions of browsers, thereby precluding mobile users.
Moreover, the mobile specific design of kAYO enables detection of malicious
mobile webpages missed by existing techniques. Finally, our survey of existing
extensions on Firefox desktop browser suggests that there is a paucity of tools
that help users identify mobile malicious webpages. To fill this void and for
immediate use, we build a Firefox mobile browser extension using kAYO, which
informs users about the maliciousness of the webpages they intend to visit in
real-time.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an
overview of related research. Section 3 experimentally motivates the need for mobile
specific static techniques. The static feature set used in kAYO followed by the collec-
tion process of the data used in modeling kAYO is described in Section 4. Section 5
provides details about the machine learning techniques used, the implementation and
evaluation of kAYO’s model, the effectiveness of kAYO’s features, and comparison
of kAYO with existing techniques. The browser extension architecture is described
in Section 6. Section 7 presents case studies of malicious mobile webpages detected
by kAYO in the wild and also discusses the limitations of our technique and future






























































































Figure 10: Normalized density curves of static features when measured on mobile and
desktop webpages. There is substantial difference between the distributions of the
number of (a) iframes, (b) Javascript and (c) redirections when measured on mobile
and desktop versions of the same websites, whereas, the distribution of the number
of (d) IP addresses is similar.
5.2 Motivation
Static analysis techniques to detect malicious websites often use features of a webpage
such as HTML, JavaScript and characteristics of the URL. Usually, these features
are fed to machine learning techniques to classify benign and malicious webpages.
These techniques are predicated on the assumption that the features are distributed
differently across benign and malicious webpages. Accordingly, any changes in the
distribution of static features in benign and/or malicious webpages impacts classi-
fication results of static analysis techniques. While successful, these static analysis
techniques have been used exclusively for desktop webpages [84,176,218].
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Mobile websites are significantly different from their desktop counterparts in con-
tent, functionality and layout. Consequently, existing tools using static features to
detect malicious desktop webpages are unlikely to work for mobile webpages. We ex-
plain four factors that motivate building separate static analysis techniques to detect
malicious mobile webpages.
1) Differences in content: Mobile websites are often simpler than their desktop
counterparts. Therefore, the distribution of content-based static features (such as the
number of JavaScripts) on mobile webpages differs from that of desktop webpages. For
example, Figure 10 (a) and Figure 10 (b) show the normalized density of the number
of iframes and the number of Javascript found in mobile2 and the corresponding
desktop versions of the top-level webpage of the 10,000 most popular websites from
Alexa [46]. Approximately 90% of mobile webpages do not have any iframes, whereas
the corresponding desktop webpages have multiple iframes. Desktop webpages have
more Javascripts than mobile webpages.
Due to the simplicity of mobile webpages, the majority of other content related
static features used in existing techniques including, the number of images, page
length, the number of hidden elements, and the number of elements with a small area
also differ in magnitude in mobile and desktop webpages.
2) Infrastructure: Website providers use JavaScript or user agent strings to iden-
tify and then redirect mobile users to a mobile specific version. Figure 10 (c) shows
the normalized density of the number of redirection steps taken by the desktop and
mobile versions of the top 10,000 websites on Alexa before landing on the final URL3.
Even the most popular mobile websites show multiple redirects, which has tradition-
ally been a property of desktop websites hosting malware [176]. However, multiple
redirects does not necessarily indicate bad behavior for mobile websites due to the
2We describe the method used to define and identify mobile webpages in detail in Section 5.3.2.
3We use the term final URL to denote the URL that is rendered in the browser after redirections
(if any) from the seed URL. The final URL may change based on the browser’s user agent.
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characteristics of their hosting infrastructure.
We note that not all static features used in existing techniques differ when mea-
sured on mobile and desktop webpages. For example, the number of IP addresses
returned by DNS servers for mobile and desktop versions of the same sites are com-
parable. Mobile websites appear to share their hosting infrastructure with the cor-
responding desktop websites [146]. We used seven public (Google, OpenDNS, Ul-
traDNS, Norton, DynDNS, Level3, and Scrubit) DNS servers to obtain the IP ad-
dresses returned in the DNS A records of mobile and corresponding desktop URLs of
Alexa top 10,000 websites. As seen in Figure 10 (d), the distributions of the number
of IP addresses returned by the seven DNS servers are similar for mobile and desktop
websites.
3) Impact of screen size: The screen size of a mobile phone is significantly smaller
that that of a desktop computer. Therefore, a mobile user only sees a part of the URL
of a webpage. Intuitively, the author of a mobile phishing webpage may only need to
include misleading words at the beginning of the URL and a short URL might suffice
to trick a user.
4) Mobile specific functionality: Mobile websites enable access to a user’s per-
sonal information and advanced capabilities of mobile devices through web APIs.
Existing static analysis techniques do not consider these mobile specific functional-
ities in their feature set. We argue and later demonstrate that accounting for the
mobile specific functionalities helps identify new threats specific to the mobile web.
For example, the presence of a known ‘bank’ fraud number on a website might indi-
cate that the webpage is a phishing webpage imitating the same bank [64].
Limitations of existing techniques: These discrepancies between mobile and
desktop webpages demand investigation. Existing static analysis techniques and tools
for detecting malicious webpages are focused on desktop webpages. Therefore, they
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are unable to detect mobile specific threats with high accuracy.4 Secondly, several web-
pages built specifically for mobile, return empty pages when rendered in a desktop
browser. Thus, even existing dynamic analysis techniques that execute websites in
desktop browsers on virtual machines, are ineffective on such mobile websites. Fi-
nally, signature based tools such as Google Safe Browsing currently only work with
desktop browsers. We manually visited five mobile specific known malicious webpages
collected from PhishTank [16], from the Google Chrome mobile browser. We observed
that these webpages are flagged as malicious on the Chrome desktop browser, but
not on the Chrome mobile browser whose users are the real targets of the mobile
malicious webpages. Although enabling Google Safe Browsing in mobile Chrome is
an engineering effort, we argue and later demonstrate that a mobile specific static
technique can also detect new threats previously unseen by such services.
Goals: Considering the limitations of existing techniques, the goals of this work are
three-fold. First, identifying relevant static features from mobile specific webpages in
the wild. Second, implementing a fast and reliable static analysis technique to detect
malicious mobile webpages in real-time. And finally, developing a mobile browser
extension that will inspect mobile webpages in real-time and provide feedback to the
user.
5.3 Methodology
Our objective is to design and develop a technique to identify mobile specific mali-
cious webpages in real-time. We extract static features from a webpage and make
predictions about its potential maliciousness. We first discuss the feature set used in
kAYO followed by the collection process of the dataset.
4We demonstrate this experimentally in Section 5.4.
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Table 17: The 44 features of kAYO from four categories. According to our knowledge,
the category of mobile specific features is studied for the first time in this work. The
significance of these features is described in Section 5.4.2.
Category Features Total # offeatures
Mobile specific # of API calls to tel:, sms:, smsto:, mms:, 8mmsto:, geolocation; # of apk, # of ipa
JavaScript presence of JS, noscript, internal JS, external JS, embedded JS; 10# of JS, noscript, internal JS, external JS, embedded JS
HTML
presence of internal links, external links, images;
14
# of internal links, external links, images
# of cookies from header, secure and HTTPOnly cookies,
presence of redirections and iframes,
# of redirects and iframes,
whether webpage served over SSL,
% of white spaces in the HTML content
URL
# of misleading words in the URL such as bank,
12
# of forward slashes and question marks, digits,
# of dots, hyphens and underscores,
# of equal signs and ampersand, subdomains,
# of two letter subdomains, semicolons,
presence of subdomain, % of digits in hostname
length of URL
Total: 44
5.3.1 kAYO Feature Set
A webpage has several components including HTML and JavaScript code, image
files, the URL, and header information. Additionally, mobile specific webpages also
access applications running on a user’s device using web APIs (e.g., the dialer). We
extract structural, lexical and quantitative properties of such components to generate
kAYO’s feature set. We focus on extracting mobile relevant features that take minimal
extraction time. Our hypothesis is that such features are strong indicators of whether
a webpage has been built for assisting a user in their web browsing experience or for
malicious purposes.
Our feature set consists of 44 features in total, 11 of which are new and not
previously identified or used. We describe the newly identified features in detail. A
subset of features in kAYO have been used by other authors in static inspection of
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desktop webpages in the past.5 However, it is important to note that these features
when extracted from mobile webpages and desktop webpages differ in magnitude (e.g.,
number of iframes) and show varying correlation with the nature of the webpage (i.e.,
malicious/benign).
We divide kAYO’s 44 features into four classes: mobile specific features, JavaScript
features, HTML features and URL features. To the best of our knowledge, we are
the first to use these mobile specific features. Table 17 summarizes the 8 mobile, 10
JavaScript, 14 HTML and 12 URL features. We empirically illustrate the effectiveness
of each of the features in Section 5.4.2.
5.3.1.1 Mobile specific features
We collect eight mobile specific features to capture the advanced capabilities of mobile
webpages. Mobile websites enable access to personal data from a user’s phone, an
experience not offered by desktop websites. For example, APIs such as tel: and
sms: spawn the dialer and the SMS applications respectively on a mobile device.
In order to characterize the behavior of mobile API calls, we extracted the number
of API calls tel:, sms:, smsto:, mms: and mmsto: from each mobile webpage.
We further extracted the target phone numbers from these API calls. We ran the
commercially available Pindrop Security Phone Reputation System (PRS) [17] on
each phone number. Based on the results of the PRS, we gave the score of 1/0
(known fraud/benign) to each phone number scraped from the mobile API calls, and
added the score as a feature in kAYO. We only extracted phone numbers with API
prefixes that could trigger an application installed on a user’s phone. We did not
consider phone number strings simply listed on webpages without an API prefix.
We argue that due to the popularity of application markets such as Google play
5A subset of kAYO’s features was selected from prior literature on desktop webpage classification
using static features. Only the features deemed to be the most critical and definitively applicable to
mobile webpages as shown by manual analysis, were selected based on the authors’ experience and
knowledge of the area.
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and iTunes, a website hosting its own mobile application binary (e.g., .apk or .ipa
files), might suggest bad behavior. Therefore, we added number of .apk and .ipa files
found on a webpage as a feature. If we found more than a threshold (in the few
hundreds) of apk/ipa files on the same webpage, we assumed that the webpage was
an app store and was unlikely to be malicious.
5.3.1.2 JavaScript features
JavaScript enables client-side user interaction, asynchronous communication with
servers, and modification of the DOM objects of webpages on the fly. We extract
10 features that capture the JavaScript relevant static behavior of a webpage, two
of which are new. All the features are faster to extract than the features based on
JavaScript deobfuscation.
JavaScript found on malicious webpages can be obfuscated. Instead of deobfuscat-
ing every JavaScript, we extract simple JavaScript related features from a webpage.
The primary reason in choosing this approach is that a large number of benign web-
pages include potentially dangerous JavaScript code as shown by Yue et al. [215]. For
example, 44.4% of the top 6,805 websites from Alexa use the potentially dangerous
eval function. These observations invalidate the assumption made in existing tech-
niques [84]; that potentially dangerous JavaScript keywords are more frequently used
in malicious webpages. Secondly, external JavaScript can be very large, sometimes
of the order of a few megabytes. Our goal is to build a real-time browser extension
based on kAYO. Accordingly, we avoided using features that would slow down the
feature extraction process.
We argue that benign webpage writers take efforts in providing good user experi-
ence, whereas, the goal for malicious webpage authors is to trick a user into performing
unintentional action with minimal effort. We therefore determine whether a webpage
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has noscript content and also measure the number of noscript. Intuitively, a be-
nign webpage writer will have more noscript in the code to ensure good experience
even for a security savvy user. We add these two newly identified features to our set.
Webpages generally include three types of JavaScript: internal, external and em-
bedded. An internal JavaScript is one hosted on the same domain as that of its parent
webpage, whereas, an external JavaScript’s domain is different from its host’s domain.
Both internal and external JavaScript are simply links to JavaScript hosted elsewhere.
Since mobile webpages are often simpler than desktop webpages and phishing is the
biggest threat on mobile webpages at present, we expect that benign webpages will
include more external JavaScript for advertisements and analytics purposes, whereas
malicious webpages will have a lower number of external JavaScript. Accordingly,
we determine whether a webpage holds external and internal JavaScript, and then
extract the number of internal and external JavaScript from a webpage. Unlike inter-
nal and external JavaScript, embedded JavaScript code is contained in the webpage.
If the number of lines of JavaScript is relatively small, a webpage with embedded
JavaScript loads faster than pages that must reference external code. This is be-
cause, as the web browser loads the page and encounters the reference to the external
code, it must make a separate request to the web server to fetch the code. Webpages
built for performance often use a number of embedded JavaScript. Performance is
critical in the mobile web since it impacts revenue and user interest [174]. Therefore,
we determine whether a webpage hosts embedded JavaScript and then calculate the
number of embedded JavaScript in a webpage. Our assumption is that on average,
benign webpages will have more embedded JavaScript. Finally, we determine whether
JavaScript is present at all on a webpage, and measure the total number of JavaScript
on the webpage including embedded, internal and external.
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5.3.1.3 HTML features
We extract 14 features in total from the HTML code of each webpage. Popular
webpages include a number of images, and internal and external HTML links for
better user experience. For example, the top-level page of m.cnn.com includes links
to other news articles published by CNN (internal HTML links), advertisements for
a local restaurant (external HTML link) and images related to the latest breaking
news. Accordingly, we first determine whether a webpage has any images, internal
and external HTML links. We then extract the number of internal links, external
links and images from a webpage as features of kAYO.
Malicious webpages (especially those implementing drive-by-downloads and click-
jacking) include links to bad content in iframes [176]. Recall that the distribution of
iframes on mobile webpages is different as compared to that on desktop webpages.
However, we do not rule out the possibility of a mobile malicious webpage including
malicious content in iframes and consider the presence and number of iframes in a
webpage as features in kAYO. Past research also shows that malicious websites take
several redirections before leading the user to the target webpage to avoid DNS based
detection [176]. Recall that mobile webpages generally take at least one or more
redirections since both desktop and mobile versions of the webpage share hosting
infrastructure. Therefore, we determine whether a webpage was redirected and then
measure the number of redirections the user experiences before landing on the final
URL. Finally, we extract other features such as the percentage of white spaces in
the HTML content, the number of cookies from the header, the number of secure
and HTTPOnly cookies, and whether the webpage is served over an SSL connection.
Readers are encouraged to refer to prior literature [84,156,218] for more information
on the usefulness of these HTML features.
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5.3.1.4 URL features
Structural and lexical properties of a URL have been used to differentiate between
malicious and benign webpages. However, using only URL features for such differen-
tiation leads to a high false positive rate. We extract 12 URL features in total.
Authors of phishing webpages often exploit the familiarity of users to a web-
page [97] by including words in the URL that can mislead a user into believing that
the phishing webpage is the legitimate webpage. Words such as login and bank are
commonly used in the URL of the login webpage for benign websites that are highly
prone to imitation. Only a part of the URL is visible to the user of a mobile phone
due to the small screen [58]. Therefore, intuitively, the author of a phishing webpage
will include misleading words at the beginning of the URL. We consider the presence
of such words in the URL as a new feature in kAYO.
A significant number of phishing domain names are simply IP addresses of ma-
chines hosting them [114, 155]. Therefore, we calculated the number of digits in a
URL and the percentage of digits in the hostname. Phishing webpage developers
usually create a number of subdomains to include deceptive keywords such as paypal
as a subdomain. This might increase the length of phishing URLs [155]. Therefore,
we include the length of a URL, whether the URL contains a subdomain, the num-
ber of subdomains, and the number of dots as features. Our URL feature set also
contains the number of semicolons, equal signs and ampersand symbols, hyphens and
underscores, forward slashes and question marks. Interested readers are referred to
prior literature [114,138,153] for details on the importance of these URL features.
Note that the HTML, JavaScript and URL features are not specific to mobile and
can be used for analyzing desktop webpages as well. However, the mobile features
derived from mobile applications such as dialer and SMS do not apply to desktop
webpages.
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Table 18: Indicators of mobile specific webpages extracted by manual analysis of the
top-level mobile and desktop webpages of the 1,000 most popular websites on Alexa.
We identified one top-level domain (TLD), nine subdomains and seven URL path
prefixes.
Mobile Webpage Indicators
Top Level Domain .mobi
Subdomain m., mobile., touch., 3g., sp.,s., mini., mobileweb., t.
URL Path Prefix /mobile, /mobileweb, /m, /mobi,/?m=1, /mobil, /m_home
5.3.2 Data Collection
Our data gathering process included accumulating labeled benign and malicious mo-
bile specific webpages. First, we describe an experiment that identifies and defines
‘mobile specific webpages’. We then conduct the data collection process over three
months in 2013.
Identification of mobile specific webpages: We crawled the top-level webpage of
the 1,000 most popular websites from Alexa.com [46] using the Android mobile and
desktop Internet Explorer (IE) browsers. We used Android mobile version 4.0 and
IE desktop version 9.0 for Windows 7. We then manually analyzed each pair of final
URLs for the same seed URL when crawled from each browser. Before classifying
a URL as mobile specific, we confirmed that the final URLs for desktop and mobile
were different for the same seed URL. We also compared the contents of each pair
of desktop and mobile webpages, and ensured that the two contents were different.
We ignored all the seed URLs that led to an identical final URL when crawled from
the desktop and the mobile browser. Our analysis identified nine subdomains (e.g.,
m.) and seven URL path prefixes (e.g., /mobile) in the URLs of popular websites to
represent their mobile specific webpages. Additionally, we considered all URLs with

























Figure 11: Number of mobile specific websites found in every 10,000 websites in the
top 1,000,000 URLs on Alexa.
specific webpage as one containing any of these 17 mobile indicators in the URL and
showing differences in content from the corresponding desktop webpage. Table 18
summarizes the mobile indicators.
Building the dataset: To generate training data for our model, we statically
crawled the top-level webpage of the top 1,000,000 most popular websites from Alexa
from an Android mobile browser. We then extracted the mobile specific webpages
using the algorithm described above. Figure 11 shows the number of top-level mobile
specific webpages found in the dataset. 1,244 out of the first 10,000 most popular
websites offer a mobile specific version and 763 maintain mobile specific webpages
in the 10,000-20,000 range. From 20,000 onwards upto one million, the number of
mobile specific webpages found using our algorithm is largely constant. We observed
that 485 out of the top one million Alexa websites have the ‘.mobi’ TLD. Using the
17 mobile indicators defined in Table 18, we collected 53,638 mobile specific URLs
at the top-level by statically crawling each website in Alexa from an Android mo-
bile browser. We then crawled each of the 53,638 mobile specific websites two levels
deep. Interestingly, we found links to several non-mobile URLs on the mobile specific
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webpages. We discarded all non-mobile webpages and were left with 295,512 mobile
specific URLs at depth two. In total, we derived 349,150 mobile specific URLs from
the Alexa one million websites.
Gathering data for malicious mobile URLs was challenging since the mobile web
is still evolving and new threats are emerging. We monitored several public black-
lists [10,11,13] continually for a period of three months and extracted mobile specific
URLs from the blacklists. We set up a continuous feed from two public blacklists
and crawled newly uploaded malicious URLs every two seconds. We also monitored
PhishTank’s [16] valid and online dataset for mobile specific phishing URLs. After
monitoring these sources for three months, we gathered data from 531 top-level and
4,681 depth two mobile specific malicious URLs. Note that our dataset also contains
mobile URLs that were submitted to the blacklists before 2013, but were live at the
time of crawling.
We established ground truth of the labels (malicious/benign) of webpages in our
dataset by using VirusTotal [23] and Google Safe Browsing [43]. The Google Safe
Browsing tool performs both static and dynamic analysis on webpages [176]. It first
discards benign webpages identified using static analysis and then performs dynamic
analysis on the webpages tagged as malicious following static analysis. VirusTotal
queries 41 different malware detection tools based on dynamic analysis, crowd sourc-
ing and signatures. To be conservative, we labeled a URL as malicious only when
Google Safe Browsing tagged a URL as malicious, or four or more tools queried by
VirusTotal labeled the URL as malicious. We also performed manual inspection if
necessary. For example, the URLs from PhishTank are crowdsourced, and Google
Safe Browsing and VirusTotal do not detect all valid URLs from PhishTank as ma-
licious. We manually visited such URLs to ensure that they are phishing webpages.
Our final dataset consisted of 349,137 benign URLs and 5,231 malicious URLs. We
used this dataset to train kAYO’s model.
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5.4 Implementation and Evaluation
We describe the machine learning techniques that we considered to tackle the problem
of classifying mobile specific webpages as malicious or benign. We then discuss the
strengths and weaknesses of each classification technique, and the process for selecting
the best model for kAYO. We build and evaluate our chosen model for accuracy, false
positive rate and true positive rate. Finally, we compare kAYO to similar existing
techniques and empirically demonstrate the significance of kAYO’s features.
5.4.1 Model Selection and Implementation
We treated the problem of detecting malicious webpages as a binary classification
problem. We considered each known benign mobile webpage as a negative sample
and each known malicious mobile webpage as a positive sample. We considered three
popular binary classification techniques in machine learning, Support Vector Machines
(SVM), naïve Bayes and logistic regression.
Support Vector Machines (SVM) is a popular binary classifier. However, it
works well only on a few thousand samples of data. Due to the scaling problem of
SVMs and our large dataset, SVM was not the best choice for kAYO.
Naïve Bayes is generally used when the values of different features are mutually
independent. Many features that we extracted were mutually dependent. For exam-
ple, the number of scripts in a webpage was dependent on the number of internal,
external and embedded JavaScript in the webpage, which were three other features
of our model. Since the assumptions required for optimal performance of naïve Bayes
did not hold for our dataset, we could not use the naïve Bayes classifier.
Logistic Regression is a scalable classification technique and makes no assumption
about the distribution of values of the features. Therefore, this technique was the
best fit for our dataset. We used the binomial variation of logistic regression to model


















Figure 12: The final ROC curve for kAYO’s logistic regression model with regular-
ization.
We used the scrapy [19] web scraping framework to crawl the collected mobile
URLs. We then built a parser for extracting features discussed in Section 5.3.1 from
each input webpage dynamically. The crawler and feature extraction scripts were
implemented in Python. We used logistic regression on the extracted features for
training and testing. We programmed the logistic regression model in the numerical
computing language Octave [8]. We tested the model on a machine with quad core
3.4 GHz Intel Core i7 processor and 16 GB memory.
5.4.2 Evaluation
Our dataset contained 349,137 benign URLs and 5,231 malicious URLs. We divided
our dataset into three subsets: training, cross-validation and test. We first randomly
shuffled the data and set aside 10% of the data as the test set. The remaining 90%
of data was used for training and 10-fold cross-validation.
For each validation round we calculated the accuracy, the false positive rate and
the true positive rate on the validation set. We further used `1-regularization to avoid
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overfitting. We varied the regularization parameter from 0 to 1,000 in the intervals of
10 and chose the best parameter. We then plotted a ROC curve by taking the mean
of all false positive rates6 and false negative rates7 output from every cross-validation
step, and found the best threshold for differentiating between malicious and benign
data. Figure 12 shows the final ROC curve.
kAYO provided 91% true positive rate and 7% false positive rate on the cross-
validation set. We used the best parameters obtained from the training and cross-
validation steps to test the 10% labeled dataset set aside. Our test set shows 90%
accuracy, 8% false positive rate and 89% true positive rate. We anticipate that in
reality, the false positive rate on the test set would be lower than what was found
using the labeled samples. This is because kAYO detected a number of malicious
mobile URLs in the wild that we hand verified, and were not detected by tools that
we used for establishing ground truth of our datatset. More details on examples and
in-depth analysis of mobile malicious URLs detected by kAYO in the wild can be
found in Section 6.4.3.
Comparison with existing static techniques:8 We have identified and used 11
new mobile-relevant features previously not studied. We note that none of the ex-
isting techniques account for mobile specific features considered in kAYO. The non-
commercial static analysis technique closest to kAYO is Cantina [218]. It detects
phishing webpages in real-time using static features of webpages. We requested the
authors of Cantina to run our test URL set through their tool for direct comparison
with kAYO. However, the authors informed us that Cantina was not available. There-
fore, we could not compare kAYO’s performance directly with it. We instead compare
6False positive rate is equal to (1 - recall) or (1 - sensitivity).
7False negative rate is also known as precision or specificity.
8To the best of our knowledge, kAYO is the first technique that uses static features of webpages
to detect malicious mobile pages. Therefore, we compare against existing desktop techniques. We
also could not secure access to the code or software of these related desktop techniques from the
respective authors upon request. Thus, our only option was to base kAYO’s comparison on the
results discussed in the related research papers of existing techniques.
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Table 19: Comparison of kAYO with Cantina, a technique using static webpage fea-
tures to detect phishing webpages in real-time. kAYO’s evaluation set size is over two
orders of magnitude larger than that of Cantina. Moreover, kAYO’s feature extrac-
tion process is two orders of magnitude faster than Cantina. Cantina’s functionality
is dependent on external tools unlike kAYO and Cantina works well only on webpages
written in the English language. kAYO does not have these drawbacks.
Factor Cantina [213,218] kAYO
Designed to detect Phishing Mobile webthreats
Detects pages written in English-only Any language
Avg. feature extraction time 2.82 sec 0.016 sec
Evaluation set size 200 34914(# of webpages)
True positive rate 97% 89%
False positive rate 6% 8%
External dependencies Requires Google’s search Noneengine to function
Detects pages missed by No YesGoogle Safe Browsing?
kAYO with the methodology, speed and performance of Cantina given in related re-
search papers [213, 218]. Table 19 summarizes the comparisons. Cantina provides
better true positive rate and comparable false positive rate against kAYO. However,
there are several drawbacks to Cantina. First, Cantina’s functionality depends on
the results of Google’s search engine unlike kAYO. Moreover, Cantina assumes that
every webpage not ranked by Google is malicious. We argue that this is a strong
assumption and might lead to a high false positive rate. Additionally, this methodol-
ogy prevents Cantina from analyzing webpages not visited by Google’s search engine.
kAYO does not depend on any external tools and can detect malicious webpages
missed by Google Safe Browsing. Second, kAYO’s feature extraction process is over
two orders of magnitude faster than Cantina. On an average, kAYO takes 0.016 sec-
onds to extract the features of a webpage and Cantina takes 2.82 seconds. We argue
that this improvement in the speed of analyzing webpages makes kAYO more usable
than Cantina in real-time. Finally, Cantina performs well only on webpages written in
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Table 20: Comparison of kAYO with five existing static analysis techniques that
detect malicious desktop webpages. kAYO provides the lowest false positive rate on
an evaluation set twice as large as the one used by other techniques. kAYO also
considers mobile web threats, whereas, the other techniques are focused on detecting
desktop web threats.
Tech- Designed for Tested False Evalua-
nique Enviro- Threat on Pos tion setnment rate size
[84] Desktop Drive by Drive by 9.9 15000Downloads download only
[188] Desktop Malicious Drive by 13.7 15000JavaScript download only
[153] Desktop Spam URLs Drive by 14.8 15000download only
Union of Desktop Drive by, Drive by 17.1 15000[153,188] malicious JS, download only
[108,147] spam URLs
kAYO Mobile Existing Existing mobile 8.1 34914mobile web web threats
threats
English due to its heuristic features whereas kAYO can work with webpages written
in any language.
We also compared kAYO’s performance with existing static analysis tools that
detect non-phishing attacks. The closest non-commercial tool to kAYO based on the
diversity of features and the scale of the evaluation set is Prophiler [84]. Prophiler de-
tects drive-by-downloads on desktop webpages. We contacted the authors of Prophiler
and to allow us to run our URL dataset on their tool. However, they too informed us
that their tool was not available. Therefore, we could not perform a direct comparison
of kAYO with Prophiler. We instead compare kAYO’s performance with the perfor-
mance numbers of existing static techniques described by Canali et al. [84]. Canali et
al. performed an analysis of 15,000 webpages consisting of about 5,000 known web-
pages launching drive-by-downloads. The contenders of the comparison were then
existing tools detecting malicious JavaScript [108, 147, 188], drive-by-downloads [84]
and spam URLs [153]. Table 20 and Table 21 show the comparison of performance
106
Table 21: Comparison of kAYO with five existing static analysis techniques that
detect malicious desktop webpages. kAYO’s feature extraction process is 10 times
faster than the fastest existing technique [188] and classification time is 100 times
faster than the fastest existing technique [153]. kAYO is the only technique that
considers mobile specific features of webpages.
Technique
Time in sec Considers
Feature Classi- mobile
extraction fication webpages?
[84] 3.06 0.24 7
[188] 0.15 0.034 7
[153] 3.56 0.020 7
Union of N/A N/A 7[108,147,153,188]
kAYO 0.016 0.0002 3
of kAYO with each of these techniques. kAYO provides the lowest false positive rate
over an evaluation set twice as large as the one used by other techniques as shown
in Table 20. Moreover, kAYO’s feature extraction process is 10 times faster than the
fastest existing technique [188] and classification process is 100 times faster than the
fastest existing technique [153]. Finally, all the existing techniques are focused on
desktop threats, whereas, kAYO focuses on mobile specific threats. Accordingly, had
we been able to run these tools over our dataset, they would have performed more
poorly.
Need for mobile specific techniques: Because neither Cantina nor Prophiler were
made available to us, we performed an experiment to demonstrate the need for new
mobile specific models. Intuitively, due to the disparity in the same static features
when measured on mobile and desktop webpages (as discussed in Section 5.2), and
the emergence of new mobile specific features, a model trained on desktop webpages
will not generate precise results for mobile webpages. Note that we are not making
claims about the exact performance of each system against our dataset; rather, we
are attempting to demonstrate (in the absence of either being made available and in


















Figure 13: Ex1: Results of a model trained on desktop webpages using desktop
features studied in earlier techniques and then tested on mobile webpages. Ex2:
Results of a model trained on mobile webpages by adding mobile specific features
to the feature set and tested on mobile webpages. Ex1 shows that a model trained
on desktop pages using static features from earlier desktop-specific techniques, when
applied to mobile webpages performs poorly. However, when a model is trained with
the same static features and additional mobile specific features exclusively on a mobile
datatset, the results of testing on a mobile dataset improve significantly as seen in
Ex2.
features identified in this work perform significantly worse than our own when ana-
lyzing malicious mobile webpages. A more exact comparison would only be available
if the authors of these systems make them available.
For this experiment, we created a training dataset of desktop webpages and a test
datatset of mobile webpages. We statically crawled Alexa top 10,000 webpages to the
second level using the desktop Internet Explorer browser version 9.0 for Windows 7.
We obtained the desktop malicious webpages by monitoring public blacklists [10, 11,
13] and crawling live URLs to level two. We verified ground truth of these URLs using
Google Safe Browsing and VirusTotal. We randomly shuffled the collected webpages
and chose 10,000 webpages while keeping the proportion of benign and malicious
webpages in the dataset equivalent to the mobile dataset described in Section 5.3.2.
We then created a test dataset of 1000 mobile benign and malicious webpages by
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randomly selecting URLs from the larger dataset described in Section 5.3.2.
We extracted 33 out of the 44 static features in kAYO from each webpage in the
desktop and mobile datasets. We disregarded the 11 new mobile features used in
kAYO and instead focused our analysis on the 33 features previously used in similar
desktop static techniques. We note that the goal of this experiment is not to extract
all desktop relevant features used earlier, but demonstrate that a model trained on
features extracted from desktop webpages does not perform well when applied to
mobile webpages. We believe that these 33 features accurately represent the static
features used in earlier techniques to detect malicious desktop webpages [84,108,114,
147,153,188,213,218].
We used logistic regression with regularization to train a model on the desktop
webpage dataset and tested the model on the mobile dataset. Figure 13 shows the
results of our experiments. Ex1 shows that using 33 features, we achieved 77% accu-
racy in training on desktop webpages. However, when the parameters obtained from
this model were applied to the mobile dataset, the accuracy reduced significantly to
40%. The difference between the accuracy of the training and testing dataset is the
important comparison metric in this experiment as it demonstrates the inability of
previous desktop-only models to accurately characterize mobile webpages. Ex2 simply
shows kAYO’s results (discussed in Section 5.4.2) of training and testing on mobile
webpages considering mobile specific features. Both training (91%) and testing (90%)
dataset accuracies improve notably. More importantly, the accuracies of the training
and testing datasets in Ex2 are comparable unlike those in Ex1. These results further
corroborate our intuition that mobile specific static techniques are necessary.
Proprietary techniques: We note that the static analysis component of Google’s
Safe Browsing tool is proprietary and no information can be retrieved about its per-
formance. Moreover, Google Safe Browsing is not enabled on mobile browsers at


























Feature Number (44 in total)
Newly identified features
Features adopted from other techniques
Figure 14: The Pearson Coefficient Correlation (PCC) of each of the features ex-
tracted in kAYO with the label (malicious/benign), found using our evaluation
dataset. Each point corresponds to the correlation of a feature with the label. In
total there are 44 points corresponding to the 44 features of kAYO, including the
newly identified features and the ones adopted from existing techniques. The Y value
of each point depicts the predictive power of the corresponding feature i.e. PCC. The
greater the absolute value of the PCC of a feature, the better predictive power of the
feature. Note that all the PCC values are non-zero implying that every feature in
kAYO’s feature set is significant and impacts the result of classification.
and Firefox mobile browser users do not benefit from this information unlike the
desktop users of these browsers. Even though enabling Safe Browsing on mobile is
an engineering effort, we later demonstrate the importance of employing a mobile
specific technique such as kAYO.
Significance of kAYO’s feature set: It is important to observe that kAYO’s
feature set has been carefully created to ensure relevance to mobile webpages and
negligible extraction time. We experimentally demonstrate the significance of kAYO’s
features using the Pearson product-moment Correlation Coefficient (PCC). PCC is
a measure of the linear dependence between two variables giving a value between
+1 and −1 inclusive [180]. In other words, PCC provides information about the
predictive power of a feature over the classification result. The larger the absolute


























7) Output 7) Output 
5) Is page mobile?
Yes No
Figure 15: Architecture of the mobile browser extension based on kAYO. User enters
the URL he wants to visit in the extension toolbar and receives a response in real-time
from our backend server about the maliciousness of the URL. If the URL is benign
according to kAYO, the page of interest is rendered in the browser. Otherwise, the
user is shown a warning message to not visit the URL.
with PCC -0.6 is a better predictor of whether a webpage is malicious than a feature
with PCC 0.21. It is important to note that identifying features with very high PCC
values is extremely difficult given the hundreds of different components of webpages
and the diversity of possible threats.
We find the PCC between each feature in kAYO’s feature set and the label (be-
nign/malicious), from the test set used for evaluation. Intuitively, if kAYO’s features
are significant, then the absolute value of the PCC of each feature with the label
must be non-zero. Figure 14 shows the plot of the PCC of each of the 44 features of
kAYO with the label. The circles show the PCC of the newly identified features of
kAYO and the Xs depict the PCC of features adopted from earlier works. As seen in
the Figure, all the PCC values are non-zero, implying that every feature in kAYO is
significant.
Comparison with existing browser tools: Browser extensions and plugins help
protect users from visiting malicious websites. The most prevalent threat on the mo-
bile web at present is phishing. Therefore, we surveyed the most popular anti-phishing
Firefox desktop extensions for comparison with kAYO. These 33 extensions were se-
lected by searching for the keyword ‘phishing’ on the Firefox extension store. Most
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of the extensions were certificate verifiers, password protectors or file protectors. We
did not find any extensions performing content-based static analysis. We disregarded
extensions that were built only for one specific website (e.g., FB Phishing Protector
and LibertyGuard) or were no longer supported (e.g. Nophish). We then chose the
top five extensions (Anti Phishing 1.0, DontPhishMe, Netcraft Toolbar, PhishTank
SiteChecker and Phish Tester) based on the number of users for further analysis. We
randomly selected a set of 10 known malicious URLs from our dataset and queried
each tool with the URLs. PhishTank SiteChecker simply queried PhishTank and re-
turned the result, detecting three of the 10 URLs. Netcraft detected three out of the
10 URLs as well, two of which were also detected by Phish Advisor. Anti Phishing
1.0 detected one URL. Phish Tester and DontPhishMe did not generate any results.
We also tested the freely available trial version of the Lookout safe browsing
tool [12]. Lookout is one of the most popular security applications available for
mobile devices. This tool protects users of the Android mobile and the Chrome mobile
browsers from phishing scams and malicious links on the mobile web. We browsed the
same 10 known malicious URLs from both the Android mobile and Chrome mobile
browser on a device running the Android 4.0 operating system. We were presented
with alerts for only two out of the 10 URLs by Lookout, while kAYO detected eight
out of the 10 webpages.
Given the paucity of a working extension to detect different threats on mobile web-
pages, and the unavailability of signature-based tools such as Google Safe Browsing
for mobile browsers, we developed a mobile browser extension using kAYO.
5.5 Browser Extension
Building a browser extension based on kAYO adds value for two reasons. First, the
mobile specific design of kAYO enables detection of new threats previously unseen
by existing services (e.g., pages including spam phone numbers). Second, building an
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extension allows immediate use of our technique. We discuss other potential avenues
of adopting kAYO in Section 5.6.3.
We developed a browser extension using kAYO for Firefox Mobile9, which informs
users about the maliciousness of the webpages they intend to visit. Our goal was to
build an extension that runs in real-time. Therefore, instead of running the feature
extraction process in a mobile browser, we outsourced the processing intensive func-
tions to a backend server. Figure 15 shows the architecture of the extension. User
enters the URL he wants to visit in the extension toolbar. The extension then opens
a socket and sends the URL and user agent information to kAYO’s backend server
over HTTPS. The server crawls the mobile URL and extracts static features from
the webpage. This feature set is input to kAYO’s trained model, which classifies the
webpage as malicious or benign. The output is then sent back to the user’s browser
in real-time. If the URL is benign according to kAYO, the extension renders the
intended webpage in the browser automatically. Otherwise, a warning message is
shown to the user recommending them not to visit the URL.
Users of the extension will browse both mobile specific and desktop webpages since
not all websites offer a mobile specific version. Recall that being a mobile specific
technique, kAYO does not perform well on desktop webpages. Consequently, pro-
cessing all pages of interest through kAYO might output incorrect results for desktop
webpages. To address this problem, the backend server first detects whether the in-
tended webpage is mobile specific using the same method explained in Section 5.3.2.
The webpage is processed by kAYO only if it is mobile. The desktop webpages are
analyzed using Google Safe Browsing. Note that any other existing technique for
detecting desktop malicious webpages can be used instead of Google Safe Browsing.
We performed manual analysis of 100 randomly selected URLs (90 benign and 10
9Firefox Mobile is one of the very few mainstream mobile browsers that support browser exten-
sions. Similar extensions can easily be developed on other mobile browsers once supported.
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malicious) from our test dataset and measured the performance of kAYO in real-time.
On an average, an output was received in approximately one second from the time
the user entered a URL in kAYO’s toolbar. We argue that the good performance is
due to careful selection of quickly extractable features and lower complexity of mobile
webpages as compared to desktop webpages. The maximum delay in result generation
was seen in scraping the input webpage from its respective server. Caching already
scraped webpages with an acceptable expiration time can further reduce this delay.
Figure 16 shows a screen shot of our browser extension at work. We plan to make
the extension available publicly post publication.
5.6 Discussion
kAYO detected a number of malicious webpages in the wild that were not found by
existing techniques. We investigate these webpages in detail and then describe the
limitations and future work of kAYO.
5.6.1 Investigating False Positives
We used Google Safe Browsing and VirusTotal for establishing ground truth of our
dataset for training and evaluating kAYO. However, such dynamic analysis techniques
execute webpages on desktop browsers running on virtual machines and miss mobile
specific threats. To validate our intuition, we performed manual analysis on webpages
that were identified as malicious by kAYO, but were tagged as benign by Google Safe
Browsing and VirusTotal. Performing manual in-depth analysis for all webpages
classified as malicious by kAYO was not feasible. Therefore, we chose a random
subset of 100 URLs from the false positives obtained by running kAYO on the test
dataset in Section 5.4.2.
We verified each of the 100 URLs by visiting them manually from an Android
mobile browser version 4.0. We found 10 URLs to be suspicious. These 10 URLs
contained survey pages to win iPads or Visa gift cards, uncommon online electronic
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equipment stores and stores selling health-related products. Most URLs did not have
a Google page rank. One particular webpage prompted a user to download a binary
file masquerading as a flash update. We downloaded and found the binary file to be
malicious by querying VirusTotal. Another webpage had a known bank fraud phone
number prefixed with the tel: API. Two out of the 10 suspicious URLs were also
marked as suspicious by the Lookout safe browsing tool. We have reported these 10
webpages to PhishTank. Five out of the 10 URLs that we submitted have already
been validated by PhishTank and marked as malicious. All 10 URLs went offline
within one week of submission. This further strengthens our intuition since phishing
URLs are usually short lived [127, 158]. We note that PhishTank might not validate
some of the URLs we submitted. This is because, PhishTank’s validation process is
based on crowdsourcing and threats such as known bank fraud numbers on a website
might not be detected without the availability of tools such as Pindrop PRS [17].
5.6.2 Cross-channel threats
We found 173 unique mobile webpages in our dataset (including training and testing)
that hosted API prefixed known fraudulent phone numbers and were all tagged as
benign by Google Safe Browsing and VirusTotal. These numbers are associated with
a number of known financial fraud campaigns (against a number of different major
US-based institutions) according to our queries to the Pindrop Security PRS [17].
These results show that adversaries have begun to exploit such cross-channels (e.g.,
create a phishing webpage and include a fraud phone number) to attack mobile users.
Moreover, these experiments suggest that the false positive rate of kAYO might be
lower in reality, given that mechanisms fail to classify such pages as malicious. We
intend to conduct a further analysis of such attacks in our future work.
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5.6.3 Limitations and Future Work
The expected concerns of kAYO are similar to those of existing malicious website
detection tools using static analysis. Evasion by mimicking the features we consider
to be good indicators of a legitimate webpage can be used to defeat kAYO. However,
our comprehensive set of features makes it harder to evade kAYO, as seen from our
evaluation over a large dataset.
We statically crawled the top million websites of Alexa. Therefore, we did not
collect webpages that use JavaScript to detect and redirect to the mobile webpage. We
have also missed the mobile webpages represented by ways other than the ones used
by the top 1,000 websites. We do not make any claims about gathering all mobile
webpages from Alexa top one million. However, given the large set of webpages
collected, we believe that our dataset is a representative cross section. Finally, the
focus of this work was on mobile webpages designed for phones. We defer the analysis
of webpages built for tablets to future work.
kAYO’s features reflect current trends in mobile malicious webpages. The poten-
tial of bad activity in the mobile web could increase yet further over time. kAYO’s
feature set and model will need to be updated, according to the new threats faced
by the mobile web in the future. However, such updates are necessary in all static
techniques that aim to detect new threats.
In-depth dynamic analysis of webpages always provides more accurate results as
compared to static analysis techniques. According to our knowledge, there exist no
techniques for in-depth analysis of mobile webpages. However, the availability of
such tools will enable detection of threats such as malicious mobile binaries hosted on
websites. If mobile specific dynamic analysis techniques are developed, then kAYO
can be used as a pre-filter to reduce the number of webpages submitted for in-depth
analysis. Finally, kAYO can be integrated in existing tools such as Google Safe
Browsing.
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Using signature based blacklist approaches such as Google Safe Browsing might
improve the performance of kAYO’s browser extension. A blacklist can be synchro-
nized with kAYO’s extension server and enforced locally. Although such techniques
might reduce the average delay in page rendering, they will also preclude from pro-
tection against webpages that change dynamically defeating kAYO’s goal of real-time
evaluation. We plan to investigate performance enhancing designs that preserve real-
time evaluation in future work.
5.7 Conclusion
Mobile webpages are significantly different than their desktop counterparts in con-
tent, functionality and layout. Therefore, existing techniques using static features
of desktop webpages to detect malicious behavior do not work well for mobile spe-
cific pages. We designed and developed a fast and reliable static analysis technique
called kAYO that detects mobile malicious webpages. kAYO makes these detections
by measuring 44 mobile relevant features from webpages, out of which 11 are newly
identified mobile specific features. kAYO provides 90% accuracy in classification, and
detects a number of malicious mobile webpages in the wild that are not detected by
existing techniques such as Google Safe Browsing and VirusTotal. Finally, we build
a browser extension using kAYO that provides real-time feedback to users. We con-
clude that kAYO detects new mobile specific threats such as websites hosting known
fraud numbers and takes the first step towards identifying new security challenges in


































































































































































































































































































This thesis has identified and provided solutions for a number of security issues in
modern mobile browsers and webpages. This chapter discusses other open problems
in the area of mobile web security. First, we discuss direct extensions of the work
presented in this thesis. We then delve deeper into the changing paradigm of mobile
applications and propose a permission system for modern mobile web applications.
6.1 Advancing Dialogue on Mobile Browser Security
The work in this thesis demonstrates that mobile browsers have taken steps back in
terms of security as compared to desktop browsers. Chapter 4 experimentally illus-
trated that by and large, desktop browsers adhere to security standards set forth by
organizations such as the W3C. However, due to the unavailability of security guide-
lines specific to mobile browsers, mobile browser vendors have implemented inconsis-
tent and incomplete sets of SSL indicators available on their desktop counterparts.
This allows newer versions of mobile browsers to introduce previously non-existent
security issues. For example, the content-indicator proximity guideline (3b from Sec-
tion 4.2.2 in Chapter 4) was correctly followed by Firefox Mobile version 4 Beta 3.
However, the latest version of Firefox Mobile (as of June 2013) violates this guideline
by placing the padlock icon adjacent to the favicon of a webpage. We strongly believe
that such oversights can be avoided by defining and standardizing security guidelines
separately for mobile browsers. We plan to advance this dialogue with browser ven-
dors and standardizing institutions such as the W3C to bring strict guidelines for
browsers on mobile platforms.
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6.2 Tools for Malicious Mobile Webpage Detection
kAYO, the tool presented in Chapter 5 was designed to target existing threats on
mobile webpages. The biggest threat on mobile at present is phishing. However, the
mobile threat landscape can change in the future. Our tool did not consider threats
originating from obfuscated JavaScript since such threats are not yet prevalent in the
mobile space. Introducing static features extracted from deobfuscated JavaScript may
enable detecting mobile webpages injecting malicious JavaScript. However, introduc-
tion of such features will increase extraction time and must be balanced with goals
of real-time analysis. Chapter 5 also provided examples of detecting cross-channel
threats (e.g., create a phishing webpage and include a fraud phone number) present
on the mobile web by querying commercial phone reputation systems. We believe that
the mobile specific features related to fraudulent phone numbers are strong. How-
ever, the ability of attackers to acquire and advertise new fraudulent phone numbers
frequently, opens interesting performance problems for extending kAYO to develop
production quality tools. Finally, dynamic analysis techniques will be required to
detect webpages hosting malicious mobile binaries or launching drive by download
attacks. A combination of static and dynamic tools will present stronger defenses
against malicious mobile webpages.
6.3 Hybrid Mobile Applications
The design, structure and languages used to build native apps are usually more com-
plex as compared to web apps. Furthermore, native apps need to be built and modified
for each targeted mobile platform. Although mobile web apps provide cross-platform
functionality and are less complex than individual native apps, web apps do not yet
provide the same device functionality as that of native apps. Therefore, developers
often choose the path of hybrid apps. Hybrid apps, similar to native apps, run on
the device, and are written with web technologies (HTML5, CSS and JavaScript).
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Hybrid apps run inside a native container, and leverage the device’s browser engine
(not the real browser) to render the HTML and process the JavaScript locally. A web
view control is used (e.g. UIWebView on iOS and WebView on Android) to present
the HTML and JavaScript files in a full-screen format [99]. A web-to-native abstrac-
tion layer allows hybrid apps access to device capabilities (such as the accelerometer,
camera and local storage) that are not yet fully accessible in mobile web apps due to
the security boundary between the browser and the device APIs.
The dependance of hybrid apps on rendering engines used in existing mobile
browsers makes the display security research presented in this thesis applicable to
hybrid apps. Furthermore, hybrid apps currently do not provide ways of including
user interfaces to show SSL/TLS indicators. This design amplifies the phishing and
man-in-the-middle security problems discussed in Chapter 4.
Other future research problems include building privacy preserving contextual
permission systems for hybrid applications. Existing efforts in this area [190] take the
first step by building a manifest-based permission system that controls application
behavior using information flow control. Developer learning curve and user incentive
of understanding and defining a complex set of rich policies are some of the limitations
of existing works. We plan to delve deeper into this area. In particular, we plan to
investigate challenges in building unified permission systems that can be deployed for
web, native and hybrid apps on mobile platforms.
6.4 Unified Permission Systems for Mobile Web Apps
The family of HTML5 technologies is set to dramatically change the way in which
applications are designed for mobile devices. In particular, HTML5 provides direct
support for features including audio, video and geolocation information. While access
to these features has become a mainstay of “native” mobile apps, their inclusion in
this standard makes it possible for mobile web apps to provide many of the features
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currently implemented by their native counterparts. Direct support for these features
within mobile browsers will be transformative - whereas app makers have traditionally
had to invest significant effort to develop software across multiple platforms, HTML5
will allow developers to rely on the mobile browser to deliver a single codebase and a
unified user experience.
Mobile web browsers provide web apps with access to features including cookies,
Javascript, native code and Flash by default. This may lead to granting more than
necessary privileges to certain web apps. For example, a file-sharing app has access
to Flash by default but may not need it for proper functioning. Access to the default
browser features, potentially sensitive hardware (e.g., camera, microphone) and data
(e.g., GPS location, contact information) require protection when provided to web
apps. While support for HTML5 features is currently limited in mobile web apps,
desktop browsers providing such features typically prompt users on a per-use, per-
site basis. Mobile browsers too have adopted the same per-use, per-site permission
model and thus, suffer from several weaknesses. The current permission model for
mobile web apps does not provide a holistic view into the permissions required by
an app. Providing a single interface containing every permission that may be used
by an app allows both users and security experts a better opportunity to assess the
potential for malicious behavior by the app. As an example, the Android manifest
file and install-time warnings have successfully served as the basis of a wide-range
of malware-detection tools [86, 89, 107, 109, 111, 219, 220]. However, we note that
simply extracting the underlying platform’s (such as Android) model and mapping
web apps’ requests directly to the platform APIs [189] is not the best matching since
the structure of mobile web apps and native apps is different. We discuss several
differences in the factors contributing to the security of native apps and web apps.
We then argue that there is a need to define permissions for web apps separately
while maintaining as much overlap with native app permissions as possible for user
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learnability and reducing developer efforts. Finally, we argue that the dynamic nature
of mobile web apps necessitates a one-stop, easy-to-use permission model that can
allow users to access, modify or change the permissions granted to individual web
apps.
In this work, we present a proof of concept mechanism that addresses some of
these weaknesses and allows a subset of the Android application security model to
be easily expressed by remotely stored mobile web apps. Our goal is to provide ex-
pert users with a single interface that allows them to reason about the permissions
requested by mobile web apps similar to native apps. We start with a clean slate with
no permissions given to a web app by default. We argue that developers should be
required to declare permissions needed for a web app up front including the permis-
sions provided by default in current browsers. We then discuss a hybrid approach of
install-time and run-time permission authorization. We propose webifest, an XML file
similar to the manifest in Android framework that includes permission declarations
and can be used to allow mobile web apps to provide a concise declaration of the
resources they intend to use. We argue that encouraging mobile web app developers
to request fewer privileges will reduce the attack surface.
We are careful to note that our proposed solution is not a tacit endorsement of
the Android permission model in particular. Specifically, we are not arguing that
users fully pay attention to and understand all Android permissions. Should a better
model be found, we would still argue that all mobile applications should be evaluatable
through a security interface providing a complete view of potential behavior. Given its
extensibility and the success with which security experts have had using it to detect
malicious applications, we simply rely on the Android model to illustrate our point.
The remainder of this section provides a brief overview of our proposed architec-
ture and attempts to consider best practices for webifests.
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6.4.1 Background
We discuss factors affecting security of mobile web apps and compare the significance
of the same factors in the security of native apps. Building on this analysis, we discuss
the potential requirements in defining a permission model for mobile web apps.
6.4.1.1 Security Factors
Web apps provide cross-platform functionality, reduce developer effort and are easy
to update. However, these useful properties also make web apps difficult to secure.
We discuss several factors that contribute to the security of a web app and compare
the security consequences of each of the factors with those of native apps.
• Nature of permissions: Mobile web apps are more dynamic in nature because
web application providers can easily update the server side code. This dynamic
nature of web apps allows frequent changes to the permissions required for
execution. In comparison, it is difficult to silently make such changes to native
apps. Current web browsers also do not provide an interface to view all the
permissions required by a web app, unlike a native app.
• User effort: One of the primary protections for native apps is the attacker has
to lure the user into installing his app. It is much easier for an attacker to
lure a user into following a link to the attacker’s web app through email or
advertisements.
• Application markets: Native apps have some level of security through app mar-
kets (such as Apple and Google) that detect and remove malware. No such
mechanism exists for mobile web apps. Unless an online marketplace such as
the Chrome webstore [21] is formed for the mobile web, having a centralized
system for security analysis will not be possible. Moreover, if such a system is
developed, the dynamic nature of web apps will require continuous monitoring
124
to ensure security. Therefore, permission/capability detection during applica-
tion submission to the marketplace (e.g., the MSIL code analysis performed on
the Windows Phone Marketplace [52]) may not work well for mobile web apps.
• Identical app logic: It is not possible to ensure that all users of the same web app
receive an identical copy of the app unlike native apps. Therefore, web apps
can collect contextual data such as location more easily by asking different
permissions from different users. Due to all users possesing an identical copy of
a native app, user-rating systems in native application markets work well. These
ratings allow an average user to decide whether an app is good or bad. No such
protection exists for mobile web apps. Moreover, even if a third-party entity
such as Google independently discovers that a particular mobile web app is bad,
conveying this information to the future visitors of the web app is difficult.
• Default permissions: Android native apps are provided with no default permis-
sions. Web apps running in a browser are provided with permissions to access
several browser resources such as cookies (maintaining SOP), Flash, download
code to the device and run Javascript. Therefore, certain web apps may end up
with more privileges than required for their execution.
This is not a comprehensive list of all the factors associated with the security of
web and native apps. Other factors including security of the underlying operating
system [121], browser [57, 61], identity management using certificates also impact
mobile web app security. We have discussed the major factors that lead to differences
in the security of web and native apps.
6.4.1.2 Reflection
The comparison between native and web apps shows that additional security factors
need to be considered while designing permission systems for managing access re-
quests from mobile web apps. However, we also observe that following wide adoption
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of HTML5, both native and web apps on mobile platforms will request access to
similar user sensitive data and hardware. Therefore, we choose an approach that will
build upon the permission model for native apps and also provide additional features
required by mobile web apps.
We anticipate more requests to sensitive information from a mobile web app as
compared to a desktop web app. This is because a mobile device can provide con-
textual information such as location unlike desktop. Current desktop and mobile
browsers request run-time permissions for each feature requested by a web app. Desk-
top browsers such as Safari allow permissions to be stored for a specific time duration.
Other browsers such as Chrome desktop store the location permission given to a web-
site forever unless the user revokes it. However, current browsers do not allow a user
to view all the permissions used by a web app nor do they allow a user to easily
access, modify or revoke permissions.
The lack of a centralized authority such as an app market increases the proba-
bility of malicious web apps on the mobile platform. We argue that mobile web app
users should be able to easily revoke or selectively grant permissions without being
overwhelmed with warnings and thus suffering from warning fatigue.
6.4.2 Proposed Architecture
Goal: We want to provide expert users with a single interface that allows them to
reason about the permissions requested by mobile web apps similar to native apps.
We use the Android system as an example and argue that our central idea can be
applied to any mobile platform. Our proposed model [60] provides a user consent per-
mission system that gives full view of the required permissions, alerts the user when
a web app asks for dangerous permissions and also allows easy revocation of permis-
sions granted to individual web apps. We propose that a web app developer declares
all the required permissions to the browser using an XML file similar to the Manifest
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file in Android. In addition to specifying how to access a particular phone feature,
our model requires a web developer to define what he wishes to access in the form of
permission. For example, when a web developer uses the HTML5 Geolocation API
to access location, he should specify that the app would require the corresponding
permission ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION as defined in the Android framework.
Permission categorization: We propose a design where the set of permissions given
to a web application by default is null. Therefore, to access resources such as Flash, a
web developer will have to request permission. This behavior is significantly different
than the behavior of current browsers where a website rendered in the browser runs
with full browser-privileges and only requests user permission for access to features
such as location. We note that we always allow web apps access to the core platform
technologies defined in the browser technologies for HTML51 [128] and do not con-
sider them in the permission system. The motivation behind requiring developers to
explicitly request access to default browser features such as Flash is to encourage web
developers to request least privilege. However, the current per-use, per-site permis-
sion model would generate multiple warnings every time a user accesses a web app
if universally implemented features such as cookies have to be authorized. This may
lead to warning fatigue [35,103,187,195] and careless clickthrough.
We propose classifying permissions required by mobile web apps into two cate-
gories, normal and dangerous. We argue that a web app connected to the Internet
should not be allowed access to permissions corresponding to the signatureOrSystem
category [5] in the Android permission system. We also note that permissions in the
signature category [5] loosely correspond to the already implemented Same Origin
Policy in browsers. Out of the 75 normal or dangerous [145] permissions provided by
the Android framework, warnings are generated only for the dangerous permissions at
1The HTML5 core platform technologies are HTML, CSS, DOM and Javascript.
127
install-time. We argue that permissions required by web apps should also be treated
in a similar fashion. However, we note that the set of permissions for web apps falling
under the normal and dangerous categories would differ from the ones defined in the
Android framework and not all of the permissions for native apps on Android would
be relevant to web apps. For example, permissions such as BROADCAST_SMS and
BROADCAST_PACKAGE_REMOVED are not relevant for web apps. Addition-
ally, permissions such as INTERNET are crucial for a web app to work unless it is
working in offline mode. Therefore, we envision that the number of permissions that a
web app can request would be much lower than 75. Even if the browser produces run-
time warnings for time-of-use dangerous permissions, we envision that the number of
warnings would be limited.
We propose categorizing permissions based on whether a permission will provide
access to a user’s private data. Normal permissions would be the ones that are crucial
for the basic functionality of a web app. Examples of a normal permission are INTER-
NET, ACCESS_WEBSTORAGE etc. Examples of dangerous permissions would be
CAMERA, CALL_PHONE and RECORD_AUDIO. The normal permissions will be
granted by the browser without user consent while a warning will be generated when
a web app requests access to a dangerous permission.
Managing webifests: We propose a webifest, an XML file that can be used by web
developers to define all the permissions required by an app. The browser intercepts all







This webifest indicates that a web app from the domain .foo.com/ is requesting
permissions to access the Internet, cookies, camera and coarse location.
When a web app is loaded, the browser intercepts the webifest file only if it
is sent over an HTTPS connection. This is to avoid a man-in-the-middle attacker
changing the permissions requested by a website. The browser then searches existing
webifests for one that matches the domain of the new webifest. If an old webifest
does not exist, the browser parses the permissions in the webifest into the normal
and dangerous categories. The browser provides normal permissions to the web app
without user consent.
Instead of generating an install-time warning for all the dangerous permissions at
once similar to native apps, the browser then uses the run-time warning model. When
a web app requires a dangerous permission, the browser generates a warning and the
user has to approve the permission. Note that the browser does not store the approval
when user consents through a warning message. However, the browser provides an
interface for the user to selectively approve, store or revoke permissions by using an
interface users are already familiar with. We propose extending the interface provided
by browsers to access SSL certificate information to accommodate permissions. For
example, consider the Chrome mobile browser shown in Figure 17. Clicking on the
lock icon in Chrome mobile opens a dialogue that provides identity information of a
website. A Chrome mobile browser running our proposed model will also provide an
interface to store or revoke any of the permissions requested by a web app. When the
browser intercepts a webifest, it generates a list of permissions requested by the web
app. This list contains both the normal and dangerous permissions and the status
information of whether they have been approved. Once a user ‘stores’ a permission,
the browser retains the consent and the user is not asked to approve permissions on
subsequent visits to the same web app until the webifest is either revoked by the user








take pictures and videos
Your cookies
read cookies, write cookies
Network communication
full internet access
https://www.foo.com https://www.foo.comuser clickson the lock
Figure 17: User interface for permission management of mobile web apps. Left:
When a user clicks on the lock icon, the browser shows this interface to interact
with permissions and certificates. Right: The browser provides an interface to view
the status of the permissions requested by www.foo.com (domain in the address
bar). The user has not stored hardware controls permissions, whereas he has stored
the location, cookies and Internet access permissions. The cookie and Internet
permissions are normal permissions granted without user consent. The location and
hardware control permissions require explicit user consent. The user can easily
revoke a permission by unchecking the box next to it.
If a browser finds an older webifest for the same ‘domain’ as that of a newly
received webifest, the browser compares the values of the ‘Permissions and Domain’
attributes of the old and the new webifest. If the attributes are the same, the browser
simply ignores the new webifest. Otherwise, the browser generates a warning for the
user about a new webifest sent by the web app and displays the additional permissions
required. If the user authorizes the new webifest, the browser stores the new one and
discards the old copy. The browser still requires run-time approval of additional
permissions if any in the new webifest. If a user rejects the new webifest, the web app
continues to execute with the permissions in the old webifest until the user deletes
the webifest.
We note that our proposal is only for a website requesting permissions of the
underlying system. However, we observe that in addition to requesting necessary
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permissions, a website can also register web-intents with the browser using the web-
ifest file, similar to the manifest file in native apps.
Storing webifests: We propose that a webifest for each web app should be stored
using the HTML5 web storage [207]. Web storage supports ‘local storage’ which is
similar to persistent cookies. When a browser intercepts a webifest, the webifest file
is stored in the local storage allocated to the corresponding web app’s domain. The
browser also maintains the status of user approval on all the permissions. Javascript
is not allowed access to a webifest unlike other local storage objects.
Managing access requests: When a web app requests access to a phone feature
such as camera, the browser searches for the corresponding webifest. The browser
verifies whether the user has already granted the requested permission and if granted,
allows access without user intervention. If a webifest corresponding to a web app does
not exist or the user did not store consent to access the resource requested by the
web app, the browser does not allow access. If the permissions required by a web app
change, the web app is expected to send a new webifest with the modified permissions
in the HTTP response header.
Revocation: Revoking permissions from individual web apps is straightforward. To
revoke all the permissions, a user can simply delete the corresponding webifest from
the local storage of an app. Alternatively, the user’s browser is required to provide
an interface that allows the user to revoke all permissions using the in-browser inter-
face. A user can also selectively revoke permissions granted to individual web apps
using the in-browser interface shown in Figure 17. Current mobile browsers do not
provide an interface to clear access granted to individual websites. For example, in
the Android, Dolphin, Firefox Mobile and Opera Mini browsers, a user is required to
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revoke location access from all web apps at once. This browser behavior precludes a
user from revoking permissions granted to only one app if he has provided location
authorization to multiple web apps such as Yelp and Google maps. Existing browsers
will need modifications to support the proposed revocation procedure.
Conditions: We require that a browser supporting our initial model allow only
the domain displayed in the address bar of a web app (top-level domain) to save a
webifest. Secondly, a cross-domain element embedded in the web app is prohibited
from requesting access to hardware or data.
The reasons for allowing only the top-level domain of a web app to save a webifest
are the following: a web app may contain cross-domain embedded elements such as
advertisements in iframes. If a browser processes the webifest received in the HTTP
response header of such an element, there are two ways of obtaining user authorization
for the permissions requested by the embedded element. The browser can create
separate authorization warnings for the webifest received from each domain or the
browser can combine the permissions requested by all domains and create one warning
listing all the permissions and the respective domains. The former can overwhelm
the user and latter may provide a false sense of security. In the latter scenario, a
user may perceive the set of permissions listed in the long warning as the permissions
required by the top-level web app to execute. Prohibiting embedded elements from
saving webifests can address these issues. Therefore, a browser supporting our model
ignores webifests received from embedded elements in a web app.
The second condition of disallowing a cross-domain embedded element to request
access to hardware or data follows as a consequence of enforcing the first condition.
Since our model requires a webifest for every ‘domain’ to be able to access a resource,
if the browser ignores webifests received from embedded elements, the corresponding
domains are unable to access resources.
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Consider a web app at foo.com that saves a webifest in the browser when the
user visits the web app. Later, if an iframe from foo.com is embedded in another
web app accessed by the user, foo.com may try to access resources using the already
existing webifest. To avoid this, we require that the browser ignore access requests
made by cross-domain elements embedded in the top-level web app. Cross-domain
embedded elements only have access to the Internet. We explore the consequences of
these conditions in the discussion section.
Size and content: The expected memory overhead in integrating the proposed
model in current browsers would be insubstantial due to the small size of webifest
files.
Current web apps in mobile browsers do not require all the information provided in
the manifest file for native apps for their execution. In addition to declaring required
permissions, the manifest file in a native app describes application components such
as activities and broadcast receivers, declares permissions required by other apps in
order to access the app, the libraries that the app is linked against and the minimum
level of the Android API required by the app [20]. Most of this additional information
is required since a native app code resides on the device and is always available.
This is not true for web apps. For example, at present there is no mechanism that
enables a web app to handle an intent created by a native app or the Android system.
Whether such a mechanism is possible is an interesting project beyond the scope
of this work. Since the compelling need for current mobile web apps is effectively
handling permissions, we chose a lightweight manifest file.
6.4.3 Discussion
The goal of the proposed model is not necessarily to ensure that average users make
better security decisions, but instead to provide an interface for expert users to be
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able to assess the potential behavior of web apps. If a security expert is unable to
evaluate whether a web app is malicious, how can an average user be expected to
do the same? Nevertheless, we believe that maintaining significant overlap between
the permission models for native and web apps will help average users in making
informed security decisions. More importantly, security experts will be able to use
the proposed model to design tools similar to the malware detection tools for native
apps [86,89,107,109,111,219,220].
There are other efforts in the area of permission management for mobile web apps
such as Mozilla’s WebAPI [44]. However,WebAPI aims at providing consistent APIs
that will work in all web browsers and our motivation is designing a permission model
for mobile web apps that increases security and user control. Another related effort
in restricting the capabilities of web apps is the Content Security Policy (CSP) [194].
CSP enables the authors of a web app restrict from where the application can load re-
sources, whereas our proposal deals with restricting web apps’ access to the resources
on a user’s device. We discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed
model.
Pros: Although the normal permissions are granted without user intervention, their
use will enable developers to request least privilege. For example, the default Android
mobile and Opera Mini browsers support Flash and videos can be played easily in
the browser without user consent. However, a word to PDF converter web app may
not require Flash support. Requiring a web developer to ask for Flash permission
explicitly may reduce overprivileged web apps.
The simple update and revocation procedure for permissions granted to web apps
maintains the highly dynamic nature of web apps while allowing the user to revoke
permissions easily at will. For example, if a security expert wants to disable cookies for
a suspicious looking webpage, he can do so using the selective permission revocation
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model (desktop browsers have a similar functionality for cookies). The user will not
have to disable cookies across all webapps in this case, a provision currently available
in mobile web browsers. An average user on the other hand will not have to worry
about basic details of browser management due to the normal permissions being
provided by the browser without user consent.
Providing a similar user interface for permission management as that of the native
apps facilitates user learnability of the proposed web app permission model. More-
over, striving for maximum overlap between the permissions defined for native and
web apps may reduce the effort required to secure mobile apps (native and web) and
also reduce developer effort.
Cons: Prohibiting a cross-domain embedded element such as iframe from storing
webifests may break the logic of certain mobile web apps. However, we argue that
due to the constrained nature of mobile browsers, the complexity of mobile web apps is
lower. Therefore, the number of cross-domain embedded elements in mobile web apps
is expected to be minimal. We plan to investigate models allowing a cross-domain
embedded element to access resources. One such method would be to fall back to
the per-use, per-website model currently used in browsers. For example, if a non-
Google web app includes a Google map, the browser can generate an authorization
request for location access when a user wants to interact with the map and never
provide the interface to store the permission. Another potential technique would be
to fetch a webifest file when a user interacts with a cross-domain embedded element.
For example, if a non-Google web app includes a Google map, when a user wishes
to interact with the map by clicking on it, the browser fetches the webifest file for
the map and generates an authorization request to access the resources required by
Google maps, again with no storing facility.
Our model mandates explicit authorization for cookies and ignores webifests sent
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by embedded elements. This prevents third-party cookies in a webpage from tracking
a user across sessions. However, due to the universal usage of cookies, not allow-
ing cookies from other domain excluding the top-level domain in the address bar
may break several websites. Whether our model should allow cookies for embedded
elements is a topic for future work.
If a web application does not support webifests, a browser supporting webifests
can default to the current model of processing permissions based on per-use, per-
website. Although this approach maintains backward compatibility, it defeats the
purpose of our model. We assert that a browser should support the same permission
model for all the elements of a web app irrespective of their domain. If the top-level
web app supports webifests, the browser should use the webifest model for all the
elements. Otherwise, the browser should use the per-use, per-website model.
Adopting the proposed model will require collaborative efforts from web devel-
opers and browser vendors. Finally, storing the webifests file may be tricky since
implementing local storage features in a browser may pose information leakage or
information spoofing risks [207].
Security comparison with native apps: The notion of security in the proposed
model is similar to that of the permissions model for native apps. The model does not
protect users against malicious apps that can access sensitive data as a result of user
authorization. The level of security depends on a user’s knowledge about permissions
and the consequences of authorizing a web app to access sensitive information. More-
over, the model cannot provide the guarantee that a web application would request
the least privileges required for its execution. Researchers have previously shown that
native app developers attempt to obtain least privilege for their applications, but fall
short due to API documentation errors and lack of developer understanding [109]. We
expect the same effort from mobile web app developers. We also note that developers
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that change the permissions required by their app too often might turn away users.
Since the browser does not store a permission unless explicitly approved by the user
and also alerts the user when a new webifest is detected, multiple changes in webifests
may make the user suspicious or annoyed.
Research questions: Several research questions present themselves:
• Normal versus dangerous permissions, where to draw the line? We based our
initial proposal of categorization on whether a web app requests permissions to
access a user’s private data. Are there other possible categorization procedures
that can further reduce warnings?
• If the set of normal permissions is large, would it be problematic to grant normal
permissions without user consent?
• Would users and developers understand the new model easily?
• Can a mechanism other than local storage be used to maintain webifests? Using
local storage requires creating a special exception for preventing Javascript from
accessing webifests.
• Is warning fatigue possible for the proposed model? If the total number of
permissions available for web apps on a platform is limited, the probability of
warning fatigue would be curtailed.
Looking forward: Due to the availability of contextual information, we envision
widespread use of HTML5 to access user’s data on a mobile device. We have taken
the first step towards rethinking the permission system for mobile web apps. An
alternative permission model would be adopting the install-time all-or-nothing model
defined in Android native apps. Yet another client-side solution for the permission
management problem would be defining in-browser policies to limit a user’s access to
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potentially malicious websites and also block a website’s access to sensitive features
such as contact lists. Although this approach is possible for corporate phones, it would
be difficult to implement on personal phones of average users. Moreover, restricting
functionality can result in poor user experience. To avoid pushing security decisions to
the user, multiple security tools such as Zozzle [94] can be executed in the browser to
protect the user from malicious web apps. However, due to the hardware limitations
of mobile devices, this approach will entail severe performance penalties and will not
be practical. Finally, if a mobile web app store similar to the Chrome webstore is
available in the future, providing centralized security measures would be possible.
Our proposed model provides more control to the user, but also redirects more
security decisions to the user. Offloading security decisions to a user is not the best
idea. However, we imagine that in the absence of a proxy like setting or an umbrella




Mobile web browsers and webpages are significantly different than their desktop coun-
terparts. This dissertation demonstrated that several factors impact the security of
mobile web browsing including porting of desktop browser code to the mobile environ-
ment, usability changes made to browsers to adapt to the small screen, modifications
in the content and layout of mobile specific webpages, and rich functionality offered
by mobile webpages (or web apps). We then discussed several new pain-points in
securing mobile web browsing by identifying new vulnerabilities in modern mobile
browsers, experimentally demonstrating the differences between mobile and desktop
browsers in terms of security, illustrating the tension between usability and security
on the small screen platform, and showing the need for new mobile specific tools to
detect malicious webpages. Finally, this work provided potential solutions for the
new found vulnerabilities, successfully initiated a dialogue with browser vendors to
address these security issues, and built the first mobile-specific static tool to detect
malicious webpages in real-time.
This dissertation is just the first step towards securing mobile web browsing, an
activity performed by hundreds of millions of people everyday. Looking forward, in-
clusion of new features in mobile webpages, adoption of HTML5 and WebAPI suites
such as Boot2Gecko, existence of native, hybrid and web apps on the same mobile
platform, and further increase in the use of the mobile web for sensitive communica-
tions will lead to new challenges in securing mobile web browsing.
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